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It wasn’t ruthlessness that enabled an individual to survive – it was
an intangible quality, not particular to educated or sophisticated in-
dividuals. Anyone might have it. It is perhaps best described as an
overriding thirst – perhaps, too, a talent for life, and a faith in life.
(Extract from the narrative of a Holocaust survivor, cited in Des Pres
1976: 191–192)
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Glossary
adaki Low-lying hut, burrow or trench that can accommodate two to
three soldiers.
adwii Literally, enemy or terrorist; also used to mean rebel.
alup Makeshift houses temporarily put up for people to sleep in; during
the insurgency, they served as hiding places to escape abduction
and violation by the LRA.
boda-boda Motorcycle (or sometimes bicycle) taxis. They are one of the most
common and convenient means for travelling short distances. The
term is a corrupted version of border, referring to their use for
crossing borders.
cunna Courtship
dano adana Human being or human person; a term that emphasises someone’s
personhood.
dwog paco Return or bring back home; a term that is used to refer to returnees
or former combatants of the LRA.
escort Bodyguard
gamente A corruption of government; mony pa gamente are government
soldiers.
intelligence A job title used for spies and other people tasked with gathering
information.
kurut A corruption of recruit; used by the LRA to refer to new abductees.
lakwenna Messenger, envoy or apostle. Since Alice Auma, the leader of
the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), also referred to herself as Alice
Lakwena, LRA fighters sometimes go by that name.
luk A customary payment or fine paid by the man to the parents of
a woman he illicitly slept or eloped with; usually translated as
dowry or bridewealth.
mato oput ‘Drinking the root of oput ’; a ritual of reconciliation and a tradi-
tional justice mechanism often used to reintegrate former combat-
ants into their communities.
moo yaa Sheanut butter or oil; it is used to ritually anoint new combatants
in the LRA.
olum Literally, bush or grass; also used to refer to combatants of the
LRA.
panga Machete
radio call Communication with high frequency (HF) radios
sick bay The place where sick and wounded LRA combatants were treated.
standby Fighters on standby are not assigned to a specific mission, but
have to wait for orders to move and act.
ting-ting Tingo means to lift or carry. It is the name given to young combat-
ants (usually, but not necessarily girls) tasked with taking care of
young children, carrying goods and helping with household duties.
wang oo The fireplace; it has a special meaning in Acholi culture, since it
is the place where stories and tales are told, often with the aim of
educating young children.
Acronyms
AFRICOM United States African Command
CAR Central African Republic
CoH Cessation of Hostilities
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC Forces Arme´es de la Re´publique De´mocratique du Congo
FRONASA Front for National Salvation
GoSS Government of South Sudan
GoU Government of Uganda
GUSCO Gulu Support the Children Organisation
HSM Holy Spirit Movement
ICC International Criminal Court
ICD International Crimes Division
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
LRM Lord’s Resistance Movement
NGO non-governmental organisation
NMPDC National Memory and Peace Documentation Centre
NRA National Resistance Army
NRM National Resistance Movement
NUDC Northern Uganda Data Center
PRA Popular Resistance Army
RLP Refugee Law Project
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
STI sexually transmitted infection
SWAY Survey of War Affected Youth
UNCST Uganda National Council for Science and Technology
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs
UPC Uganda People’s Congress
UPDA Uganda People’s Democratic Army
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
UPDM Uganda People’s Democratic Movement
UPE Universal Primary Education
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the run-up to the Ugandan presidential elections in 1985, the incumbent pres-
ident, Milton Obote, gave a memorable interview to the BBC. Its editor, Robin
White, was set on talking about the political turmoil that preceded the elections.
In the course of the interview, Obote became increasingly enraged by White’s
questions about the challenges posed by, as he put it, “a handful of gunmen” and
Yoweri Museveni in particular (White and Obote 1985) – a line of questioning
which he saw as both irrelevant and insulting. The insurgency, he said, would
be over soon; “their numbers and areas are shrinking” (White and Obote 1985).
As it turned out, he was wrong both about the threat that Museveni posed to
his leadership and about the longevity of the armed conflict that evolved around
it. For more than 30 years now, Museveni has been the president of Uganda,
and the insurgency continued – or, rather, was renewed – with his coming into
power. Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been at war with
his government, operating in Uganda, (South) Sudan, Central African Republic
(CAR), and Congo. While the LRA’s fighting force has been severely diminished
since its peak in the late 1990s and the early 2000s,1 so far, all predictions that
it would disappear soon have proven to be premature. As the remnant of an
inactive Ugandan civil war, groups of LRA combatants still terrorise populations
in Congo and CAR through the abduction, looting, and killing of civilians. Many
armed groups disappear as quickly as they rise to power – because they lack ef-
fective command structures or committed fighters who stay when the going gets
tough, or they stumble over internal power struggles. Against this backdrop, the
persistence of the LRA is at least surprising.
1Back then, the LRA was presumed to consist of between 2’500 and 3’000 armed combatants
(see Cakaj 2017c, Lancaster et al. 2011: 28–29, Lancaster and Cakaj 2013: 55, LRA Crisis
Tracker 2015: 5).
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This thesis is an attempt to shed some light on the puzzle of the LRA’s
extraordinary resilience. Initially an armed militia that contested the takeover
by Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM), it quickly
turned against the civilian population it aimed to protect, and resorted to the
forced recruitment of minors into its ranks. Without much popular support from
the civilian populations they move in, with no access to natural resources, and
relying on mainly involuntary personnel, the LRA clearly lacks the ingredients
considered necessary to start an armed movement, let alone to sustain it over a
prolonged period of time.
What makes the continuous presence of the LRA possible? How can an orga-
nisation that has no popular support or financial means, one that relies on forced
recruitment, sustain itself for such a long time? How does it manage to create
compliance and even commitment among its mainly involuntary personnel? And
how do the combatants themselves cope with these demands of violent action?
What resources do they have to survive, get used to, and – for some – even come
to enjoy an everyday life that is structured by violence and the threat of it? How
does their violent lifestyle impact the way combatants think about themselves,
and vice versa? In short: How do combatants cope with the violent demands of
the LRA, and how does the LRA manage to enforce its violent demands? These
are the questions motivating this thesis.
Both sets of questions possess relevance beyond the case study presented here.
Through them, I intend to make a point in analysing the organisational struc-
tures and the intra- and interpersonal dynamics of civil war, thus devoting more
attention to the meso- and-micro level dynamics of armed conflict. Since the LRA
is a more extreme example in regards to individual motivation for participation
in civil war, it can be considered a suitable case to develop a theory of agency in
and commitment to collective action.2
2On the rationale of case selection in case study research, see Gerring (2007).
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1.2 Connecting the micro and meso level of
violent conflict: Concepts and theories
Departing from the case of the LRA, this thesis makes an argument about the
interplay of organisation and institutions on one side and interpersonal action
and identity on the other. In this chapter, I will detail the concepts central to my
thesis, and outline the contributions that my analysis will build on. The leading
questions are these: Who are the actors in armed conflict, and how do they come
to act as such?
Youth at war: Young combatants in contemporary conflicts
Most participants of war in Africa are young, as is the continent (see Honwana
2012); young combatants shape the face of conflict in Africa (see for instance
Honwana 2006, Richards 2008, Shepler 2005, Utas 2003, Wessells 2006). There
is a genuine nexus between being a combatant in contemporary conflicts and the
category of youth, which is why I will address the two social categories together.
In what follows, I will talk about ‘young combatants’ instead of ‘child sol-
diers’, a term I consider both less precise and fraught with difficult implications.3
For one thing, it evokes certain notions about childhood as defined and practised
in modern Western societies: a period free of concerns and obligations that is
defined by age instead of social place (see, for instance, Honwana 2006, Lee 2009,
Shepler 2005). The term ‘child soldier’ is misleading even if it is reserved for those
below the age of 18, since not all of these combatants are minors (as defined by
the Geneva Convention), and not all of them are soldiers (in the sense of fighters
on the battlefield). Moreover, it obscures the fact that most LRA combatants
were abducted as children, but lived in the LRA and returned from the bush as
adults (Oloya 2013: 20–22).
By combatants, I refer to participants in war and armed violence against state
and non-state actors. As such, combatants are part – members or personnel –
of both state- and non-state armed groups. They fulfil different organisational
tasks – most visibly, but not necessarily, fighting. Indeed, in many armed groups,
3I will also abstain from using the term ‘rebel’, a choice I will explain in Chapter 4.4 starting
on page 121.
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only a small number of combatants actively and regularly participate in fights,
while they and others fulfil support and social functions most of the time. Not
all combatants engage in warfare on the battlefield, but all of them are somehow
involved in the business of waging war – be it by taking care of wounded fight-
ers, spying on enemy forces, providing food and shelter for the group, handling
administrative tasks, recruiting new personnel or in some other way.
Here, two questions are of particular relevance: (1) How do young people
come to join armed groups? (2) How do they learn to act as members of armed
groups, i.e., to routinely perpetrate violence?
The youth of combatants is relevant because, for one thing, it relates to their
motives for participation in war and armed conflict. What drives (young) peo-
ple to join violent insurgencies? In civil war research, this question has been
discussed thoroughly. Among the numerous publications, the contributions of
Berdal and Malone (2000) and Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) on greed and grievance
have become a cornerstone of reference for the debate. In short, they identify two
distinct complexes of motives: Combatants fight either because they expect some
kind of material gain, or they do so to address perceived injustices that relate to
their collective identity (as a nation, tribe, social group, etc.). This juxtaposition
has been challenged and build on over the years. Armed groups have been cate-
gorised by the goals they pursue, and the incentives for participation they offer
to their members: material and non-material, individual and collective, long and
short term (Gates 2011, Tarrow 2007, Weinstein 2009).
In sum, participation in today’s civil wars has been discussed as a resource
for individual and collective empowerment. This aspect of empowerment through
waging war is not a new, but is certainly a genuine aspect of the wars of the
present, and it is inextricably linked to the youth of its protagonists. For most of
them, being young is an experience marked by precariousness and exclusion, of
being denied access to resources of empowerment, such as jobs and land, which
would allow them to build independent lives. A large portion of African youth
are caught in a state of limbo between childhood and adulthood, a state which
Alcinda Honwana (2008b, 2012) has described as “waithood”. While they are
no longer children in need of care, they lack the necessary means to become
people capable of making decisions concerning their own lives. Their age may
indicate that they are adults, but they are not socially recognised as such, be-
cause their status depends on the social roles they assume rather than on their
4
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biological age (Honwana 2008a: 144). Their collective waithood is both a source
of grievances (see for instance Philipps 2013) and a resource for their mobilisa-
tion as participants in armed conflict (see for instance Richards 2008). In this
situation, becoming a combatant might turn out to be an opportunity to survive,
and even thrive, in an environment that provides only limited life chances both
on and off the battlefield (see Vigh 2006, Vlassenroot and van Acker 2001). For
many, fighting becomes a life and career choice that not only secures the means
for survival, but allows young people to gain social recognition after all. In this
sense, war might become an alternative route for young people’s transition into
adulthood (Utas 2003: 85–117). By engaging in subcultural spaces, they find
avenues to participation in conventional society (Richards 2008, Vlassenroot and
van Acker 2001).
In sum, the literature on civil wars provides us with a number of clues why
young people in particular come to join armed groups, i.e., how they become par-
ticipants in armed conflict. But how do they manage to be participants in armed
conflict? How do they learn to perpetrate violence against armed and unarmed
others, and how do they adjust to their violent roles? Both the violent organi-
sation’s and the individual combatants’ resources are crucial to answering these
questions.
Armed groups and organisation(s) of violence
Typically, combatants act violently as part – members, prisoners or staff – of
armed groups. By ‘armed groups’, I refer to collective actors that use violence
or its credible threat to realise their goals. Armed groups challenge the state’s
monopoly of power, either by directly opposing or fighting it, or by questioning its
legitimacy or reach.4 They create and enforce competing social and legal orders,
and reserve the right to control territory, people, or resources. Often, they pro-
vide services and functions that replace or fill in for their public equivalents. As
such, the term encompasses a wide array of collective actors – including, but not
limited to, guerrillas, paramilitaries, terrorist groups, and civil defence militias.
Armed groups are not only collective actors, but organisations. As such, they
4This definition is challenged by the existence of terrorist assassins who act on their own.
However, they often perpetrate their attacks with reference to one of these groups even without
formal membership status, and typically understand themselves as part and representatives of
institutionalised or imagined communities (see for instance Berntzen and Sandberg 2014).
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are not identical with the combatants that are part of it. Not only do they have
members, but they are characterised by a set of roles, rules, and hierarchies, and
command means to monitor and sanction their members to make them comply
with their rules (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, Luhmann 1995). Regularly, armed
groups come into being in order to realise particular goals. Typically, these goals
are political (access to power) or economic (access to resources) in nature. While
this characterisation clearly posits them as task-oriented groups, they also fulfil
a number of socio-emotional functions for their members.5 For instance, to un-
derstand the Sicilian Cosa Nostra primarily as a criminal business organisation
misses its character as a social institution that provides more than just opportu-
nities to enrich its members. In the same vein, armed groups in settings of civil
war provide more, and often more important, benefits than access to material
goods. Among other things, they may provide their members with a vocation
(Vinci 2007), a sense of belonging to a community (Vermeij 2014), and feelings
of empowerment and self-worth (Baaz and Stern 2013, Peters and Richards 1998,
West 2000). Because armed groups fulfil these and other functions for their mem-
bers, compliance with orders and violent actions in particular do not necessarily
depend on the individuals being convinced of the legitimacy of the organisation’s
goals or the suitability of the chosen means. That is, combatants may comply
even where they question the reasonableness of the assignments given to them.
In his study of the Reserve Battalion 101 that was tasked with exterminating
the Polish Jews, Browning (1992) showed that it was not, or at least not primar-
ily, ideological conviction or successful indoctrination or “obedience to authority”
(Milgram 1969) that motivated its members to kill on a large scale (Browning
1992: 159–189). In fact, most of them were repulsed by the mass killings they
were expected to perform, at least initially. But refusing participation meant
leaving the ‘dirty work’ to their comrades, an asocial act that was all the more
isolating in an environment where their comrades were their only peer group
(Browning 1992: 184–185). Similarly, in their study on cohesion and disintegra-
tion in the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz (1948) found that compliance with
orders was, for the most part, motivated by loyalty towards one’s immediate pri-
mary group (i.e., one’s squad or section). Even in the face of defeat, desertion
rates were unusually low, and rose or fell as a function of the social integrity of
one’s primary group. Desertion rates were higher for those individual’s who failed
5The differentiation between socio-emotional and task-oriented groups goes back to Anderson
(1975).
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to integrate into the group, and low even among political dissidents, who justified
their failure to desert with feelings of solidarity and responsibility towards the
group (Shils and Janowitz 1948: 285–286). Clearly, combatants’ actions are influ-
enced not only by their attitudes towards their assigned tasks, but also by their
relationship with the group and its members. Where armed groups provide their
members with a sense of belonging, this not only motivates their members to act
violently. Moreover, the common perpetration of violence works as a source of co-
hesion (Shils and Janowitz 1948: 287) and identification with the group (Littman
and Paluck 2015). That is, acting violently itself helps to create and confirm a
group identity and individual feelings of being part of that group. Armed groups
are acutely aware of the meaning of these identification processes, and will make
use of institutions that encourage the creation of new group identities (Drury and
Reicher 2000), or mobilise pre-existing social identities. In her study of popular
participation in the Rwandan genocide, Fujii (2008) showed how ties of kin and
friendship were crucial for the recruitment of young males into the killing groups,
and helped hesitant members to participate in collective acts of lethal violence.
But armed groups offer more then a sense of belonging to their members. By
acting as employers, armed groups provide combatants with a vocation. Being a
combatant, or fighter, offers young males (and, although under different terms,
females; see Baaz and Verweijen 2013, Coulter 2009, Utas 2005, West 2000) a
more or less socially accepted occupation. It allows them to provide for them-
selves and for their families. By becoming armed actors, young people often leave
behind a life where they sit around doing nothing, or waiting for whatever petty
job might come their way. At the same time, soldiering as a profession is not
just a job, i.e., a way to acquire resources and to engage in an accepted line of
work. It is also an important resource for people’s identity claims. By participat-
ing in combat, people engage in an activity that can be endowed with meaning,
and that as a collective enterprise transcends their personal contribution. In her
study of insurgent collective action in civil war in El Salvador, Elisabeth Jean
Wood (2003) shows how both pleasure in agency as a collective experience, “this
redrawing of boundaries and reshaping of history by subordinate people” (Wood
2003: 235), and the value attributed to participation as such were crucial for
ordinary people’s involvement in insurgent collective action, even where the risks
clearly outweighed any expectations of personal gain. By becoming combatants,
young people find a place where they don’t just belong to a group, but are seen as
persons with valuable and valued skills. The emotional gratification of becoming
a “committed insider” (Hundeide 2003), of being proficient in and good at some-
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thing, is a powerful resource for building a positive identity. For some, doing a
good job might become more important than doing the right thing – that is, the
proper execution of a task might outweigh its moral implications. By focusing on
the technical aspects of a task, a person’s moral questions may disappear behind
its orderly and routine completion (Kelman 1973: 46–48).
For many, being a soldier is not only a profession, but a calling, and a civic
duty. The military ethos that depicts soldiering as the ‘honourable profession’
of ‘courageous men’ that adhere to a strict code of conduct contributes to such
an understanding. As such, taking up arms allows combatants to affirm ideas
of masculinity (Baaz and Stern 2009, Stewart 2017, Theidon 2009), and to con-
struct and reclaim for themselves an “identity of toughness” (Crowther et al.
2013). Participation in armed conflict can thereby become a source of self-worth
and empowerment. Combatants come to perceive themselves as potent, as ‘being
somebody’ who can ‘make things happen’ (see also Greiner 2010). Being a sol-
dier may allow them to move up from a position of powerlessness to a position of
efficacy.
Armed groups are at the same time collective actors and organisations. As
collective actors, they reveal dynamics that go beyond organisational and rational
planning. Collective identities and combatants’ self-categorisation as members or
part of a group with a shared identity may arise situationally (Drury and Reicher
2000, Reicher 1984). Situations of violence are suggested to be particularly prone
to unforeseen and unplanned turns and dynamics because they are emotionally
intense experiences. These dynamics will be partly mitigated or managed through
the armed groups themselves in their capacity as organisations (see Ha¨rtel and
Schwalb 2016, Hoover Green 2011). As organisations, armed groups structure
collective action through institutions. Following Berger and Luckmann (2007), I
use the term ‘institution’ in a broad sense, as the sum of rules, roles, expectations
and norms that in turn influence individual and collective action. As such, they
are important elements of violent organisations and for the organisation of vio-
lence. They provide combatants with guidelines, blueprints or scripts on how to
act (Klatetzki 2015, Schnell 2008), and frame actions as legitimate, expectable,
or desirable. As such, they allow combatants to act in the first place. Armed
groups’ actions and identities are both structured by institutions and situation-
ally contingent, subject to unforeseen and unplanned for dynamics.
Armed groups like the LRA that recruit and retain their personnel through
8
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the use and the threat of force can also be understood as ‘total institutions’ in
the sense that Goffman (1990) introduced the concept. In this understanding,
the total character of organisations lies in their isolation from other social groups
and the wider society, an isolation which is both created by the organisation and
upheld through visible (like spatial distance and guards supervising the settle-
ments) and invisible (deterrents to leave such as violent threats) barriers. Total
institutions monitor and control every aspect of their members’ lives, and en-
force this claim to power through the use of sanctions. They organise and often
meticulously plan all of the group’s activities as collective tasks, and assign their
personnel or inmates to different positions and roles within the social universe
they so create. All activities are meant to contribute to a single overall rationale
or goal defined by the organisation’s high command. The strict organisation of
everyday life, and the proximity and dependence between the individuals affected
by it, allows total institutions to make do with a relatively small number of peo-
ple entrusted with supervisory tasks. People enter total institutions as persons
with different roles, affiliations, and identities – all of which will be denied to
them upon their entry into the organisation. Total institutions like the LRA that
are at the same time violent organisations challenge their members to retain or
renegotiate their sense of self under the conditions of forced violence.
Agency and identity in armed action
Evidently, violent organisations and total institutions in particular command a
number of means to commit combatants to violence. But what resources do the
combatants themselves mobilise in order to learn to live with war and violence?
How do they position themselves in relation to the organisation’s agenda of turn-
ing them into capable, committed and loyal fighters? In this thesis, I will try to
find answers by focusing on two aspects: namely, combatants’ agency and identity.
In the literature, the discussion about combatants’ agency, understood as their
capacity to act, has focused on their youth and their decision to join and act as
members of armed groups. How much do young combatants know about the
repercussions of their actions, and how firmly are they grounded in moral imper-
atives that prohibit and sanction the use of violence? Do young combatants fully
understand the consequences of their violent actions? How much agency does a
young person, a child or adolescent have to make informed decisions? As one
interviewee put it: “Can a ten years old child be a combatant or soldier? Can
they make such a profound decision in life?” (Faith, ll. 912–915).
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These discussions are closely connected to how young combatants are ad-
dressed as actors in armed conflict, especially under the conditions of forced re-
cruitment. Are they victims, perpetrators, both or neither of these things? In the
civil war literature, young combatants have almost unequivocally been discussed
as actors who share attributes of both characterisations. They are perpetrators
and victims at the same time, as violence happens through them as much as it
happens to them – sometimes, but not always, simultaneously. So the question is
not if young combatants are one or the other, but how these two categories can
be thought of and brought together, and what they mean when applied to young
combatants and situations of limited choice. Erin Baines (2009) has suggested
to address these actors as “complex political perpetrators”,6 which she defines
as “youth who occupy extremely marginal spaces in settings of chronic crisis,
and who use violence as an expression of political agency” (Baines 2009: 163).
This definition points to the fact that young people’s recruitment into armed
groups is often not one of the two things – either a free choice or a result of
force – but a decision located somewhere between the two (see also Brett and
Specht 2004: 105–119). For instance, the lack of means to provide for oneself and
one’s family may ‘force’ combatants to enrol and become engaged in warfare as
a means to maximise their chances of survival. Moreover, peer and community
pressures might push young people to join armed groups to defend civilian com-
munities against real or imagined threats (Castelein 2008, Fujii 2008, Koos 2014).
In this thesis, I will put aside the concepts of victim and perpetrator. As
I see it, focusing on these concepts misses, or sidelines, the important point of
discussing combatants’ agency. This is because perpetrator and victim are legal
categories; as such, they concern, respectively, a person’s accountability and cul-
pability, or their right to seek retribution. As I see it, the important question
is not whether young combatants are legally responsible for what they did, or if
and how they can seek retribution for what has been done to them. Although
these are certainly important questions, they are not my questions. Here I am
only interested in the agency actors exercise both by making claims of personal
agency and by withdrawing themselves from it. The categories of victim and per-
petrator are only relevant insofar as they are used by the research participants
themselves, that is, as self-identifications or discourses that shape and frame how
6A term she develops in reference to the concept of “complex political victims” (Bouris
2007), and that challenges the notion of victimhood as the position of being a passive and
powerless bystander of one’s own life.
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former combatants think and talk about themselves, and how they feel seen and
talked about by others. This approach of putting the agency of young combatants
front and centre has been chosen before, most notably, in the works of Alcinda
Honwana (2000, 2006) and Mats Utas (2003, 2005). Both admit to the limita-
tions in young combatants’ agency, but emphasise and focus on the ways in which
they encounter and make use of their however limited scopes for decision-making.
Part of combatants agency concerns not only their (physical) actions, but also
their agency to make and uphold identity claims. As members of armed groups,
combatants are challenged to build positive identities while assuming roles and
responsibilities that are imagined as being at odds with such identities.7 Violence
is not only bound to a range of emotions, such as feelings of potency (Greiner
2010, von Trotha 2011), excitement (Durkheim 1984), fear (Collins 2009, Gross-
man 2009), rage (Scheff and Retzinger 1991), and shame and guilt (Gilligan 2000,
2003). As transgressive action that violates another person’s physical integrity,
violence is always in need for justification. Violent groups provide the framework
for such positive identity claims as gang members (Decker 1996, Hagedorn 1998,
Short 1996), soldiers (Baaz and Stern 2013), or hooligans (Buford 1991). These
group identities allow people to identify with, and distance themselves from, their
violent performances, either by reframing violence as necessary, heroic or inno-
cent, or by dissociating their violent role identity from their personal identity.
Combatants negotiate their roles and exercise agency as they physically act and
situate themselves as violent actors and persons through both their actions and
their narratives.
7This is not only true for violent actors, but also for other stigmatised identities – for
instance, being a housewife (Bu¨chele 2017), doing a ‘dirty job’ (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999),
being a blue-collar worker (Sennett and Cobb 1972), a thief (Cromwell and Thurman 2003),
or a hitman (Levi 1981), or participating in the street (Copes et al. 2008) or night economy
(Preiser 2016).
11
1.3 Research questions
Through this thesis, I intend to make an argument on the interplay of the meso
and micro levels in violent action – that is, of organisations and institutions on
one side and individual agency and identity on the other. I argue that this anal-
ysis will provide some new insights not only into the organisation of violence in
the LRA, but into the organisation of violent collective action more generally.
As I see it, the LRA is a suitable candidate for showing how the two dimensions
are linked, because of both its longevity and its reliance on forced recruitment.
For one thing, since the overwhelming majority of combatants didn’t join the
LRA on their own volition, their commitment to the armed group is neither a
given nor an effect of self-selection. While combatants’ motives for joining may
be less relevant in the case of the LRA, the question of how the organisation
manages to commit its involuntary personnel to its agenda, and how it prevents
its combatants from doing a poor job or leaving the organisation, remains all the
more relevant.8 Secondly, the extraordinary resilience of the LRA points to the
importance of organisational (in contrast to environmental) dynamics. Looking
at the case of the LRA eliminates, or at least reduces, some of the background
noise that makes it hard to identify the mechanisms at work.
By looking at the internal dynamics in the LRA, I will try to address two
sets of questions. On the meso level, I will look at armed groups as organisations
of violence. I ask: How does the LRA structure itself to realise its goals? How
do its institutions influence its use of violence? How does it manage to commit
its personnel to its goals and mode of operation? On the micro-level, I aim to
provide some insights into the social psychology of armed action by asking: How
do these directives translate into individual action? How do institutions structure
individual and collective behaviour? How do individual actors cope with these
violent demands? What kind of resources do they have to adapt to their roles
in the LRA, to even learn to find a place where they feel at ease? How do they
position themselves? What does the perpetration of violence mean for their sense
of self and identity?
8Gates and Nord˚as (2010) and Gates (2011) have made a strong case to look more closely at
the differences between circumstances and incentives in recruitment on one side and retention
on the other. Rather than seeing retention as “a mere continuation of recruitment” (Gates 2011:
39), researchers should understand motives for retention as separate, not least because deciding
to join or leave an armed group requires a different kind of momentum than the (non-)decision
to stay.
1.4 Outline
In Chapter 1, I have detailed my research questions, and provided an overview
of the key concepts and theoretical contributions I draw on in this thesis. In
Chapter 2, I describe the methodological approach to both the data collection
during my field research and the data analysis. I highlight some of the challenges
of doing research with former combatants in a post-conflict society, and detail my
experiences and possible shortcomings of the collected data. Chapter 3 gives a
short overview of the armed group’s history and the political prequel to its emer-
gence. As such, it is a highly selective history that focuses on aspects related to
the identity conflicts and ethnic politics that, as I argue, lie at the heart of the
conflict. I show how people’s memories of what happened shape their percep-
tions of the conflict up to today. These perceptions both precede armed action
and create the environment in which the LRA operates. As such, they offer an
explanation for the LRA’s resilience and its use of violence on the macro level.
In Chapter 4, I analyse and discuss the data I collected to answer my research
questions. Each of this chapter’s seven subsections addresses a particular aspect
of what it meant for the research participants to become, and to be, combatants
in the LRA. Chapter 4.1 deals with the initiation and socialisation of new com-
batants into the organisation. I show how becoming a member of the LRA is not
experienced as a singular event, but as a process of social becoming. This process
is performed through a number of status passages in which abductees are asked
to commit themselves to the organisation, thereby becoming full members. In
Chapter 4.2, I detail which resources combatants have and use to adjust to their
violent lives. I show how everyday life is both an organisational and an individual
accomplishment, in which institutions and routines, but also narrative and prac-
tical efforts to create some kind of normalcy, play a central role for combatants’
immersion in ‘bush life’. Chapter 4.3 addresses combatants’ agency in the process
of becoming and acting as part of the LRA. I show how combatants’ narratives
are testimonies not only of forced obedience, but of their active engagement with
organisational demands through acts of both hidden resistance and active com-
pliance. Through these actions, they become invested; they commit themselves;
they find spaces to escape within and, thereby, to stay. Chapter 4.4 deals with
the question of how combatants manage to lead violent lives on a psychological
level: how they make sense of the violence they commit, witness and experience,
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and how they understand themselves as perpetrators, bystanders and victims of
violence. I show that their narratives, the stories they tell themselves about them-
selves, are a vital means to resolve the conflict between individual claims to a
moral identity and the organisation’s violent demands. Chapter 4.5 is devoted to
the roles and living realities of female combatants in the military and domestic
sphere. I show that women performed a number of often conflicting roles on and
off the battlefield that became vital for the constitution of everyday life in the
LRA. More importantly, women were not passive bystanders to this dynamic,
but instead actively negotiated their roles through both their actions and their
narratives. Chapter 4.6 addresses the question of how combatants relate to the
political struggle of the LRA. It shows how many combatants, though they didn’t
choose to live in and work for the LRA, attribute some kind of legitimacy to its
fight. I argue that these legitimacy beliefs are crucial to understanding combat-
ants’ motivation to stay in or leave the bush. Chapter 4.7 looks at the decisions
and challenges involved in returning from captivity and in readjusting to civilian
life. I argue that the experience of return isn’t limited to combatants’ escape, but
continues in their struggles to become civilians again and to make sense of their
violent past.
I see the analytical sections as pieces of a puzzle that, together, provide a
quite powerful image of what it means to become, and to be, a combatant by
chance. The fifth and final chapter will summarise the results of the thesis and
provide an assessment of their relevance for the challenges involved in disarming
and reintegrating former combatants and in reconstructing society after mass vi-
olence.
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Methodology
2.1 The stories we tell ourselves about ourselves:1
Narrative criminology and the challenge of
analysing combatants’ stories
Narrative criminology as research paradigm
This thesis is an attempt to find answers to the following questions: How do com-
batants in the LRA understand not only the LRA’s fight, but their engagement
in it? How do they make sense of their roles as violent actors? What does the
organisation of the LRA contribute to these processes of sense-making?
Before I dive into the analysis, a more basic question needs to be addressed:
What can interviews with former combatants contribute to answering these ques-
tions? Which insights can be gained from the self-stories of the violent actors
themselves? This question – what kind of data does one expect to emerge from
the interviews? – is relevant not only for the study of violent actors, but for
interview-based research more generally.
In her study of violent offenders, Lois Presser (2008) presents a helpful dis-
tinction between three epistemological approaches. She argues that researchers
can treat narratives (1) as records, (2) as interpretations, and (3) as shapers of
experience.
If we treat narratives as records, we make a statement about the epistemo-
1I owe the idea for this title to Ada Nissen, who used it in a presentation of her PhD project
on Norwegian peace diplomacy. It goes back to an argument Clifford Geertz (1973: 448) made
in his Notes on the Balinese Cockfight : “Its [the cockfight’s] function, if you want to call it
that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves
about themselves.”
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logical status of narratives, affirming that they tell us something about facts (for
instance, deviant behaviour) in the world. It implies thinking about narratives
as being true or false. This approach depends on research participants telling us
the truth, and, more importantly, on the premise that there is something like the
truth. Thus, interviews are a means to gather information about certain events –
for instance, massacres: When did it happen? How did it start? What happened
to whom? What kinds of weapons were used? – and so on. This approach is well
grounded in a positivist research tradition.
In contrast, the understanding of narrative as interpretations departs from a
constructivist stance. Narratives are not about objective facts, but about how
actors perceive and interpret things in the world, and what circumstances they
understand as causing chains of events to unfold. Why did the massacre happen?
Who started the hostile actions that led to it? In this understanding, interviews
serve as a means to access the actors’ interpretations of events and actions.
To see narratives as shapers of experience differs from these approaches in an
important respect. In this understanding, experiences are not just ‘there’, waiting
to be narrated and interpreted by the actors. They are accessible only through
their narrative processing. In this sense, the experience is a genuine product of
its narration; experience and narration create each other. This is how narrative
criminology looks at the accounts of delinquent or violent actors, and how I will
look at large parts of the accounts of my interviewees. To choose this approach
means to understand social and deviant action in particular as the result or val-
idation of a story the actors tell themselves – and others – about themselves.
These narratives are self-stories they want not only themselves but also others to
believe in, to make authentic identity claims.2
Positioning narrative criminology in an old debate, it is situated right between
agency (which stories do I want to tell?) and structure (which narrative means
do I have to do that?). It posits that our narrative is a joint product of language
that is activated and language that is available (Sandberg 2010: 455).
2Here and in line with the premises of narrative criminology, ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ are used
interchangeably, and always encompass accounts that make claims to an individual or group
identity (Presser 2013).
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Narrative identity: Storytelling as negotiation of identity
What all narratives have in common is that they make claims to an individual or
collective identity (Presser 2013). As such, identity, or more precisely narrative
identity, is a central concept for the study of narratives. What does ‘narrative
identity’ mean? Importantly, it means to see narratives as sites for the negotia-
tion of identities. In this understanding, identities do not precede their narrative
imagining, but come into being as people construct them through their narra-
tives: “the story answers to the man” (Ricoeur 1991: 30). Identities only ‘exist’
insofar as people build them through their self-stories.
A person’s story is not the same as the story of their life, i.e. a complete
history of everything that has happened to that person. It “draws selectively
upon lived experience. [...] It must start and end somewhere; it must emphasize
some events and not others to make a point” (Presser 2004: 179). When con-
structing a narrative, we not only structure experience, but give meaning to the
incidents involved. In order to create a coherent story, one that ‘adds up’, we will
leave out parts and add or emphasise others, thereby weighting their importance
to the story. These adjustments are as inevitable and subconscious as they are
deliberate and strategic. The resulting narrative says as much about the events
as it says about us, about who we want to be and what we (want to) believe
to be true. We tell these stories not only for our own sake, but also to and for
others. In this sense, self-stories always emerge against the background of a more
or less intimate public sphere. These accounts affirm, build and negotiate iden-
tity claims beyond the story told. This position relies on an understanding of
identity as dynamic, in flux, and provisional (Presser 2008: 3). Our stories are
open to new turns and points, because we don’t know where they will lead us,
or where we are going to lead them: “We are in the middle of our stories and
cannot be sure how they will end; we are constantly having to revise the plot as
new events are added to our lives” (Presser 2008: 4). Our stories change as new
events become part of them, and as we become, or try to become, someone else.
Not only does every situation offer different alternatives for acting, but the same
is true for how we tell our stories and, thereby, understand ourselves.
Narrative criminology gives due attention to the fact that storytelling is per-
formative action, an “enactment of identity” (Presser 2008: 133). In sharing and
structuring their stories, in choosing what to tell and how, research participants
ask researchers to buy into their version of the events, to accept their identity
claims, and to adopt their evaluations of the (il)legitimate action, politics, and
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constraints and freedoms involved. In this sense, research interviews are sites for
the negotiation of identities (Presser 2004). They are a vital display of the agency
interviewees have and use, and question the image of an all-powerful interviewer
at the steering wheel and merely responsive interviewees sitting in the back seat
of the research process.
As all interview data results from an interaction between researcher and re-
search participant, the stories that emerge are negotiations “between my infor-
mants and their memories, but ultimately between my informants and myself,
between them as narrators and myself as listener and producer of text and analy-
sis” (Coulter 2009: 20). As such, all qualitative research data is a joint product of
the interaction between the two (or more) parties involved. As a consequence, the
researchers’ identities, interactions and approaches will critically influence what
the resulting data looks like.
Identity, narration, and action
To just say “Well I’m a criminal,” that’s not a very positive, assertive
thing to say about yourself. You know, you start believin’ that stuff,
and then the next thing you know you’re doin’ what criminals do.
(Tim, interviewed for and cited in Presser 2008: 110; emphasis in
original)
Why do interviewees put so much effort into creating a story they want others
to believe in? After all, their relationship with the researcher is typically rather
casual. Why are they invested in their stories? First of all, interviewees tell their
stories not just, or even primarily, for the researcher; they tell them for them-
selves. The research participants’ commitment to their stories is what separates
an authentic narrative from a made-up tale. They themselves believe, or want to
believe, in the stories they tell. But why is that? Narrative criminologists argue
that these narratives are a crucial means both to make sense of the world and to
make sense of oneself. We can only understand ourselves, who we are, through
our stories.
These different narrative goals – making sense of the world and making sense
of oneself – are inextricably linked, because they provide a guide to action. The
kind of person I am, or claim to be, by means of my narrative, frames and limits
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possible action. For instance, if I like to think of myself as an honest person, I
will have trouble telling an outright lie. Some actions will become unthinkable,
others at least questionable. But the opposite is also true: Our stories become
a means to (re-)evaluate our actions so that they become compatible with the
identity claims we make. If telling a lie is in conflict with seeing myself as an
honest person, my narrative can become a means to convince myself that, for
whatever reason, this lie doesn’t really count.3 In this sense, narratives are also
performances that try to create coherence between identity claims and social ac-
tion (Linde 1993). In many situations, our values, morals, and character traits do
not present us with a straight-forward answer on how to handle a given situation.
Narratives help to bridge this gap between identity and action.
The narrative looks both backward, trying to understand the self through past
action, and forward, guiding future interpretations and actions. Narrative crim-
inology makes an argument on the power of narratives to motivate and premed-
itate actions: “Narrative criminology is challenged to show that story precedes
action: people talk themselves into engaging in some behaviour even as they also
talk after doing it” (Presser 2012: 9). Thus, narratives can become antecedents
to crime (Presser 2009: 178), convincing or allowing people to engage in violent
action, because they see their acts as just, legitimate, or negligible. By giving
legitimacy to deviant acts, narratives might help actors adjust to a violent iden-
tity, or to distance themselves from these actions even while committing them
(for instance, by appealing to higher authorities, or by claiming a momentary
lapse in judgement: “The devil made me do it” (Cromwell and Thurman 2003)).
Of course, individual and collective violence in civil wars is different in many
regards from violence in civilian settings. Shoplifting and even armed robbery
is not the same as looting and raiding civilian settlements. Domestic violence
is different from institutionalised sexual abuse. This is even more true in the
context of the LRA, where most combatants perpetrated violence not through
their own initiative and convictions, but as a result of (the credible threat of)
force. Still, even forced combatants have to make sense of their actions and find
ways to give meaning to their violent lifestyle. In my thesis, I will treat narrative
criminology not as an all-encompassing way to decipher individual and collective
violence in civil wars, but as a way to look at the empirical material, in particular,
3I will talk about these ‘techniques of neutralization’ (Sykes and Matza 1957) more detailed
in Chapter 4.4 starting on page 121.
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the interviews with former combatants.
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2.2 Doing research with former combatants in
a post-conflict setting
What are true stories?
One question that poses a challenge to research with violent offenders is whether
research participants tell us the truth. Do they omit shameful or possibly self-
incriminating actions and attitudes from their stories? Do they only tell us what
(they assume) we want to hear? Can we trust their sincerity and their recollec-
tion? How can we possibly know if research participants tell us the truth? These
questions seem to be even more critical when it comes to acts of violence that
happened a long time ago, that are linked to traumatic memories and that have
gone through a treadmill of interpretive discourses in local communities, among
policy actors and last but not least in the international community.
So what if research participants, in one way or another, don’t tell us the truth?
The first question is, as Sandberg (2010) points out, does it matter? It depends.
If we are looking for facts as the foundation for our arguments, that is, if we treat
narratives as records, it certainly does. But this is only relevant for part of this
analysis, namely, where I look into the organisational structure of the LRA – for
instance, how they set up their settlements, which rules they enforced, or the
tactics they used on the battlefield. These questions are typically just the back-
ground to the interviewees’ stories; they may misremember, but there’s nothing
to make sense of in the first place. Moreover, these aspects can be cross-checked,
at least to a certain degree.4 As for the interviewees’ stories, I understand that
these are not and cannot be true or false in the same sense. Rather, the question
is: Why do people tell their stories the way they do, with all their inconsistencies,
gaps and additions?
In a paper based on her field research on the Rwandan genocide, Lee Ann
Fujii (2010) argues for the inclusion of what she calls ‘meta-data’ in the analysis;
i.e, the rumours, inventions, denials, evasions, and silences that emerge in and
around interview situations. She claims that attention to meta-data is crucial
to access the research participants’ motives and inclinations to lie, omit things,
4Sandberg (2010: 453) makes this argument for the narratives of drug dealers: information
on drug prices and the organisation of transactions can be cross-checked among their narratives,
because there is no reason to suspect that they have collaborated on their accounts.
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avoid certain topics, or hold information and emotions back. She makes an argu-
ment for the inclusion of meta-data as a means to both improve data quality and
ensure the ethical conduct of research (for instance, where participation might
put interviewees at risk). Importantly, meta-data itself is data as it becomes part
of the stories interviewees tell us. In what follows, I will outline how questions of
truth and falsehood, of fact and fiction – in short: meta-data – impact the pro-
cess of data collection, and what that means for the analysis of interviews with
former combatants against the backdrop of a narrative criminology approach and
my experiences in the field.
Inventions. Interviewees make decisions not only about what to tell, but also
about how to tell it. This ‘how’ is not only about the things they do (not) tell,
but also about the minor and major adjustments they make to create the story
and identity of their imagination. Life as it happens has no plot, no inherent
‘storyline’, no self-evident moral. Meaning is not inherent to our lives, but the
result of narrative efforts to find and to claim it. To do that, people change bits
and pieces of the story to fit what happened into a plot. These inventions, as
additions and changes to a story, are as inevitable and subconscious as they are
deliberate and strategic. From a narrative criminology stance, the task is not to
separate truthful from deceptive accounts, but to understand why research par-
ticipants tell their stories the way they do, and why they want us to believe them.
I would like to give an example from my research: On one occasion, I met with
a former high-ranking commander who had just returned from the bush. The
terms of his disengagement were unclear – while some sources (among others,
the Ugandan military) said he was captured, it was also rumoured that he left
the organisation voluntarily (he himself claimed that he organised his escape).
What was known for sure was that he had joined the LRA voluntarily, in its
early days when abductions weren’t part of its standard repertoire. For all these
reasons, I was more than eager to talk to him. The story he presented us with,
though, was an adaptation of the prototypical story of violent initiation and re-
tention: He claimed that he was ‘convinced’ at gunpoint to join the LRA, and
was constantly confronted with threats of retaliation against his community if
he ever tried to escape. His account wasn’t mere fiction – some of it matched
with established events – but his overall story just didn’t add up. My cautious
attempts to question his account were met with resistance on his part. While the
interview fell short of my hope to find out what encouraged fighters to join the
LRA voluntarily, it was instructive nonetheless. More than anything, it showed
how powerful a particular narrative of forced participation had become, and how
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well aware the interviewee was that his terms of engagement would not be met
with the same level of sympathy. In trying to portray himself as a decent person
that only fell prey to circumstances beyond his control, the interviewee engaged
in identity work.
Silences. When it came to accounts of traumatic experiences, interviewees
often chose to remain silent on certain painful, self-incriminating, or shameful oc-
currences. These silences are part of the interviewees’ agency (see also Hammond
2011), i.e., of their power to tell their story and to protect themselves from harm.
During my interviews, silences emerged around accounts of sexual violence (see
also Fujii 2010), interviewees’ own violent acts, and sensitive information that
they felt might put them or others at risk. Part of the researcher’s obligation to
‘do no harm’ is the imperative not to inquire where research participants aren’t
willing to share certain experiences. The question is, as Daniel (1996: 121) put
it, how does the researcher work with the interviewees’ stories “when the most
poignant parts of their voices are their silences?” I tried not to make any as-
sumptions based on these silences. For instance, the absence of stories of sexual
violence doesn’t mean that my interviewees didn’t experience it.5 Also, I tried
not to force sensitive questions on the interviewees. For instance, I never brought
up the issue of sexual violence myself. Instead, I asked the interviewees how they
related with their spouses and superiors. Such open questions left it to the inter-
viewees to decide what they wanted to share with us. While some interviewees
chose not to address these issues, others shared insightful stories of the abuse
they experienced.
Rumours. Rumours – about the LRA’s movements, its modus operandi and,
most importantly, the terms of return to civilian life – played an important role
in people’s lives during the war. But they also helped former combatants to
navigate their lives afterwards and the interview situation itself. For instance,
rumours about the subsequent prosecution of rank-and-file soldiers who had been
guaranteed amnesty by the Amnesty Act (Government of Uganda 2000) may have
kept interviewees from talking about their own participation in violent acts, as
they couldn’t be sure that we were not, in fact, investigators, and that the infor-
mation they shared was safe with us. Considerations like these not only affected
the data collection, but told us something about how people perceive these events
5This might be particularly true in cases where victimisation has no legitimacy, for instances,
in cases of male-to-male rape.
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and their involvement, and how they cope with emerging insecurities. Rumours
help them to manage these states of uncertainty.
Denials. Denials often evolved around individual acts of violence, the pos-
session of weapons, personal responsibility, acts of disobedience, and abusive
relationships with spouses or co-wives. Interviewees often denied one of these
things when I raised the topic head-on, but during the interview, they often re-
counted incidents that were in conflict with their overall denial. These denials
weren’t necessarily attempts to deceive, but often seemed to serve as a means
to preclude a discussion they didn’t want to have, or one that undercut their
story. For instance, by portraying the relationship with their husbands as good,
women avoided having to talk about abuse and victimisation. Likewise, denying
any possibility of circumventing the LRA’s rules allowed the research participants
to depict the LRA as all-powerful and their actions as inevitable. By denying
that they held a rank, interviewees could avoid questions of responsibility and
accountability. Denials have to be seen in light of the overall story interviewees
want to tell, as a means to cut off storylines that don’t belong to it or that ques-
tion their overall story.
Evasions. Evasions took different forms; they could precede the interview, or
become apparent in the interview situation itself. People only rarely declined to
be interviewed at all6 (even though some seem to have done so in effect, by being
hard to reach after the initial contact), and most of the time willingly agreed to
be interviewed. However, people were sometimes unresponsive during the inter-
view, answering questions in a very general and offhand manner.7 Or they were
generally open and just unwilling to talk about a certain topic. More often, in-
terviewees avoided talking about their own experiences, and talked instead about
how things were done ‘in the bush’ or ‘by the LRA’ (see also Baaz and Stern
2009). Sometimes, especially when it came to sensitive issues such as atrocities,
I employed that strategy myself, asking interviewees whether they were aware of
or had witnessed any atrocities against civilians or colleagues. This allowed the
research participants to talk about atrocities without addressing their personal
6This apparently happened for a couple of people who were contacted by one of the in-
terviewees (who acted as a mentor for a group of returnees). While the interviewee was very
responsive and even offered himself to facilitate contact, only two of the people he asked re-
sponded positively, while the others lamented that the interview would only profit the researcher
and not those who volunteered the information.
7Some of these interviews have been excluded from the core sample; see Chapter 2.3 starting
on page 37.
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involvement.8
Looking at how interviewees employ these narrative strategies tells us a lot
about how they make sense of their experiences in the LRA. Working with a nar-
rative criminology approach is not about finding ways to make interviewees tell us
‘the truth’, but about treating the way they tell their stories as data. Though it
is interested in authentic accounts, that is, in stories the interviewees themselves
(want to) believe in, it posits that “‘truth’ may not be the best measure of in-
teresting and theoretically relevant data” (Sandberg 2010: 448). Such a research
approach allows for inconsistencies and argumentative shifts in the research par-
ticipants’ narratives without having to assume a breach in sincerity. We can offer
different accounts for the same actions, and no one of them may be more authen-
tic than the others, because they pursue different narrative goals. Every story
can be told in a myriad of ways, with different plots, morals, and heroes or villains.
The ethics of conducting research in post-conflict societies: Research
as intervention
Figure 2.1: The economy of aid in Gulu’s Senior Quarters (photo by author)
When I first went to the field in late 2012, my research proposal wasn’t exactly
met with enthusiasm. Many of the organisations I contacted weren’t interested in
supporting my research. In their view, it was something that had been researched
8On some occasions, this strategy may have kept them from talking about their own deeds,
but in my experience, interviewees rather talked about these in passing, if at all. In contrast,
most research participants talked relatively freely about atrocities they witnessed or heard of.
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exhaustively before and wasn’t worth further investigation. Much of the scepti-
cism I encountered was well-founded: Since the conflict largely left Ugandan
territory in 2006, northern Uganda has seen a large influx of researchers working
on conflict-related issues and with war-affected communities and former combat-
ants in particular. While there wasn’t much literature addressing the questions
I was interested in, there was indeed a lot of research with the very people I was
interested in talking with. Some gatekeepers were rightly concerned about the
long-term impact of the permanent presence of foreign researchers on northern
Ugandan society. Others worried that the continuous research on war and its
effects would prove to be an obstacle to post-conflict recovery. Quite visibly,
aid economy and advocacy research have undermined displays of strength and
generosity by forcing people to showcase their vulnerability (see also Edmondson
2005).
People deal with such demands differently, sometimes actively subverting and
resisting the dependency on conditional aid.9 But even where individuals find
ways to make international attention work for them, the impact of foreign aid,
research activities, and advocacy work on northern Ugandan society at large is
still significant. Until very recently, access to conflict-related foreign aid has been
a major economic factor in the North. This has been especially true in the town
of Gulu which, not having much in the way of agriculture or industry, “developed
an almost exclusively humanitarian economy” (Branch 2013: 3156). In a way, as
one of my informants10 stated with regards to the reintegration centres, aid has
turned out to prolong captivity: a state of complete dependency without per-
sonal responsibility, as a form of patronising (and potentially disabling) care that
is accepted because it increases the chances of survival. Even if most researchers
do not offer much in the way of financial assistance, their presence and questions
continue to shape the way northern Ugandans think about themselves. They
have come to understand ‘conflict’ as a label that is both helping and hurting,
generating funds to reconstruct society but also hindering Acholiland from mov-
ing beyond it. The town of Gulu is probably the best depiction of this twofold
9For some time, the performance of traditional reconciliation rituals (such as mato oput) was
very popular with many non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who encouraged them even
where they didn’t fit traditional purposes (Anett Pfeiffer Tumusiime, personal conversation,
February 2016). A colleague in Gulu recounted an instance where a village requested assistance
for a cleansing ceremony – a goat, some chicken, drinks – and used these commodities to perform
a social event rather than a ritual (Lioba Lenhart, personal conversation, November 2012).
10Ocitti David, former combatant and founder of Pathways to Peace Uganda, an organisation
that facilitates the reunion of returnees with their families, in a personal conversation, February
2016.
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dynamic: an ever-growing city bustling with activity that is, to a significant ex-
tent, created by the presence of foreign researchers, aid workers, and investors.11
It is a legitimate question: Is it responsible and ethical to conduct research
in this setting? Isn’t there an obligation to ‘stay out’, in order to protect the
societies in question from harm? I am not sure. Against this reading, one could
argue that staying out is also a way to incapacitate local actors, who often have
a better understanding of what it means for them to participate in research or
not. Most of my interviewees showed a clear understanding of the aim of research
on their experiences in general – certainly an effect of the continual coming and
going of researchers in northern Uganda. They knew that the interview was a
short-term engagement rather than a long-term obligation, and presented their
requests for support knowing that our resources were limited in time and scope.
Over the last few years, attention to the conflict and to them as former combat-
ants has diminished, and many interviewees told us that they were happy to tell
their stories now, as time has distanced them from their experiences of abduction
and violence. Others felt comforted by the fact that their suffering and struggles
haven’t been forgotten. They wanted their stories of what they had to go through
and what was done to them to be told and made known. Some interviewees also
showed interest in the research results.
As to whether the continuous presence of foreign researchers and their concern
with the conflict helps or hinders post-war recovery, I suppose that both are true:
The questions researchers ask former combatants and that former combatants
ask themselves have the potential to both further or interfere with individuals’
coping strategies. Research intervenes in people’s lives in ways that can neither
be controlled nor predicted. And as much as the premise of doing no harm should
guide all research, researchers can only vouch for the ethical conduct of research
and not for its long-term effects. Next to the obligation to protect research par-
ticipants from harm, for me this meant to take the research participants’ concerns
and requests seriously. Many research participants voiced their disappointment
and frustration with researchers who promised to update them about the progress
of the research, but never got back to them after conducting the research inter-
view.12 It seems that much of the ambivalence towards interview requests does
11Although much of the attention has shifted over the last years to other research topics,
agendas, and areas, by and large, this characterisation still holds true.
12This observation has also been made by Browne and Moffett (2014: 229) and Coulter (2009:
26) for the case of Sierra Leone.
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not stem from interviewees misunderstanding the nature of research, but from
their frustration with promises being broken. Now that northern Uganda is re-
covering from the conflict, former combatants are claiming ownership of their
stories. In this sense, this research might provide some new insights into former
combatants’ life-worlds at a moment when the world has moved on to other, more
urgent states of emergency. Focusing on their agency in dealing both with their
past and present and with the research situation also provides a counter-narrative
to their common depiction as helpless victims, or, as Honwana (2006: 73) put
it,“empty vessels into whom violence was poured”.
On the caveats and challenges in interpreting testimonies of former
combatants
This thesis pursues two research interests: On the meso level, it aims to show how
organisation and institutions allow for the routine perpetration of violence in the
LRA. On the micro level, it explores how individual actors cope with this violent
everyday life, how they make sense of themselves and their actions. Though the
same material is used to answer these two questions – namely, interviews with
former combatants – the data analysis faces different challenges and limitations.
Interviewing former combatants presents a number of methodological chal-
lenges. In her thesis on the Salvadorian civil war, Elisabeth Wood (2003) iden-
tified three factors that shape data: (1) the respondents’ initial memories, (2)
the shaping of memories through social and cultural processes (the narratibility
of experiences and memories), and (3) the respondents’ objectives (Wood 2003:
33). Beyond these three, I argue that (4) researchers’ objectives, and (5) the
interaction between researcher and research participant greatly affect what the
data looks like.
Respondents’ initial memories: Experiencing, remembering, and narrating
war and violence. Retrospective consideration is an innate feature of studies
on violence and war. In-situ approaches – like participant observation and inter-
views with active combatants – are typically not possible or safe, or they interfere
too much with people’s routine behaviour.13 Therefore, research on violence and
criminal behaviour routinely relies on retrospective description, that is, on stories
13One of the few studies that researched active armed groups (in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC)) in their everyday is Hedlund (2014).
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recounted “sur le registre de la me´moire” (Shepler et al. 2002: 50).14 How do
people remember and recount war and violence? This is where things get messy.
Not everything that is remembered can and will be recounted; and on a more
basic level, not everything that is experienced will be remembered. For instance,
episodes of intense and excessive violence are more likely to be remembered, and
are typically remembered in more detail.15 But in cases of severe violence, for-
getting and choosing to forget can also be functional, both for communities as
a whole (Buckley-Zistel 2006) and for individuals (Hatzfeld 2004: 262). Among
the former combatants we interviewed, some had just recently returned from the
bush, while others had returned more than a decade earlier (see Table 1). Their
narratives are not a straightforward account of the events in question, but one
that is partial, biased, and modified. The interviewees don’t provide accounts of
the past as it happened or as it has been experienced, but of the past as seen
from the present. As such, the interviewees’ stories are not about their experi-
ences of life in the LRA, but about their imagining of this violent past as they
understand it today. This is an important difference that might render some ob-
servations invalid, because we cannot know for sure which parts of the story have
been added after the fact, for instance, in former combatants’ efforts to overcome
their violent past. It is largely unavoidable that former combatants’ stories are
a mere proxy for their experiences in situ. What we get to know about war and
violence does not depend only on what interviewees remember and incorporate
into their stories, but on what they learn about war in the first place. Even for-
mer combatants had only partial insight into what happened in the organisation.
Their experiences and level of participation differed depending on their place in
the chain of command, their affiliations, age, and sex. Younger and lower-ranking
combatants (and women in particular) often had only a limited understanding of
where they were, what the political environment looked like, and what capacities
and strengths the organisation had. Higher-ranking combatants were often quite
knowledgeable about these things, but were more detached from the experiences
of rank-and-file and especially female combatants.
14A fact that, as Sandberg (2010: 451) notes, has been downplayed in much of ethnographic
research.
15Apart from my experiences in the field, this has also been supported by a randomised
experimental study by Bornstein et al. (1998). In the experiment, the authors assigned research
participants to one of two groups. All participants were shown the same film, except that a
violent scene in one group’s version was replaced by a non-violent scene in the other’s. The
research participants that saw the violent version were more successful in remembering the
scene in question, but less successful in recalling what happened before and after.
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The narratibility of experiences and memories. How do interviewees talk
about their experiences? Former combatants’ self-representations and narratives
are affected by the ways in which they learn to convey their experiences. They
may resort to standardised narratives which fulfil a number of functions: They
help the former combatants to structure their stories, for instance, by following a
salvation theme.16 They allow them to fit the chaotic and often conflicting reality
of living with war and violence into a linear and unified narrative (Edmondson
2005: 452). They reduce the complexity of lived experiences to a simple, or at
least simpler, storyline, making it both accessible to an outsider (and, often, to
themselves) and communicable for the narrator. Also, former combatants may
find some comfort in using a shared narrative of abduction and forced violence
through which they can identify as part of a community. Moreover, resorting
to a public narrative may also be a way to protect themselves from confronting
intimate and potentially traumatising experiences.
Interviewees’ own objectives. The research participants not only respond to
the questions posed by the interviewer, but bring their own agendas to the re-
search (see also Hedlund 2014: 34). Interviewees have two basic objectives that
may interfere with the researcher’s agenda: They want to (1) protect themselves
from harm, and (2) profit from the research in some way.
(1) Interviews with former combatants in settings of civil war are inherently
sensitive, because interviewees are being asked for potentially self-incriminating
information. Research participants will ask themselves whether they can trust
the researcher with their story. In 2000, the Amnesty Act was passed, granting
amnesty to Ugandans “involved in acts of a war-like nature in various parts of the
country” (Government of Uganda 2000). In May 2012, the Amnesty Act expired,
and it hasn’t been fully reinstated since. The ongoing legal proceedings against
the former LRA combatants Thomas Kwoyelo and Dominic Ongwen have added
to a sense of legal insecurity. However, even though many interviewees were dis-
appointed by the reintegration efforts, only a few feared prosecution. But beyond
the potential legal implications that are a rather faint threat for most of them,
they are concerned with judgement, mostly from their communities. While most
interviewees said they related well with other community members, many of them
16Such narratives of redemption, as I would like to call them, present a powerful narrative
that is supported by the NGO and aid sector, and that “condense[s] the children’s pasts into
a single tale of terror, hardship, and restoration” (Edmondson 2005: 451), with evil-minded
rebels on one side of the equation and the government forces as saviours and protectors on the
other.
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reported that they had experienced some judgement. Typically, this included the
assumption that former combatants returned as ‘damaged goods’ or even ‘ticking
bombs’, that is, as people prone to resort to violence to solve their problems.
They had to make an effort to convince other community members that they in
fact had left their violent lifestyle behind.17 Talking about the struggles they face
today and about the things they found easier to deal with or even enjoyed in the
bush might feel like jeopardising the efforts they have made to prove themselves
as good and ordinary persons. The aim of portraying themselves as rehabilitated
persons might interfere with the intention to give a straightforward and possi-
bly more ambivalent account of their experiences. Moreover, people might try
to protect themselves from psychological damage by choosing not to talk about
certain issues such as experiences of abuse and violence.
(2) The interviewees will use the research interview to attain some positive goals.
Obviously, material expectations often influence people’s willingness to talk; but
more importantly, non-material expectations will greatly influence how the inter-
viewees approach the interview situation, and which aspects of their story they
want to emphasise. Former combatants quickly learned the vocabulary of aid
agencies and political actors, and may use it to tell and sell their stories, often
times generating accounts in “victim mode” (Utas 2003: 49). Discourses also
influence what can be articulated at all (Das 1996), that is, what is seen as a
legitimate expression. For instance, in an environment that makes great efforts
to stress the involuntary, forced nature of participation in armed resistance, it
becomes almost impossible to admit to be committed to it. Former combatants
might try to portray themselves as a certain kind of person (decent, God-fearing,
knowledgeable), use the interview situation to build relationships with people who
are, in one way or another, imagined as resourceful, or ask the researcher to ad-
vocate for the interviewee’s concerns. While exploring these agendas is a research
interest (namely, in violent actors’ agency), they also show that interview-based
research is not a one-way street.
Researcher’s objectives: Representation. The data basis for analysis depends
not only on what the interviewee is willing and able to tell us, but also on the
researcher’s objectives and strategies: What and whom do I ask? What stories
am I interested in? Research on war and violence looks at a human experience
that is, for most people, something out of the ordinary. Its most extreme expres-
sions fascinate humans as much as they frighten them. When one researches an
17I will elaborate on this in more detail in Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
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everyday life that is marked by war and violence, one challenge is to not over-
estimate the importance or prevalence of outstanding occurrences. For instance,
the killing of family members as a means of violent initiation into the LRA was
cited a lot in the advocacy and parts of the academic literature (see for instance
Bogner and Rosenthal 2014, Eichstaedt 2009, Human Rights Watch 2003), but
wasn’t reported by any of my research participants.18 Where first-hand informa-
tion is scarce, there is a pattern of reproducing the same information over and
over again (Hedlund 2014: 38), sometimes with effects not unlike those of play-
ing Chinese whispers. Other forms of violence – for instance, male-to-male rape
– are missing from much of the literature, not necessarily because the victims
remain silent,19 but also because they do not fit the dominant discourse (in this
case, of gender-based violence that targets women and girls).20 Moreover, the
experiences of particular groups of former combatants are under-represented, due
to remote location, access and language barriers, among other factors. Adding
to this selection bias, much of the research done by humanitarian and advocacy
organisations has focused on young combatants (typically under the banner of
child soldiering),21 and has mostly addressed their abuse and not their agency.22
And there is also a greater focus on male combatants – underscoring a common
perception of women as mere auxiliaries or spoils of war – that privileges their
experiences over those of women.
18While some might have omitted such occurrences from their stories, it makes sense that
these violent performances are not part of the organisation’s standard operating procedure. The
majority of the abductions happened at night, with the government forces not too far away.
Typically, the LRA couldn’t afford the luxury of staying in the same place for too long, for the
sole purpose of setting an example; it would have attracted too much attention, thereby risking
confrontation with government forces. More likely, they would do so later, after they had left
the civilian settlements with the newly abducted. Moreover, as (Dolan 2009: 79) points out,
atrocities like mutilations weren’t a constant, but were more widespread in some years, notably
1991 and 1996. See also Chapter 3 starting on page 43.
19Some of the people I talked to mentioned sexual violence against men (tek gungu – literally,
‘hard to bend’; a term that only emerged as a reaction to such rapes by the National Resistance
Army (NRA) (Oloya 2013: 49)) in passing, when talking about the atrocities committed by the
government forces, but they never discussed any personal experiences. A number of personal
accounts can be found in the video documentary “Gender against Men” (Refugee Law Project
2009) and Wambui (2014).
20Chris Dolan, one of the few researchers concerned with the phenomenon, poignantly com-
mented on this institutional silencing: “The organisations working on sexual and gender-based
violence don’t talk about it (...) There’s a fear among them that this is a zero-sum game; that
there’s a pre-defined cake and if you start talking about men, you’re going to somehow eat a
chunk of this cake that’s taken them a long time to bake” (Storr 2011).
21A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) study published in 2001 estimated that the
20’000 adults abducted between 1986 and 2001 represented two thirds of overall abductions.
(Dolan 2009: 75).
22This has been analysed with sharp criticism by Utas (2003: 52–53).
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In this sense, the results of my research cannot be seen as representative of
experiences in ‘the’ LRA. While my interview sample included women and men
equally, I didn’t talk to people who were abducted from or returned to places
outside of Uganda, and whose experiences differ in some regards.23 Combatants
who spent most of their time in the LRA in Uganda in the early 1990s tell a
story that is different in many regards from that of somebody who left Uganda
in, say, 2004, and spent years in Sudan, Congo and CAR (not to mention those
who were abducted outside of Uganda). What they perceived and portrayed as
the everyday life of the organisation may differ to a large extent, and one would
have to talk to many more combatants than I did to do justice to the multitude
of experiences. One might argue that this approach won’t yield a full picture of
the dynamics within the LRA. This is true, but such a task is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Moreover, the data is diverse enough as it is. The fact that the
LRA has been in existence for so long, and that it has changed its strategies
and institutions along the way to account for changing environments, makes a
comprehensive account of the LRA a much larger project than can be realised
here.
Interaction between researcher, interviewee and third parties. Apart from my
research interest and approach, my person and the way I interacted with the in-
terviewees clearly influenced what the interviewees were willing to share, and how
they presented their stories. The interview data is a joint product, or co-creation
if you will, of the researcher and the interviewee. And that is not just because the
researcher is typically the one asking the questions and thereby structuring the
answers. The impression the interviewees have about who they are talking to will
undoubtedly affect how they talk about their experiences. My identity as a young
white woman clearly influenced people’s perceptions, expectations and the way
they told their story. My unfamiliarity with the interviewees’ life-worlds might
have closed some doors while it opened others. While some people are more open
with a stranger, others relate to and engage more with somebody who shares the
same cultural background. Being a stranger to people’s lives was only partially
mitigated by the presence of the research assistants, who occupied an intermedi-
ate space. All of my research assistants were locals who had also experienced war.
Growing up in Acholiland, they had lost families and friends, lived in camps, and
still struggled to make ends meet. But they were also undeniably different. They
hadn’t been to the bush, hadn’t lost out as much on educational opportunities,
23I will talk about sampling in more detail in Chapter 2.3 starting on page 37.
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and had access to a world most interviewees were shut out from, all of which
was most visible in their interaction with a young white woman. But they shared
a strong sense of identity as Acholi that, to my mind, overrode these differences.24
For my research, I greatly depended on the research assistants as interpreters
and facilitators during and in the preparation of the interviews. Most interviewees
were only proficient in the local language, Acholi, and I learned merely enough
Acholi to greet people (a sometimes lengthy ritual comparable to small talk) and
detect key words in conversation. The need to go back and forth, to translate my
questions and the interviewee’s answers, definitely affected the narrative flow, and
sometimes led to questions that didn’t exactly pick up on what the interviewee
had said before.25 Some things got lost in the interpreter’s summary translation
during the interview, only to resurface in the transcript, posing new questions.
Sometimes, translated questions were less open, thereby pointing interviewees in
a particular direction. The need for translation also affected the analysis. As
the Acholi language has a comparatively small vocabulary, one word can have
many different meanings, depending on tone and context (Odonga 2005: v). As
a result, the same sentence could be translated with a variant wording and some-
times even with a different meaning.26
However, these limitations were clearly outweighed by the advantages of work-
ing with interpreters. Doing so allowed me to fully focus on the interviewees –
their non-verbal expressions, tone, mood alterations, and interaction styles. Be-
yond reasons of necessity, I wouldn’t have wanted to forgo my research assistants’
support. Conducting research in an unfamiliar setting is not only affected by the
barriers posed by language competence, but also by failure to read and under-
stand cultural codes (Fujii 2013: 149). Language and cultural competence are
closely connected: Not knowing (much of) the language the research participants
speak limits participation in and understanding of people’s everyday life. Lan-
guage proficiency is about knowing not only the vocabulary and grammar, since
understanding is not limited to what people say, but includes what they mean by
24Considering that society is largely structured by gendered expectations, it struck me that
sexual identity was, by comparison, much less important. Due to initial difficulties of finding
a female research assistant, some of the interviews with women were conducted with male
interpreters, but I couldn’t detect a systematic difference in the interviewees’ openness or in
the issues addressed.
25To check how this affected the interview, a number of interviews were conducted without
me by two trained research assistants (see Chapter 2.3 starting on page 37).
26To find out how much I could rely on the translations, some interviews were transcribed
twice.
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it (Fujii 2013: 148). Researchers are prone to miss out on meaning because they
are unfamiliar with the ways in which meaning is conveyed.27 Moreover, they risk
overrating observations from the interviews. During my research, I encountered
many situations in which I wasn’t quite sure what to make of the data. When
is the tolerance of domestic violence a display of virtuous agency, and when does
it simply mirror what happens in society at large? Is the less affectionate way
parents connect with their children a strategy of emotional disengagement in a
harsh environment, or just a parenting style different from the continental Eu-
ropean one? Is the absence of displays of emotion a protective mechanism, or
a sign of lacking rapport, or is it based in a cultural pattern that discourages
sharing personal sentiments? What is noise, and what is signal? Whenever I was
unsure of something, I tried to check for it through the study of ethnographic
literature, but also through discussions with my interpreters and informants. The
same goes for questions of translation. Both I and the research assistant who han-
dled the editing of the interviews checked all changes to the transcripts with the
translators (who also assisted the research as interpreters, but didn’t necessarily
translate the same interviews they co-conducted), and discussed our uncertainties
and questions with them. My experience was that the research assistants were
more than merely facilitators. They assisted the research not just technically –
by arranging interviews and translating questions and statements in situ – but
materially, as they enabled understanding where my questions didn’t make sense
to the interviewees. On numerous occasions, the research assistants provided me
with keys to access the interviewees’ narratives and behaviour as they picked up
on the cultural codes and conventions the interviewees used. In this sense, they
were not just technical assistants; they became, as Fujii (2013: 151) noted, in-
formants themselves. Where researcher and research participants don’t share a
common language, the interpreter is the researcher’s voice, for better or worse.
My impression during the interviews was that the rapport between interpreter
and interviewee eased communication on numerous occasions. Sometimes, first
encounters benefited from a leap of faith, since the research assistant had talked
to the interviewee once before, or knew them personally.
Third party participation was not always limited to my research assistants.
Visitors, mostly neighbours, regularly stopped by to say hello, to satisfy their
curiosity, or to interact with the interviewee. Children often played in close prox-
27For instance, sensitive topics such as domestic abuse and rape were often addressed in
encoded terms (see also Porter 2013), and instead of asking for a tip or small bribe, gate
keepers asked for a soda or a smoke, expecting to be paid some money for granting access.
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imity to the interview site, and babies and toddlers were nursed during the inter-
view. On rare occasions, another person – typically a parent – was present during
the interview. We always asked interviewees to choose a venue, and checked if
they were comfortable with the set-up. However, these interferences and inter-
ruptions undoubtedly impacted the interviews.
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Figure 2.2: Going to the field (photo by the author)
Field research. I conducted a preliminary field visit in November–December
2012, and three follow-up field stays in January–February 2014, July–August
2015, and January–February 2016. The research project has been reviewed and
approved by the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST)
and facilitated by the RLP, a research institute at the School of Law, Makerere
University, Kampala. Most of the data was collected in 2015 and 2016. Up
through early 2018, my local research assistants and I have been in touch with
the interviewees.28
Data basis. In preparation of the interviews with former combatants and
during the data collection process, I conducted 18 expert discussions with other
researchers, NGO workers, and locals with a professional background. These dis-
cussions were rather informal – mostly set up as a talk over drinks or food – and
largely unstructured. Questions depended on the other person’s field of expertise
or research interests. I assumed that this approach was more effective in regard to
28A few interviewees picked up on our invitation to contact us after the interview. However,
these were by and large social calls only loosely related to the research.
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both turnout (most people easily agree to a chat, while a formal interview might
feel more obligating) and effectiveness (some scholars feel they waste their time
explaining things they have already discussed in their publications). For the same
reasons of facilitating the conversation and keeping the atmosphere informal, I
refrained from asking the experts to audiotape our conversation. Instead, I took
notes during the talk whenever necessary, and wrote a protocol of our discussion
directly afterwards. Sometimes, discussions continued via email.
Together with my research assistants, I conducted 51 interviews with former
combatants. Thirty of these interviews were conducted by me with the help of
one of my four research assistants (three male, one female) who also acted as
translators. Twenty-one more interviews were conducted by two of my research
assistants (one male, one female), who had assisted me during earlier interviews,
and were trained in advance and advised during the data collection process. These
interviews were also conducted to check how my identity, presence and the need
for translation influenced the data.29 Of these 51 interviewees, 27 were male and
24 were female. Upon the interviewee’s request, two interviews were conducted
mainly in English, whereas 49 interviews were conducted in Acholi only and trans-
lated for me during the interview. My (very basic) knowledge of Acholi helped
me to get an understanding of the challenges involved in translating from Acholi
to English, and to recognise key terms and concepts. Two more interviews were
conducted with war-affected persons whom we contacted with the intention of
interviewing them as former combatants but we weren’t aware at that point that
they didn’t actually fit that criterion. Of these 53 interviews, 43 interviews (19
female, 24 male) were included in the final analysis. Ten interviews were excluded
from the sample because the interview was not audiotaped (2), the interviewee
turned out not to be a former combatant (2), the interviewee was unresponsive
(5), or withdrew from the interview (1).
Sampling and recruiting. Interviewees were recruited through numerous chan-
nels: contacts provided by the reintegration centres, advocacy organisations,
small NGOs, income-generating activities and personal contacts provided by the
former combatants themselves, informants and the research assistants. I focused
on combatants who had been with the LRA for a longer period of time (at least
29In comparing the interviews, I found that my presence or absence did not make a systematic
difference with regards to the issues people addressed and their openness to talk, but that
unmediated interviews were typically shorter and contained more statements I had to make
sense of with the help of my research assistants.
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a year), and included as many respondents located in remote areas as possible.
Initially, I relied on convenience sampling combined with snowballing. After I
had conducted a number of interviews and had established contacts with differ-
ent gatekeepers, I used purposive sampling to include different experiences. Table
1 (starting on page 231) provides an overview of the sample’s characteristics.
As a result of using these channels (and for reasons of convenience), many
interviewees were located in and around Gulu town, but we conducted an equal
amount of interviews in more remote areas of Gulu district and other districts
in northern Uganda, including Amuru, Alebtong, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya, Lira,
Oyam, and Pader district.30 We left the choice of interview location to the re-
search participants. Most interviews were conducted in or close to the intervie-
wee’s private home, but some were also conducted at their workplace or in a
rather secluded public place. We excluded children born in captivity from the
sample, as well as returnees who were still minors or who suffered from ongoing
psychological problems (provided we had information on that). We informed all
interviewees that we would be happy to link them up with an organisation that
offers trauma counselling and psychological support.
Informed consent. Before starting the interview, we explained the reasons for
our coming, introduced ourselves to the research participants, and outlined the
terms of engagement. We emphasised that the interviewees were free to cancel
their participation at any time, to abstain from answering any questions, and to
ask us anything they might wonder about throughout. We explained that we
could not offer payment, but that we would compensate them for their time and
expenses, and offered to arrange (for instance, medical) support where possible.
We asked for the interviewees’ consent to audiotape the interviews, and abstained
from recording at the interviewee’s request and took extensive notes in these cases
instead.
Reciprocity in research. As noted above, we provided the interviewees with a
small compensation for transport and their time. The issue of compensation and
payment for participation in research is highly debated,31 but rarely addressed
30Figure 1 on page 232 and Figure 2 on page 233 provide maps of the interviewees’ home
districts and sub-counties.
31At least in the social sciences – interestingly, this does not apply to experimental studies in
psychology or medicine, whose participants are almost always incentivised by material rewards.
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in the literature.32 In the field, locals and research assistants alike complained
that the practice of paying a ‘sitting allowance’, i.e., a small payment made for
attending events such as NGO workshops, became so common that people started
to refuse to participate or they were disappointed when none was offered.33
These concerns are legitimate, but have to be weighed against the problems
involved in not offering compensation. In fact, only a handful of interviewees
ever asked us for financial reimbursement.34 We found that many interviewees
were on their way to sell goods at the market, were offered small jobs during the
interview by other members of the community (like getting water from the well),
took care of their own or a neighbour’s children, or would have been working at
income-generating activities if it hadn’t been for our visit. (Some even worked
during the interview, mainly on small tailoring jobs or making paper beads.)
Others offered us expensive soft drinks, or took a boda-boda35 to meet us in time.
They only rarely mentioned these expenses and lost opportunities to us. The
rationale behind providing interviewees with a relatively generous lump sum was
that I couldn’t (and didn’t want to) calculate the ‘just’ amount to be repaid,
and didn’t want the interviewee’s inclination to bargain or their modesty to be
the decisive factor. Moreover, another common concern – that people would in-
vent a backstory as former combatants to be included in the study – was largely
excluded through the choice of channels used for identifying former combatants.
Where possible and requested, we linked them up with organisations that could
support them with medical or psychosocial assistance. We informed those who
were interested in the progress of the research and offered them the opportunity
to ask questions at any time.
Data collection. The process of data collection itself was structured by the
choice of research approach. There is to date no conclusive guide on how to con-
duct research in narrative criminology, but Sandberg (2010: 462) has outlined
a few principles that guided my data collection process. These principles are
largely congruent with procedures used in narrative and qualitative research (see
Lucius-Hoehne 2010): First, interviews should be tape-recorded whenever possi-
32Among the notable exceptions are Jacques and Wright (2008) and Wamai (2014).
33See also Prince (2014: 85–88), and Boesten (2008: 11) for the case of Tanzania.
34One person chose to cancel the interview, since he couldn’t agree to be interviewed without
payment, arguing that we could market the information he gave us at a much higher price. In
a gesture of benevolent power, he still offered to have his driver take us back to town.
35Boda-bodas, or motorcycle taxis, are the most convenient, fast, and (compared to taxis,
which are called ‘special hires’) relatively affordable means of transport in all of Uganda.
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ble to avoid loss of data. Second, the interview guide should allow for probing
stories from different angles, and to follow what seems interesting. Rather than
sticking too much to the interview guide, the researcher’s questions should invite
open answers, and prestructure the interviewee’s responses as little as possible. In
sum, the interview situation should support the interviewees in telling the stories
they want to tell.
Tape-recording and transcription. As a result, the majority of the interviews
were audiotaped; only two interviewees were hesitant to be recorded and asked
us to take notes instead. The interviews were transcribed and translated by four
Acholi research assistants, three of whom had also facilitated the research as inter-
preters. All of the research assistants had prior experience with interview-based
research and were recommended by colleagues in the field. The transcripts were
edited, anonymised and standardised by myself in tandem with my Swiss-based
research assistant. Whenever we had questions on translation and meaning, we
discussed these with the translators to improve both the transcript and our un-
derstanding.
Data analysis. As aforementioned, I had two research interests: I was keen
to identify the means the LRA as an organisation commanded to commit forced
combatants to violent lives, and to understand what resources the combatants’
themselves had to cope with these demands of violent action and identity. To
this end, all interview transcripts have been coded following the logic of grounded
theory (see Charmaz 2006 for coding in grounded theory). For coding, I used
f4analyse, a simple and light-weight program to code qualitative research data.
In a first step, I defined codes based on the broad topics that came up as a result
of both my research interests (as reflected in the interview guide) and the inter-
viewees’ accounts (such as initiation, everyday life, return from captivity). These
broad topics later became the basis for the analytical chapters. In a second step,
I refined these categories by axial coding, or sub-codes, that addressed particu-
lar aspects of the main categories or codes (for instance, friendships or religious
beliefs as part of combatants’ everyday lives). In a third step, I identified themes
for theoretical codes (like ‘finding solace in God’ as a theme for the role religious
beliefs play). The narrative analysis included a content analysis as a first step.
In a second step, I identified passages for a more thorough narrative analysis that
focused on aspects of agency and identity. Lastly, I read the interviews in their
entirety to identify grand narratives.
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history and memories
The conflict in northern Uganda and the insurgency of the LRA have a history
that spans several decades. While the emergence of the LRA can be pinpointed
to the year 1986, the prelude to civil war goes way back, and there remains some
element of caprice no matter which starting point one chooses. But the decision
matters because it is a statement of interpretation: What or who caused the war?
Who wronged whom? What grievances lie at the heart of the conflict? I would
like to argue that war and violence – and any social action for that matter – start
with a narrative that includes what people remember as vital parts of the story.1
In this sense, the conflict is inextricably linked to ethnic identities (in particular,
that of the Acholi), and it starts long before the first acts of war by the LRA and
even before Museveni’s guerrilla army took power.
The aim of this section is not only to present a chronology of the war,2 but
to link history as written to history as remembered.3 Therefore, I will emphasise
issues the interviewees brought up in their narratives, and complete the chronol-
ogy of events with their accounts. The idea is to show how people in northern
Uganda relate to the struggle of the LRA without actively supporting it, thereby
highlighting the complexity of political issues that lie beneath a seemingly erratic
insurgency.
A number of authors have presented different chronologies of the conflict’s
history, which now stretches back more than 30 years. An early attempt to iden-
tify different conflict phases has been made by Gersony (1997), who looked at
the dominant actors in each phase.4 In his thesis, Dolan (2005) identified five
1This is in line with the narrative approach to social reality detailed in Chapter 2.1 starting
on page 15.
2Which others have done convincingly; see Atkinson (2010b), Dolan (2005), Gersony (1997).
3A similar approach has been chosen by Chris Dolan (2005).
4Namely, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) (03/1986–07/1988), the HSM
(late 1986–end 1987), Severino Lukoya (01/1988–08/1989), Early Kony (late 1987–02/1994),
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phases based on the momentum of the conflict, differentiating between phases
of enforced violence and phases of relative peace.5 Ron Atkinson (2010) has fol-
lowed Dolan’s chronology, but updated it to 2010.6 While these classifications
are helpful and convincing, I would like to propose a slightly different chronol-
ogy, focusing on the critical junctures that set a new tone and create a different
reality of what it means to live with war, both inside and outside the LRA. In
identifying these critical junctures, I look equally at environmental changes, in-
ternal (leadership) dynamics, and individual experiences of former combatants
and war-affected civilians.
Ethnic politics and politicised ethnicity in colonial and post-colonial
Uganda
The conflict in northern Uganda and the emergence of the LRA cannot be un-
derstood without reference to ethnic identities. Today’s Uganda is home to quite
a large number of ethnic or socio-linguistic groups,7 among them the Baganda in
the South, Banyankole and Banyoro in the West, Iteso and Basoga in the East,
and Acholi, Langi and Karamojong in the North. With close to 17 percent of
Uganda’s population, the Baganda are the largest ethnic group, followed by the
Banyankole, who represent around 10 percent of the population (Uganda Bureau
of Statistics 2016: 20). While the importance of ethnic affiliations clearly pre-
cedes colonialism,8 it was British rule that made ethnic identities political on a
national stage.
Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894. Prior to colonialism, politi-
cal structures differed significantly between the regions, with highly centralised
forms of governance in the kingdoms in the South and West of the country, and
less politically stratified societies in the North and East (Omara-Otunnu 1987:
and Current Kony/LRA (03/1994–present, considering developments up to 08/1997).
5Namely, phases I: 08/1986–05/1988, ending with the signing of the peace accord with
the UPDA; II: 06/1988–03/1994, ending with the failure of direct negotiations between the
Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA; III: 04/1994–early 12/1999; IV: late 12/1999–
03/2002, ending with the signing of the peace accords between the governments of Uganda and
Sudan; V: 04/2002–2004, ending with the failure of the military offensive Operation Iron Fist.
6With phase V lasting up to 2006, a phase VI (06/2006–early 12/2008), and a phase VII
(late 12/2008–present, which at the time of the writing was May 2010). The author has argued
that the latest developments would justify adding one or two more phases, or at least sub-phases
(personal communication, June 2016).
7Alesina et al. (2003) found that Uganda is actually the most ethnically diverse country in
the world among those with a population of 1 million or more.
8For the case of the Acholi, see Atkinson (1989, 1994).
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1). These differences were, to a considerable degree, a consequence of natu-
ral constraints and possibilities. In the North, ecological conditions were harsh,
with long dry seasons and unpredictable rain fall patterns. Population density
was low, productive labour was focused on agriculture and livestock, and was,
for the most part, subsistence economy (Atkinson 1989: 20–21, Mamdani 1976:
21). Division of labour was rudimentary, and rarely transcended the boundaries
of the household. Where surpluses were generated, they were used to perform
rituals of gift-giving (Atkinson 1989: 36). Shifting cultivation and herd move-
ment in search of fertile land, water, and grass affected social organisation, as
did slave raids (Mamdani 1976: 20, Mamdani 1984: 1047). Political structures
were largely based on lineage and kinship, and society was organised in smaller
chiefdoms with limited power and reach. In contrast, ecological conditions in the
South were much more favourable. Fertile soil and more predictable and regular
water supply allowed for a more settled and productive lifestyle (Mamdani 1984:
23). Surplus production led to a more complex division of labour, the creation of
classes and a feudal organisation of society, in which the productive masses paid
tributes to chiefs that in turn guaranteed their safety. Centralisation was both
driven and facilitated by the dynamics of accumulation and tribute collection, and
gave rise to the formation of kingdoms in the South. Among them, the kingdom
of Buganda stood out as the largest, wealthiest and most powerful political body
(Atkinson 1994: 2). Based on a mixture of pragmatic and racist considerations,
the British quickly focused their interactions with the colony on Buganda. It
became the hub of commercial and missionary activity, the primary recipient of
infrastructural investments, and the administrative centre of Uganda (Atkinson
1994: 2–4). While these processes were largely structured by the colonial power,
it was powerful Bugandan chiefs who facilitated the colonial project as much as
they profited from it. In this arrangement of intermediary rule (intermedia¨re
Herrschaft ; von Trotha 1994a), the colonial government vitally depended on the
cooperation of local intermediaries to enforce its claim to power. Buganda was
quick to realise that the interaction with the colonial power could be to their
advantage, and actively engaged in strategies of extraversion9 to confirm and sta-
bilise its hold on power and access to economic resources. Buganda’s political
and economic strength also served as a rationale for the British administration
to keep the South demilitarised, and to recruit people from the North and East
9Originally a psychological concept, Bayart (2000) has suggested using the term ‘extraver-
sion’ to describe relationships of exploitation and dependency between Africa and Europe (and
Asia), in which the African leaders “mobiliz[e] resources derived from their (possibly unequal)
relationship with the external environment” (Bayart 2000: 218).
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into the army (Tripp 2010: 42). By employing Southerners (mostly Baganda)
in agriculture and civil service, and people from the northern and eastern region
(Langi, Acholi, and Iteso) in security positions, the British effectively divided
economic and military power along tribal lines (Dolan 2005: 70–71).
Under colonial rule, the Buganda kingdom became even more powerful. When
Uganda became independent in 1962, colonialism’s legacy was one of more pro-
nounced differences between the regions it had created and, at that point, an
irreversible imbalance of power. The first constitution, drafted in London right
before independence, reflected this power structure by giving autonomous status
with greater rights and privileges to Buganda, and quasi-autonomous status to
the other kingdoms (Tripp 2010: 44). This cemented the political and economic
dominance of Buganda, an inequality which proved to be one of the greatest chal-
lenges for all post-colonial governments (Tripp 2010: 42).
On 9 October 1962, Uganda became an independent republic. As Kasozi
(1994: 59) noted, “[t]his transfer of power marked the only peaceful change of
government in Uganda’s history as an independent nation”. The government was
based on an alliance between the Bagandan Kabaka Yekka party and the Uganda
People’s Congress (UPC), a multi-party union led by Milton Obote. Power was
handed over to Milton Obote, who became the first prime minister. A year later,
the Bugandan Kabaza (King) Mutesa II was installed as the first president and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The first government was endowed with
little political experience and did not have much of a political agenda for the in-
dependent nation (Kasozi 1994: 59–61). As a consequence, politics were largely
structured by ethnic affiliations and power interests. While Obote acknowledged
the kingdoms, he soon sought to diminish the influence of Buganda by remov-
ing Baganda from influential positions in civil service (Kasozi 1994: 74). This
approach quickly backfired, and was met with nationalist resistance in Buganda
(Tripp 2010: 43). The struggle over control resulted in the exile of King Mutesa
II, and led to the constitutional crisis of 1966. On 2 March 1966, Obote sus-
pended the offices of the president and vice president, thereby assuming the full
executive power of the state (Kasozi 1994: 84). Only six weeks later, a new consti-
tution that established a unitary and highly centralised state was single-handedly
pushed through by Obote, who went on to make himself president without elec-
tions (Tripp 2010: 45). Under the new constitution, the military assumed an
even stronger role. In the military, Idi Amin, by then deputy commander of the
armed forces, replaced many of the Langi and Acholi soldiers with people from
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West Nile, Amin’s home region. Obote realised too late that Amin was building
up to challenge his grip on power. He was ousted in January 1971 in a military
coup staged while he was abroad.
While Northerners and the military dominated politics under both Obote and
Amin, regime change resulted in new divisions within the North. Amin’s take-
over and an unsuccessful coup attempt against him led to the widespread killing
and torturing of Langi and Acholi soldiers and West Nile officers who had been
loyal to Obote (Kasozi 1994: 111–112). Amin in turn replenished the military
ranks with Nubi and Kakwa from the North, Amin’s own group, and mercenaries
from southern Sudan. Without much of a political program beyond the retention
of power, his term in office was characterised by mass violence against civilians,
the close surveillance, torture and killing of any opponents, and the destruction
of the economy. By 1978, there wasn’t much support left either in the populace
or in the army, and mutinies and violent insurgencies preceded the escalation of
power struggles in the military. Many members of the opposition sought refuge
in neighbouring Tanzania, where they formed a number of armed groups to fight
Amin’s regime. When the conflict spilled over into Tanzania, the Tanzanians
joined forces with the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), a merger of
28 Ugandan exile groups opposing Amin’s government. Among them was an old
acquaintance, former president Obote, who supported the fight with his militia
Kikosi Maalum. When Obote was reinstated in 1980 with the help of the Tanza-
nian forces, the military became dominated by Langi and Acholi soldiers again.
Since Obote was afraid that one of his officers might once again become too pow-
erful, promotions were based on loyalty rather than experience. This strategy
aggravated many officers, including the Acholi Tito Okello and Bazilio Okello,
and led them to stage a coup against Obote in 1985.
Up to this point, all post-colonial regimes had been more about the acquisition
of power than its exercise. During independence, state politics had been succes-
sively militarised, a development that started with Obote’s first term (1966–71)
and culminated in the regime of Idi Amin. The NRA emerged in 1981 out of
frustration over the 1980 elections, which fell short of their democratic objec-
tives. Tanzania, which had protected Obote and, in fact, had helped him to get
back into power, certainly didn’t want to see Amin get replaced by yet another
undemocratic and illegitimate government. The problem was that the UPC had
already seized political power, but was unlikely to be confirmed in free and fair
elections (Kasozi 1994: 136–137). The election campaign was characterised by
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the at times violent intimidation of the opposition, the election itself was fraught
with irregularities, and the results were too obviously manipulated to produce the
desired outcome. Yoweri Museveni, who had been a member of the intelligence
service under Obote’s first government, had joined Obote in Tanzanian exile. As
the leader of the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), he fought alongside
Obote’s militia Kikosi Maalum against Amin’s regime (Kasozi 1994: 124). After
the 1980 elections, he formed the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) and staged an
unsuccessful coup attempt against Obote’s second government. In 1981, the PRA
merged with other opposition groups and formed the NRA and its political wing,
the NRM. They continued their struggle after Tito Okello’s take-over, arguing
that the new government had left unchanged the dysfunctional and destructive
organisation of the state and the armed forces (Kasozi 1994: 174, Mutibwa 1992:
169–170). Effectively violating a peace accord that the NRA had signed with the
Okello government in mid-December 1985, Museveni’s forces overthrew Okello in
January 1986.
On 29 January 1986, Museveni took power. In his inauguration speech, he
emphasised that
No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change
of guard: it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country. In
Africa, we have seen so many changes that change, as such, is nothing
short of mere turmoil. We have had one group getting rid of another
one, only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced.
Please do not count us in that group of people. (Museveni 1992: 21)
Museveni sharply criticised the influence of the military in state affairs and
the sectarian tendencies in both the army and the state. His coming to power
was welcomed by many civilians and international observers (Tripp 2010: 1–2,
Omara-Otunnu 1992: 446–447). At least in the beginning, it appeared that Mu-
seveni was more committed to the anti-sectarian project than his predecessors had
been. His promise to create a ‘broad-based government’ was supported by his ac-
tions: The new government passed an amnesty law that included all police, state
security and military personnel, incorporated members of other armed groups
into the army, and invited representatives of other political factions into the gov-
ernment (Tripp 2010: 48–49). But Museveni’s ambitions to create a broad-based
government were quickly overwhelmed by the challenges of maintaining his grip
on power. While the first cabinet represented a wide range of different societal
groups, soon assignments in the government and military were being given to a
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more narrowly defined group that clearly favoured ethnic groups from the South
and the West, and reserved many key positions for Banyankole, Museveni’s own
group (Lindemann 2011: 395–396). People from the East and especially from the
North were greatly under-represented at all administrative levels, and virtually
excluded from all positions of influence.10
In sum, Museveni did not succeed in freeing state and military politics of
their sectarian tendencies, though he shaped them to suit his needs. He both de-
ethnicised politics on a local level, forging a Bantu identity shared by those from
western and central Uganda, and re-ethnicised politics by emphasising ethnic and
regional identity on a national level (Atkinson 2010b: 279–280). This move was
meant to create unity among the ethnic groups participating in power – smooth-
ing over the differences between Baganda and Banyankole – by emphasising the
contrast to the non-Bantu ethnic groups.
Marginalisation and spiritual renewal: Resistance movements in north-
ern Uganda, 1986–1988
Museveni’s take-over had such an impact in northern Uganda because it gave
rise to both an internal and an external crisis in Acholiland (Branch 2010). In-
ternally, Acholi society suffered from a breakdown of traditional authority. The
lineage-based and gerontocratic leadership had lost its legitimacy, and this crisis
was only aggravated by the return home of the defeated UNLA soldiers, who were
unwilling to bow to the authority of the elders (Branch 2010: 26–31). Externally,
Museveni’s take-over cut the cord that linked the ethnic groups in the North
to power in the national state. For the people in northern Uganda, Museveni’s
seizure of power was not about promoting democracy, but, by removing a gov-
ernment dominated by Northerners, about forcing a war between the North and
the South (Finnstro¨m 2008: 74). For them, the period right after Museveni’s
take-over didn’t represent the hope for lasting peace, but rather was “a strange
time of holding one’s breath while preparing for the worst” (Dolan 2005: 72).
As it turned out, they were right to be concerned. The strategy of the NRA
in the North was rather one “of breaking their backs than of winning over the
people’s hearts” (Weekly Topic, 1 April 1987, as cited in Omara-Otunnu 1992:
453). Expecting to fight an armed rebellion in Acholiland, the NRA “launched
10Apart from some cases of window-dressing; see Lindemann (2011: 401–404).
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a counterinsurgency without an insurgency” (Branch 2007: 146). In the process,
NRA soldiers committed gross human rights violations against civilians that were
justified as both pre-emptive and retaliatory action against the UNLA soldiers.
There are countless reports of stolen cattle, male-on-male rape, illegal detentions
and the intentional spoiling of food (Amnesty International 1991). These viola-
tions were remembered vividly by many research participants, who complained
that NRA soldiers were “taking their crap in the flour that is meant for human
consumption” (Patience, l. 611; see also Sarah, ll. 329–330).11 Both as a result
of and parallel to these dynamics, a large number of armed groups that countered
the NRA’s violence and questioned Museveni’s reclamation of power emerged.12
The most important armed actors became the UPDA, the HSM, and the LRA.
The UPDA and its political wing, the Uganda People’s Democratic Move-
ment (UPDM), were established in Juba around March 1986. The force consisted
mainly of former UNLA soldiers who, after their defeat by the NRA, had retreated
into Sudan or returned to their home villages in northern Uganda (Gersony 1997:
20). They were joined by young men living in these villages who hadn’t yet been
involved in the conflict. Not least because they protected them from the NRA’s
abuse, the UPDA enjoyed widespread support by the civilian population, who in
turn provided them with food and intelligence. The group launched a number of
successful attacks against the NRA, and although it didn’t succeed in capturing
any of the towns or trading centres, it controlled large parts of the countryside
(Gersony 1997: 23). The NRA responded to these attacks with brutal violence
against the civilian population. By late 1986, the UPDA had lost support and
military strength, and struggled with fading morale after an unsuccessful military
operation (Atkinson 2010b: 287).
The vacuum that the UPDA left was quickly filled by the HSM. The HSM was
founded and led by Alice Auma, a young woman who had previously been a mem-
ber of the UPDM. Auma claimed to be possessed by a spirit named Lakwena,
the ‘messenger’,13 who instructed her to fight the newly established Ugandan
government and to bring lasting peace to Uganda. What set her apart from the
11In 1987, Museveni himself admitted to the systematic destruction in Acholiland; see Omara-
Otunnu (1992: 455).
12An Amnesty Commission report identified 22 armed groups that had resisted Museveni’s
take-over; see Hovil and Lomo (2005: 6).
13In Acholi, lakwenna stands for ‘messenger’ or ‘apostle’; Auma hence became known as Alice
Lakwena. To keep confusion at bay, I will refer to the person as Alice Auma and to the spirit
as Lakwena.
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UPDA was that she aspired to solve not only the external but the internal cri-
sis in Acholiland. Her message was one of universal peace, and by integrating
religious and spiritual elements that transcended ethnic divisions and localised
practices, it appealed to a wide array of people even beyond Acholiland (Omara-
Otunnu 1992: 455).14 While she and her following didn’t have much in the way of
military expertise,15 let alone equipment to wage war against Museveni’s forces,
their commitment to the cause made up for what they lacked in manpower, at
least in the beginning. It seems to have been that drive and fearlessness (which
was also ritually enforced by Auma) that secured the movement some surprising
victories against the otherwise superior forces of the NRA. Outside Acholiland,
the movement lacked the at least passive support of the local populations. The
movement was ultimately defeated in October 1987 in a decisive battle in the
swamps of Iganga, a place not far from Jinja town and approximately fifty miles
from Kampala. After the defeat, Auma fled the country and escaped to Kenya,
where she died in 2007.16
Concurrent with the rise of the HSM emerged another spirit-guided move-
ment, the LRA, under the guidance of Joseph Kony.17 In the beginning, the
LRA was characterised by the same elements of spirit possession and Christian-
ity as the HSM. Like Alice Auma, Joseph Kony claimed to be possessed by the
spirit of Lakwena, which instructed him to take up arms against Museveni and
fight for a better, renewed and devout society. It was backed by the LRM, the
political arm of the LRA with members mostly in the British diaspora.
Much noise has been made about the HSM and the LRA as spiritual move-
ments, often portraying northern Ugandans as a superstitious and primitive peo-
ple unable to cope with social change in a modern, democratic manner. This
interpretation served the new leadership in Kampala well, and was actively sup-
ported by it (see for instance Atkinson 2010b: 288–289, Dolan 2009: 238–241,
14Some authors have argued that this Christian universalism was a deliberate strategy to
attract as large a following as possible (see for instance Allen 1991: 395, Omara-Otunnu 1992:
455).
15Though some high-ranking military men joined the movement, including Colonel John
Kennedy Kilama, a former battalion commander in the army (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 459).
16The history of the HSM (and its predecessor, the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces) and Alice
Auma can only be treated in passing here; for further reference, see Allen (1991), Behrend
(1999), Omara-Otunnu (1992).
17In its early days, the LRA called itself – in line with its self-understanding as the successor
to the HSM – Holy Spirit Movement II, then quickly and briefly became the United Democratic
Christian Army and the Lord’s Salvation Army before permanently settling on the name Lord’s
Resistance Army (Dolan 2005: 74, Vinci 2005: 366).
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Finnstro¨m 2013: 114, Omara-Otunnu 1992: 457–458). By extension, it labelled
all Acholi claims as illegitimate and irrational, thereby distracting from the polit-
ical problems at the heart of the conflict. Moreover, it made it possible to uphold
the image of Uganda as an African success story that both the government and
the international community were invested in. It also sat comfortably with West-
ern discourses about the tribal nature of African politics at large. Whatever
the concrete nature of the HSM’s religio-political vision, one shouldn’t read too
much into it. It suffices to say that in a situation of existential insecurity and
political impotence, Auma’s message struck a nerve among her fellow northern
Ugandans:18
Lakwena was merely a vehicle through which social discontent in the
North of Uganda found expression. She was able to gain tenacious
followers who were prepared to risk their lives against all odds because
a cross-section of marginalised inhabitants recognised her as a symbol
of both their plight and aspirations. (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 458)
During Museveni’s time in office, the de-legitimation of northern Ugandans’
claims to power became a constant in the relationship between the North and
the government in Kampala. The conflict did not just mirror and deepen ethnic
cleavages; it also created “essentially two separate countries: a mostly peaceful
and relatively prosperous south [...] and a war-torn, impoverished, isolated north”
(Atkinson 2010b: 284). This perception was also echoed by the interviewees:
If you look closely at the way we are treated in northern Uganda,
western Uganda and eastern Uganda, there is a difference. [...] I also
remember during the time when I was still in captivity, Kony said he
would not have started this rebellion but what made him get into it
was the regional differences. The Acholi are discriminated against by
other tribes. That was the reason why he decided to start this rebel-
lion, so that he can become president, leading on this side of Gulu.
Museveni would lead the other side of Kampala and beyond, because
18A similar judgement has been voiced by Tim Allen (1991: 396): “In a situation in which
structures articulating former orthodoxies have crumbled, and the state has been unable to
replace them with effective administrative and legal institutions, spirit possession has been
crucially important in negotiations with the realm beyond moral intercourse, and with estab-
lishing a degree of social accountability. [...] In a world turned upside down, where society is
perpetually being unconsciously and consciously reinvented, where witchcraft and sorcery are
widely believed to be the most common cause of mortality, where the sphere beyond moral
interaction is a frightening aspect of daily life, spirit possession has helped make some sense of
the confusion.”
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of these differences that have separated us. The way I also see it,
there is inequality on many issues including the roads, hospitals, and
environment. I travelled through Masaka19 and beyond and realised
there is a big difference. (Faith, ll. 1156–1181)
While the NRA’s offensive in the North was, in the beginning, based on an
“imagined insurgency” (Branch 2007: 148), armed rebellion soon became a self-
fulfilling prophecy, with a confusingly large number of actors engaged in warfare.
With the end of Museveni’s bush war, civil war had not in fact ended, but had
shifted northwards (Finnstro¨m 2008: 69). As usual, it was the civilian popula-
tion who had to bear the brunt. The NRA met the uprising with brute force,
and often pre-emptive or retaliatory action directed against civilians. During
the first years of the conflict, the lines weren’t nearly as clear as they appear
today: “Back then, people were not running away from the LRA soldiers, they
were running away from the government troops” (George, ll. 608–610). In fact,
all major forces engaged in massive looting, killing, and burning (Dolan 2005: 74).
Fighting back and fading support, early to mid 1990
In May 1988, the UPDA signed a peace accord with the Ugandan government.
Its members either demobilised, or joined one of the remaining forces: the gov-
ernment forces or the LRA. By 1989, the LRA had become the only viable group
opposing the Ugandan government. On both sides, violence against civilians
continued throughout 1989 and 1990. In April 1991, the government launched
Operation North, a counterinsurgency campaign that would last for four months.
Planned as a mass screening operation in search of armed combatants and intelli-
gence, the operation resulted in large-scale human rights violations by the NRA:
looting, arrests and detentions, rape, torture, and killings (Atkinson 2010b: 290).
In addition to this search-and-destroy mission, Operation North included the cre-
ation of so-called ‘arrow groups’: groups of young men armed with spears and
arrows, machetes, or sticks and mobilised to support the fight against the LRA.
As the fights intensified, the NRA decided that the arrow groups should handle
the LRA on their own; a decision that subjected the civilian population to violent
retaliation by the LRA. This was also the time when the LRA started to system-
atically maim people by cutting off their lips, ears, hands, and legs. The LRA’s
19Masaka is a large town with more than 100’000 inhabitants located in the Central Region
of Uganda, approximately 140 kilometres South-West of Kampala.
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violence and the NRA’s passivity sent two messages to the civilian population:
one, that they shouldn’t cooperate with the government forces, and two, that
they couldn’t count on the government’s protection if they did.
After these violent excesses, between 1992 and 1993, the violence decreased.
Betty Atuku Bigombe, by then Minister of Pacification of the North, initiated
meetings between representatives of the Ugandan government and the LRA that
led to the 1994 Peace Talks. However, the negotiations came to a sudden halt
when Museveni set an ultimatum for the fighters to come out of the bush within
seven days. The abrupt ending of the Peace Talks was rumoured to be a conse-
quence of the Sudanese involvement (Atkinson 2010a: 206–207). In fact, around
that time, contact between the Sudanese government and the LRA was estab-
lished, though it remains unclear whether this contact preceded or followed the
collapse of the peace process (Atkinson 2010b: 295). After that, violence spiked
again, and northern Uganda became the site of a number of large-scale massacres
with several hundred victims, including the Atiak massacre in April 1995, the
attacks on the Karuma and Acholpi refugee camps in March and July 1996, the
abduction of 139 girls from a boarding school in Aboke in October 1996, and the
Lokung-Palabek massacre in January 1997 (Gersony 1997: 103–107).20 During
that time, people started to commute at night to places they considered safer –
towns, hospitals, churches – and returned to their homes and workplaces in the
morning.21
Sudanese exile, proxy war and displacement, 1996–2002
In 1995, Uganda adopted a new constitution that limited the president to two
five-year terms in office. Effectively ignoring the two terms in office he had served
before, Museveni got elected for a first term under the new constitution in May
1996 (Dolan 2009: 46). He entered his third term in office22 with the campaign
promise to defeat the LRA militarily. With the promulgation of the 1995 Consti-
tution of Uganda, the NRA became the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).
20For further reference, see Bagenda and Hovil (2003), Komakec and Schulz (2012), Owor
Ogora et al. (2007), Temmerman (2001).
21On the practice of ‘night commuting’, see Allen and Schomerus (2006), Baines and Paddon
(2012), Falk et al. (2004).
22Against common convention, I will not follow this creative counting; i.e., from 2016 to 2021,
Museveni is serving his seventh term in office and not, as is often stated, his fifth term.
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Meanwhile, the LRA had entered an alliance with the Sudanese government
that would soon prove to be consequential. After the Peace Talks of 1994 failed,
the Sudanese government started to support the LRA, both materially (with ar-
tillery and provisions) and with military bases on their territory. The conflict
quickly escalated to a proxy war between the governments of Uganda and Sudan,
with Uganda supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a guerrilla
movement that was fighting for a secular and unified Sudanese state,23 and Sudan
supporting the LRA to fight the SPLA, thereby countering Uganda’s involvement
in the conflict.
This support has led some observers to portray the LRA as warlords for
whom waging war had become a career choice, that is, a way of making a living
by spreading terror, controlling territory and looting from civilians. But the al-
liance with the Sudanese government was always a pragmatic move rather than
the result of a deliberate decision to exchange political for economic goals (Dolan
2009: 82–83). Even under Sudanese protection, the LRA tried to remain as self-
reliant as possible, for instance, by cultivating gardens. Many former combatants
described life in Sudan as relatively peaceful, prosperous, and structured by ev-
eryday routines and chores, “like at home” (Sarah, ll. 168; Elisabeth, ll. 968).
Sudanese support helped the LRA to meet the UPDF eye-to-eye, by providing su-
perior equipment and training. Under Sudanese sponsorship, the LRA was even
better equipped than the UPDF (Schomerus 2007: 41). While most combatants’
training was limited to learning how to dismantle and reassemble a gun and get-
ting used to walking long distances, Sudanese exile also meant extensive military
training for some of them. From their Sudanese bases, the LRA dispersed troops
and launched attacks in Uganda.
In September 1996 and as part of the military offensive against the LRA,
the Ugandan government started to resettle the northern Ugandan population in
so-called ‘protected villages’. Where most people had lived in scattered villages
before, they were now forced to relocate to former towns and trading centres
whose population now ranged from a few thousand to tens of thousands of inhab-
itants (Dolan 2005: 78). The government made it clear that their relocation was
mandatory; whoever stayed in the villages was considered to be in support of or
part of the LRA. At the height of the conflict, about 80 percent (more than 1.5
23Today, the SPLA is the army of the Republic of South Sudan, which has been independent
since 2011.
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million people) of the population of the war affected parts of northern Uganda
were displaced (Allen and Schomerus 2006: 70). One of the biggest issues with
the ‘protected villages’ was that they were often anything but protected, but
instead left people vulnerable to attacks by the LRA. Since the barracks of the
UPDF were located in the middle of the settlements, civilians often protected the
military rather than the other way around, creating ‘protected barracks’ instead
(Dolan 2005: 165). One former combatant angrily described the situation:
In the camps people lived all over the place, even at the outskirts,
while the government troops lived in the middle of the camp. They
would have posts of soldiers like one here, three right over there and
two on this side. Those posts were where they thought the LRA would
enter at. In the middle of the night, when the rebels started firing
guns at them, they ran away. They would run to the barracks. The
civilians would be left alone sleeping. [...] It is the reason people were
killed even in camps. The rebels burnt huts in many numbers, in
order to access the government troops who were hiding in the middle
of the camps. (John, ll. 745–764)
So-called ‘local defence units’ or ‘home guards’ – who were often poorly
trained, forcibly recruited and not exactly highly committed – had to compen-
sate for the lack of military personnel (Dolan 2005: 218–219). Moreover, civilian
compliance with UPDF demands for resettlement and their deployment as mil-
itary accessories further angered the LRA, who felt betrayed by what they saw
as cooperation with the enemy. Moreover, the camps were considered ‘easy’ (i.e,
badly protected) and lucrative targets, both for abducting new people and for
looting food delivered by relief agencies.
Not only did the government do a bad job protecting civilians in the camps,
they also made them prisoners. The camp populations were severely limited both
in their movements and activities, and in their possibilities for earning a living.
Curfew meant that civilians couldn’t move too far from the camps to cultivate
their gardens. Apart from the sanctions imposed by the UPDF and the risk of
running into LRA units, movement was further restricted by land mines planted
by one side or the other (Dolan 2009: 120). In most cases, people couldn’t cul-
tivate enough to feed themselves, and were highly reliant on often unpredictable
food deliveries. While some created surpluses and sold them in town, often times,
trade was not primarily motivated by excess production, but rather by the ex-
change of goods for cash-bound commodities like soap, medication, or dowry
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payments (Dolan 2009: 117–118). Life in the camps debilitated people by mak-
ing them dependent on aid and keeping them from earning an income, and by
subjecting them to inhumane living conditions. The crowded living arrangements,
lack of sanitary facilities, and malnutrition led to the spread of diseases like HIV
and Ebola (Dolan 2009: 162–164). Camp life also broke with many traditions
that were vital for the cultural identity of the Acholi people, like storytelling,
funerals and burials, marriages, and dances. The cramped living conditions, lack
of privacy, and exposure of children and adolescents to the sexual activities of
their parents gave rise to what interviewees have described as moral decay: a
high prevalence of prostitution, early sexual relationships, and pregnancies with-
out proper courtship and marriage (Dolan 2009: 170–171). These dynamics were
also described by some of the interviewees:
In the camps, mothers, children and fathers to the children all slept
in one house or room. You would sleep with your eldest daughter in
the same room and probably if your husband returns drunk at night,
he would come asking for sex. Your eldest daughter would be in the
room listening to whatever would be happening. The girl then decides
to leave the home and go find a husband. And it’s the reason many
of the young girls gave birth to children while they were in camps.
(Janet, ll. 1431–1443)
The failure to keep up with gender-specific expectations led to high rates of
suicide, domestic violence and substance abuse, especially among men. Women,
in turn, were often left alone with the responsibility for taking care of the family.
In sum, lacking overall commitment and resources made the camps sites of
the abuse of civilians rather than of their protection (Dolan 2009: 151). Dolan
(2009) has made a compelling case that the large-scale and long-term resettlement
wasn’t a military strategy, but a manifestation of social torture meant to put the
people in northern Uganda ‘in their place’, to punish and make them bow down
to the government in the South. The government actions and inaction didn’t
do much to discourage the suspicion that the camps weren’t meant to protect
civilians, but to penalise them and keep them from supporting the LRA (Dolan
2009: 109).
By that time, there was a lot of international involvement through humani-
tarian and relief agencies. While international political bodies shied away from
confronting the issue politically, relief agencies stepped in. By 1997, Gulu Sup-
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port the Children Organisation (GUSCO)24, an NGO operating in Gulu, had
founded a reception centre for returning combatants.
Although Museveni refused to talk to the LRA, discussions with other actors
intensified. Different societal groups campaigned for a non-military solution to
the conflict, which resulted in the passing of the Amnesty Act in late 1999. The
Amnesty Act provided a blanket amnesty not just for members of the LRA, but
for “any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986,
engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of
the Republic of Uganda” (Government of Uganda 2000). In late 1999, the gov-
ernments of Sudan and Uganda reached an agreement to cease supporting each
other’s non-state armed groups. While the so-called Nairobi agreement didn’t
create binding force (Khartoum continued to provide the LRA with ammunition
and food), it certainly antagonised the LRA, which was excluded from negotia-
tions that were basically about them. At the same time, the relationship between
Khartoum and the LRA deteriorated because the LRA had started to attack civil-
ian settlements close to their bases, and it then turned sour when the Sudanese
government requested that the LRA relocate a thousand kilometres northwards
on short notice (Dolan 2009: 83).25 The LRA retaliated for Uganda’s involvement
in Sudanese politics quickly; within two weeks, they re-entered Uganda from Su-
dan. Civilians who had begun to leave the camps were forced back into them
around January 2000. With conflicting statements going back and forth about
the LRA’s impending defeat and civilians’ return into the camps, the government
subjected civilians to an unnecessarily insecure and vulnerable situation, as one
interviewee lamented:
The government even goes ahead to share information on all media
platforms that the rebels are already powerless and the civilians start
to become relaxed about the war. Thereafter you hear that forty
people have been abducted at a certain place. The rebels do this to
avenge. The government should be made responsible for that. If the
government was telling the people to be aware that the rebels are still
strong, and that people should limit their movement, people wouldn’t
24GUSCO is a community based NGO located in Gulu, and one of the longest-standing actors
in northern Uganda that has been operational (with interruptions) up to today. Funding comes
from different donors; for instance, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)
which helped GUSCO to set up the first reception centre in 1997 and UNICEF (Allen and
Schomerus 2006: 77).
25Namely, from Nisitu, a market ten kilometres south of Juba, to Jebelein, which today is just
across the South Sudanese border, on Sudanese territory, 350 kilometres south of Khartoum.
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have been abducted in large numbers like it happened. (John, ll.
2366–2379)
Against these persistent insecurities, a ‘decongestion plan’ to resettle people
from the camps in an area within their parish of origin (not necessarily their home
parish) was set in motion in November 2000. Rather than allowing people to go
home, this effectively meant splitting camps into smaller units.
In March 2001, Museveni was re-elected for a fourth term. Election results
showed a clear divide between the regions most affected by the war and the rest
of the country: In the former districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader (the heart
of Acholiland), Museveni was supported by only 13.7 percent of the electorate,
whereas he won 71.7 percent of the votes in the rest of the country.26 Clearly,
war further divided the country politically into those affected by and those spared
from it.
Renewed attacks, retaliation and shifting alliances, 2002–2006
The situation took a new turn in December 2001, when the US Department of
State classified the LRA as a terrorist organisation in response to the 9/11 attacks
(Reeker 2001). This decision was based on the LRA’s link to Khartoum, which
had at some point been home to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Khartoum,
though admitting that there had been an arrangement in the past, was eager
to deny continued support for the LRA (International Crisis Group 2004: 7).
While the Sudanese government does seem to have stopped supplying the LRA
with ammunition and food at some point, this hiatus was rather short-lived. But
more importantly, it gave way to negotiations between the governments of Sudan
and Uganda on joint action against the LRA.
Ugandan troops had been unofficially deployed in Sudan throughout the 1990s,
with regular sightings from 1996 onwards (Schomerus 2012b: 128). From 1995,
UPDF and SPLA forces had been cooperating by sharing intelligence and pro-
viding material support to each other. Sudan, in turn, fought a proxy war with
Uganda by supporting the LRA to fight the SPLA. But with the LRA being listed
26The last figure includes poor results in the neighbouring Langi districts of Apac and Lira
(21.8 and 19.9 percent respectively). My own calculations are based on the official election
results published by The Electoral Commission (2001).
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as a terrorist organisation, priorities changed and forced Sudan to withdraw from
their engagement with the LRA. In early 2002, the governments of Uganda and
Sudan reached an agreement that allowed the UPDF to launch attacks on LRA
bases within Sudan. Operation Iron Fist was started in March 2002. It came
with the mass deployment of 10’000 soldiers – and high casualties on both sides:
“seen from northern Uganda the only signs of military activity were trucks carry-
ing live soldiers northwards and corpses southwards” (Dolan 2005: 89). Despite
the enormous efforts, the operation did not succeed in capturing Kony, but in-
stead pushed the LRA back into Uganda, extending its area of operation beyond
Acholiland into the regions of Lango and Teso (Lomo and Hovil 2004: 6). In
2003, the conflict shifted into eastern Uganda, up to Soroti and Katakwi (Dolan
2005: 91), and the advance was accompanied by a spike in abductions and the
re-emergence of night commuting. As a response and with support from Ugandan
government troops, a number of defence units – also referred to as home guards
– emerged inside and outside the camps, including the Amuka in Teso, the Rhino
Boys in Lira and Soroti, the Frontier Guards in Kitgum, and the Arrow Boys
in South(ern) Sudan (Dolan 2005: 92, Koos 2014, Lomo and Hovil 2004). Their
creation and support by the Ugandan government further antagonised the LRA,
and helped to blur the lines between combatants and civilians.
But there were also important changes in the legal dimension of the conflict
that contributed to its continuation. In March 2002, Uganda passed the Anti-
Terrorism Act, which, while making no reference to the Amnesty Act, basically
negated it and was perceived as an exclusion of senior LRA members from the
Amnesty Act (Dolan 2009: 53). In December 2003, Museveni decided to refer the
case to the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC). The referral
and its timing were widely criticised as undermining an ongoing process of conflict
resolution; the RLP,27 for instance, commented that the referral “did not reflect
an honest desire to meet international obligations under the Statute, but was a
trump card to reassert democratic credentials at the international level” (Refugee
Law Project 2004: 5). In October 2005, the ICC issued arrest warrants for the
LRA leadership, namely, Joseph Kony, Otti Vincent, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic
Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya. The initial indictments listed 33 crimes, including
21 counts of war crimes and 12 counts of crimes against humanity.28
27The RLP is a research institute belonging to the School of Law at the Makerere University
in Kampala, Uganda, and that also supported this research project.
28While Dominic Ongwen was initially charged with the lowest number of counts, namely
seven, the pre-trial hearings resulted in the confirmation of 70 charges against him (International
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Ceasefire and negotiations: The Juba Peace Talks, 2006–2008
The presidential elections of February 2006 confirmed Museveni in office for a
fifth term. Again, the results showed a clear rejection of Museveni in the North,
where he received a total of 15.9 percent of the valid votes in the districts of
Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader,29 and 61.0 percent in the rest of the country.30 What
becomes apparent in the results is that the voting in the 2006 elections happened
along political rather than ethnic lines (Tripp 2010: 40). Around the same time,
most probably in late 2005 or early 2006, the Sudanese government stopped sup-
porting the LRA (Schomerus 2007: 25). The end of the Sudanese civil war and
the creation of the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS) gave
way to negotiations between the latter and the LRA. Although the LRA had lost
Sudanese military support, the South Sudanese acknowledged their cause and the
Ugandan government’s lack of commitment to a peaceful solution. By February
2006, they had agreed on the GoSS’s role as mediator in negotiations between
the LRA and the GoU, and on the cessation of hostilities on South Sudanese
territory (Atkinson 2010a: 210).
The negotiations got off to a slow start, not least because the GoU’s commit-
ment to the talks seemed questionable, with announcements and actions going
back and forth between dialogue and military action (Atkinson 2010a: 213–214).
The talks that became known as the Juba Peace Talks formally started on 14 July
2006.31 The two parties quickly agreed on five agenda items: (1) the cessation of
hostilities, (2) comprehensive political solutions, (3) justice and accountability,
(4) demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and (5) permanent ceasefire
(Schomerus 2012a: 94). The LRA’s opening demand was ceasefire, a claim that
was quickly rejected by the Ugandan government. On 12 August, Raska Lukwiya,
for whom the ICC had issued a arrest warrant, was killed in battle, which put
another damper on the negotiations. Quite surprisingly, the delegations adopted
Criminal Court 2016a). On the process and its perception in northern Uganda and among
former combatants, see Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
29He also performed poorly (<20 percent) in the northern districts of Lira and Apac, and in
the war-affected eastern districts of Soroti, Amuria, and Kabermaido.
30Looking at the official election results, which have only been published in a 221 page
document as detailed results by polling station and with little data aggregation, one cannot
help but think that this format is intentional, an effort to drown potential analysts in data.
31I will give only a very short summary of the Juba Peace Talks; a comprehensive account is
Schomerus (2012a).
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a Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement only two weeks later. In this early
stage, another important source of conflict had already become apparent, namely,
the outstanding ICC warrants. While the Ugandan government went on to offer
amnesty to the top commanders (including Kony), the ICC insisted on the le-
gal force of the warrants. Repeated violations (or allegations thereof) of the CoH
agreement became important stumbling blocks over the next months. While such
allegations were made against both sides, breaches by the UPDF seem to have
been more frequent and serious (Atkinson 2010a: 215). As a result of the dif-
ficulties arising in its implementation, the CoH was amended in November, and
extended in December until the end of February 2007.
In late February, the LRA rejected the renewal of the ceasefire agreement that
was about to expire. By the end of 2006, having lost trust and confidence in the
GoSS’s capacity to provide effective and impartial mediation (Atkinson 2010a:
217), the LRA rejected the involvement of the GoSS and of vice president and
chief mediator Riek Machar in any further talks and Juba as the space for negoti-
ations. A series of negotiations followed, and the talks were resumed in May 2007.
Shortly after that, the parties signed Agenda Item 2 on comprehensive solutions
that addressed questions like the integration of LRA members into the army, the
dissolution of the camps, and programs for post-war recovery (Atkinson 2010b:
312). Only eight weeks later, on 29 June 2007, they agreed on Agenda Item
3, which dealt with questions of accountability and reconciliation. But rumours
about parallel negotiations without the LRA’s involvement and cash-outs paid to
LRA members fuelled their delegation’s mistrust (Schomerus 2012a: 170–179).
The suspicions led to the execution of Otti Vincent, a high-ranking LRA com-
mander engaged in the talks, on the orders of Kony, who was concerned – possibly
rightfully – that Otti was plotting with the Ugandan government behind his back
(Schomerus 2012a: 177–180). The talks were resumed only six months later, in
January 2008. In February, additions to the already signed Agenda Items 2 and 3
and a final agreement on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
and a permanent ceasefire were negotiated. On 10 April, Kony was supposed to
add his signature to the agreement before it would be signed by Museveni four
days later. But Kony didn’t show for the signing, supposedly because he was
dissatisfied with some of the provisions on accountability, especially ambiguities
about the fate of the ICC warrants. Another deadline to sign the peace agree-
ment, accompanied by a ceasefire and repeated verbal confirmations by Museveni
that he would request the ICC to defer or suspend the arrest warrants, was set
for 29–30 November 2008. Again, Kony didn’t show up, and as Uganda didn’t
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waste much time before launching another attack only two weeks later, the peace
process was soon considered unsuccessful.
In sum, the negotiations failed as a result of mistrust on both sides, and not
least because of legal hurdles and insecurities that couldn’t be resolved sufficiently
in the negotiations. A number of interviewees insisted that the failure of the peace
process was ultimately due to the ICC warrants:
I really thought the peace talks were going to bear fruits and we could
rest from the suffering we have gone through in captivity. And back
then I really had hope because I saw lots of traditional leaders from
Acholiland and also so many members of Parliament, and different
people from different departments of the UPDF, soldiers with higher
ranks. [...] [M]ost of the issues on the agenda were signed already,
I understand that there was a part Kony was supposed to sign and
he did not sign it, he gave a condition that if they want him to sign
the paper, the ICC issue must be removed. [...] According to me, I
think Kony was serious about the peace agreement, the only thing
that spoiled it was the ICC. (Joel, ll. 442–485)
While the peace talks hadn’t resulted in the resolution of the conflict, the war
had left northern Uganda, and the transition on the ground was under way. Peo-
ple hesitantly started to leave the camps again, moving back home or to smaller
‘decongestion’ camps, or they stayed in the camps and started to cultivate the
surrounding area again.
Withdrawal into Congo and CAR, December 2008–2010
The Juba Peace Talks also meant peace for South Sudan. By the end of 2006,
the LRA had left their bases in South Sudan and relocated all of their units to
Garamba National Park in the DRC (Cakaj 2010: 4). In Garamba, the level of
violence and abductions decreased considerably. The LRA and the Congolese gov-
ernment lived alongside each other in blissful ignorance until July–August 2008,
when the Congolese army, the Forces Arme´es de la Re´publique De´mocratique du
Congo (FARDC) started to station troops on both sides of the park. The LRA re-
sponded to this perceived provocation with attacks against Congolese and South
Sudanese civilians, and also engaged in battles with troops of the SPLA and
FARDC (Atkinson 2010b: 221). Shortly thereafter, hostilities stopped to allow
for the signing of the peace agreements scheduled for 29–30 November. But just
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two weeks after the deadline passed, on 14 December 2008, and with support from
the United States African Command (AFRICOM), the UPDF began attacking
settlements of the LRA in Garamba National Park. The large-scale attacks be-
came known as Operation Lightning Thunder. In response, violence by the LRA
against civilians flared again. In late December 2008 and January 2009, and
again a year later, the LRA launched a series of large-scale attacks on the civilian
populations in northern Congo that became known as the Christmas massacres.32
Since then, the LRA has been slowly but steadily diminished both through mil-
itary interventions by the Ugandan forces (with the direct and indirect support
of the US and the African Union) and through defections. By the end of 2010,
the LRA had been decimated to an estimated force of 400 fighters (Cakaj 2010,
Lancaster and Cakaj 2013: 55).
Recent developments and current state
It is doubtful whether the LRA still aims at overthrowing the Ugandan govern-
ment. Vinci (2007) made a compelling argument that today’s LRA is in mere
survival mode, not being in a position to make substantial strides towards their
self-declared goal, surviving on revenue streams that undermine their credibility,
being both too weak to fight and too vulnerable to lay down their guns. With the
ongoing trial of Dominic Ongwen at the ICC,33 and the pre-trial hearings in the
case against Thomas Kwoyelo at the International Crimes Division (ICD) at the
High Court of Uganda, it is unclear whether the top commanders will be inclined
to defect only to face prosecution.
Those who are wanted by the ICC or who fear criminal prosecution and those
born into the LRA arguably do not have much of an incentive or even inclina-
tion to leave. There are only speculative numbers on the current troop strength
of the LRA. In June 2017, Cakaj (2017c) estimated that there are fewer than
80 active fighters remaining (plus wives and young children), supported by an
unspecified and ever shifting number of temporary captives used as porters and
guides. Whatever the exact number of fighters, the LRA has been significantly
32For further reference, see Human Rights Watch (2009, 2010).
33The trial of Dominic Ongwen began on 6 December 2016. In January 2017,
the prosecution started to present its case, which continued throughout 2017 and was
concluded on 12 April 2018. The process is documented on the ICC’s homepage:
https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen. Summaries of the trials dates can be found at
https://www.ijmonitor.org/category/lra-trials.
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weakened in recent years, and it is unlikely that they will regain strength any
time soon. Recent defections of high-ranking officers34 and of a whole unit in
December 2013 under the leadership of Okello Okutti have been severe setbacks
for the LRA. Credible reports of a mutiny against Kony (Cakaj 2015a), as well as
rumours about his delicate state of health (Invisible Children 2015, Owich 2017)
and of the disengagement of at least three groups (Cakaj 2015b: 9), likewise point
to a weakened leadership.
Over the last years, Kony has made some moves to strengthen control and
command; most visibly, by promoting younger fighters into positions of responsi-
bility and demoting senior commanders (Lancaster and Cakaj 2013: 16). Kony’s
own children Salim, Ali and Candit, who are, as of 2018, supposedly 26, 24 and
14 years old, have been continuously promoted, and it is rumoured that Kony is
preparing one of his older sons to become his successor (Cakaj 2015b, United Na-
tions Security Council 2016a,b). Moreover, the LRA seems to draw more heavily
on female combatants as fighters. Most recently, non-Acholi combatants have
risen in the ranks that have been previously reserved for fighters of Ugandan ori-
gin.
The cessation of Sudanese support has presented a challenge for the survival of
the LRA. In recent years, the LRA has increasingly engaged in trading commodi-
ties, particularly, by poaching elephants in Garamba National Park and trading
the ivory tusks for ammunition, equipment and food in Sudan (Agger and Hut-
son 2013, Cakaj 2015b, Christy 2015, Titeca 2013).35 While this new source of
income has proven to be crucial to the survival of the group, it has come at a
price. Combatants who have recently defected or been captured report a growing
disillusionment with the cause of the LRA (Cakaj 2011) that is only aggravated
by the use of strategies that de-legitimise their stated political goals. The re-
cruitment of more and more non-Acholi soldiers also means that many of today’s
members do not relate at all to their political struggle.
As the capacity of the LRA has considerably weakened, the efforts to demo-
bilise its remnants have decreased as well. In June 2016, the US announced that
it would withdraw its troops (an estimated force of 2’500 fighters) from CAR by
34Namely, Opiyo Sam, June 2014; Dominic Ongwen, January 2015; and Okot Odek, February
2016.
35To a lesser extent, the LRA has also traded raw materials like gold and diamonds looted
from artisanal miners in CAR (Cakaj 2015b: 16).
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the end of 2016 (Associated Press 2016). While Kony is still out there, supposedly
hiding in Kafia Kingi (Cakaj 2015b) or in southern Dafur (Kasasira 2016), the
US stated that its mission is fulfilled, since the LRA combatants “have been suf-
ficiently degraded” (Associated Press 2016). In August 2016, the UPDF started
to withdraw its troops stationed in CAR, and announced that it would be out
by the end of the year. Since April 2017, no armed actors are actively engaged
in fighting the LRA anymore (Cakaj and Titeca 2017).
This withdrawal and the history of the LRA – one of the longest-lived non-
state armed groups worldwide – poses the question of how committed the Ugan-
dan government was and is in its fight against the LRA (see also Dolan 2009:
72–73). Some observers have suspected that its interest was limited to keeping
the LRA weak enough not to pose a direct threat to the government’s grip on
power, but relevant enough that it could ask for assistance in fighting it. They
have argued that, by exploiting the carefully fabricated image of vulnerability
and strength to their advantage, the Ugandan government is actually engaging
in strategies of extraversion.36 While the LRA is at a historic low, it is unclear
whether the withdrawal of its adversaries is giving the LRA the chance to re-
plenish their ranks. The re-election of Museveni in February 2016 in a heated
race whose free and fair circumstances were debatable (Do¨rrie and Schlindwein
2016, European Union Election Observation Mission 2016, Kwon et al. 2016) cer-
tainly didn’t help the case. Rumour has it that Museveni (ironically, not unlike
Kony) is preparing his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who was promoted in May
2016 to Major General in the UPDF, to become his successor. Up to today, the
grievances that gave rise to the LRA remain unresolved, and might even outlive
their protagonists.
Looking at Uganda’s and the LRA’s history helps to understand the reasons
for the latter’s puzzling resilience on the macro level; that is, it is important to
understand the political environment in which the LRA emerged and survives
up to today. From this perspective, the LRA’s survival is the consequence of a
number of contributing factors: First, the lack of commitment to and challenges
in militarily defeating the LRA. The reluctance to put any more effort into this
project has only recently been underscored by the withdrawal of U.S. troops in
March 2017, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Ugandan and African Union
36See, for instance, Fisher (2014). On the use of shadow soldiers, see Mwenda (2010). A
similar argument on the “benefits of famine” has been presented by Keen (2008).
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forces in April 2017 (Okiror 2017). Second, the conflicting messages sent out to
active fighters between general amnesty and international prosecution have time
and again undermined an effective demobilisation of the LRA. The ongoing trials
of Dominic Ongwen and Thomas Kwoyelo, the slow and only partial renewal of
the Amnesty Act, and the dissolution of reporting sites following the withdrawal
of troops on the ground have added to a sense of legal insecurity, and will proba-
bly further discourage active combatants from returning from the bush. But most
important, the Ugandan government has never addressed the problems that lie
at the roots of the insurgency of the LRA and its at times numerous competi-
tors. It has never given priority to investigating and prosecuting (and, in fact,
has even contributed to) the abuse of civilians in northern Uganda by soldiers
of the NRA/M;37 their displacement, impoverishment and social dislocation in
the camps, and the struggle over land that resulted; their vulnerability to being
recruited into armed groups at a tender age, be it as home guards or combatants,
thereby severely affecting their chances to earn a living today; and their marginal-
isation in the nation’s development, particular in regard to infrastructure (roads,
water, electricity, and health care) and education. For large parts of the country,
Museveni and his government stand for a period of steady, if modest, growth.
While everybody complains about corruption in the government and the mili-
tary, the debilitating effects of decentralisation, and Museveni’s overstaying in
power, many, especially among the rural population, are satisfied enough or too
afraid to bet on the possibility of political change by raising their voice against
the incumbent.
Given these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the remnants of the LRA
will give up the fight anytime soon. And even if today’s LRA is just a shadow of
the fighting force it was at the height of the conflict, its perseverance is a discon-
certing reality. Though it is improbable that the LRA will return to Uganda, a
small number of combatants abducted in Uganda and their children born in the
bush are still returning, joining a much larger number of young combatants who
have returned over the years. Their presence is as challenging for them as it is for
the society and communities they live in. Many former combatants have grown
into adults, and their perspectives on their lives continue to shape the ideas and
visions northern Uganda has about itself. Their stories become part of its story
and are both disruptive and productive. To tell these stories, and to show how
37Though Yoweri Museveni admitted to and condemned these atrocities during a military
function in January 2014, and promised a thorough investigation of these cases and legal pros-
ecution of the culprits (Kwesiga et al. 2014), so far, no action to that end has been undertaken.
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they relate to the struggles (northern) Uganda faces today, will be part of the
following analysis.
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Analysis
4.1 Getting a gun and becoming a soldier:
Initiation and socialisation
Abstract
What does it mean to become part of an armed group? Why and how do people
become professional fighters? A number of studies (see for instance Brett and
Specht 2004, Richards 2008, Utas 2003) have shown that the decision to pick up
a gun and join an armed group is complex and influenced by a number of envi-
ronmental, situational, normative and individual aspects. Understanding what
motivates combatants is further complicated by the fact that people’s attitudes
may change as they act (Gates 2011, Littman and Paluck 2015). But what hap-
pens if there is no such decision to begin with? How do people become something
they never aspired to be, and how do they get good at it? In this chapter, I will
describe the process of initiation and socialisation into the LRA. I will show that
becoming a member of the LRA is not experienced as a singular event, but as a
process that is performed through a number of status passages: abduction and
endurance training, registration, getting a gun, military training and education,
and receiving a rank. I will argue that the incremental inclusion of new recruits
into the LRA is crucial to understanding how they became committed and loyal
fighters, or, at the very least, combatants who were less invested in getting out
than in making the most of being in the organisation.
Abduction and endurance training
The majority of the combatants joined the LRA by force, i.e. by abduction at
gunpoint.1 Typically, they were abducted at night, and sometimes during the
1Only a small proportion of combatants joined the LRA voluntarily in its early days, and
most of them have since risen in the ranks or died. Since circa 1994, volunteers have been
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day while in or on their way to or from the gardens they cultivated. Others
were caught on their way to or at the very places they commuted to during the
night, trying to escape abduction: public places in town (like churches, schools,
hospitals, courts or even the streets), make-shift hideouts in the bush (referred to
as alup2), or even the ‘protected villages’ they were resettled in. Most interviewees
remembered their abduction vividly, and described what happened in detail:
It was close to midnight. [...] I was dreaming at that time and heard
gunshots from A [a place in Gulu district] centre. I went out of the
house, and after I returned to the house, I slept again. I was dream-
ing that I was abducted. I dreamt that one of us ran very fast and
couldn’t be abducted. When I ran I was so tired, I fell down. That
was when I woke up from my dream. Upon waking up I saw the rebels
in the house ordering all of us to get up. (Mercy, ll. 105–120)
My first abduction, it was due to a food problem. It was around 8
pm, and all my friends with whom we lived had already eaten at their
homes. So they came to me and told me to now go to the alup. [...]
And I told them: “I am hungry, I cannot go like this.” So when the
water boiled I prepared the bread and I was supposed to carry the
bread down. That was when I saw very bright torch lights surround-
ing the hut I was in and even all the people outside at the wang oo
[fire place].3 I was still inside and thus was the only one who had not
been abducted yet. I saw a bright torchlight and when I wanted to
get out there, they were, they were the ones with the light. (Charles,
ll. 416–438)
When I was abducted, it was my first time living here. I had just spent
maybe two weeks here because our family used to live in Jinja4. It
was at 1 am at night when we all slept. All of a sudden we realised our
hands were caught. We lived in the center but that day we had gone
to the bush to hide from the rebels. We had been warned to go take
refuge before and my grandmother decided to go to a certain home at
virtually absent (apart maybe from those who rejoined after escape) (Blattman and Annan
2008: 6). Only a small number of the volunteers returned from the bush – among them,
Brigadier Kenneth Banya, Major General Caesar Acellam, and Brigadier Sam Kolo.
2Throughout the analysis, I will introduce the Acholi terms wherever useful. Often, different
spellings coexist; here, I will use the spellings and translations suggested in Odonga (2005) and
by my Acholi research assistants.
3The fire place has a special meaning in Acholi culture, since it is a popular place to gather,
tell stories and educate children. See also Oloya (2013: 42).
4Jinja is a town in eastern Uganda, located approximately 80 kilometres east of Kampala.
Except for a short period in 1987, when the HSM tried to take Kampala, Jinja was not scene
of the civil war. See also Chapter 3 starting on page 43.
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the center where many people used to sleep in. It was a big home that
housed children. At 1 am they called the name of the owner of the
house and they ordered him to open the door, which he didn’t. They
then kicked the door in and entered the house. When they entered,
they shouted: “Get up, get up, get up!”. I was just learning Acholi
back then, we all stood up and they tied our waists with ropes. We
then all went out of the house. [...] from there we were taken to a
certain house. We were many kids who were abducted, maybe ten
of us. Many other people were also abducted from the surrounding
areas. We were all put in the same house and the place was full of
people. Surprisingly, there were UPDF soldiers with their Mamba
and tankers at the center. They didn’t do anything [to help]. We
were told to enter the house. We didn’t know these people had a plan
of burning us in the house. I didn’t know. [...] They were arguing
outside whether to burn us inside or not. [...] “We have children in
there that can help us”, they argued. They continued the argument
that we could hardly hear. And then they came and pushed all of us
out of the house and we started walking. (Faith, ll. 71–128)
In these narratives of abduction, war doesn’t suddenly enter the picture; it is
already there, be it in the sound of nearby gunshots, in nightmares, rumours, or
strategies of evasion. People are abducted from the town centres and makeshift
homes they commute to at sunset, trying to prevent their abduction, trying to
get out of war’s way. Their everyday is structured by the presence of war and
their strategies to deal with it. Still, their abduction breaks quite radically with
the kind of life they are used to.
Some of my interviewees recounted that they were abducted alone, only meet-
ing other new abductees on their way to or at an assembly point. Others reported
that they were abducted together with members of the same household (siblings,
parents or uncles) or community. The main targets of these abduction mis-
sions were adolescent boys. Girls were targeted for their physical features and
(pre-)adolescent age, assuming that they hadn’t had sexual intercourse before
and were therefore less likely to have contracted HIV. For the same reason, older
women were rarely kept, but were sometimes used as guides or porters and re-
leased on the way (see also Annan et al. 2009: 7). While the LRA has often been
portrayed as an army of child soldiers, the majority of combatants were adults
(Cakaj 2010: 7).5 Most abductees were asked to take provisions they kept at their
5In my core sample, 13 (7) of 43 interviewees were presumably 18 (21) years or older upon
abduction, all of them male (see Table 1). (By comparison, the average age of draftees in the
Vietnam War was just below 20 years; after basic training or a couple of months of service else-
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place with them, or were given other luggage to carry. Typically, they continued
to walk throughout the day or night, only resting briefly to prepare and eat some
food. They were strongly discouraged, either with words or through (exemplary)
violent action, from complaining or showing signs of weakness. People witnessed
others being beaten if they couldn’t keep up with the group’s pace or if they
admitted that they were struggling. Many abductees described what happened
if they asked to rest, or were asked if they wanted to take a break:
Many children’s feet started swelling since we walked barefoot. Peo-
ple’s feet swelled, but if you told them that you were tired, they would
say they would let you rest, meaning they would kill you. You were
not supposed to say you are tired. Even if you were very tired or
your feet hurt you should persevere and move with the rest of the
people. That is how combat was. We would sleep in the rain. (Faith,
ll. 306–315)
Those people who could not walk anymore and were very tired were
killed. But they were deceived that they were being taken back home.
In that process, they picked one of the rebels to go with them and kill
them on the way. And when he came back with a machete that was
stained with blood (. . . ) [...] Then they said to us that if we failed to
walk they would do exactly the same thing to us. (Ivy, ll. 89–107)
While children who were too young or weak to keep up with these challenges
were sometimes freed, they could also be severely punished or even killed on the
way. This punishment was either performed in the open for others to see and
learn from it, or apart from the group without further discussion. Apart from
their sheer necessity, these ordeals in walking and carrying heavy luggage are a
first lesson in the normative universe of the LRA. New recruits quickly learn that
the combatants are serious, that there is no room to misstep, that one has to
be tough to survive. Moreover, new combatants come to understand that these
ordeals are a kind of test of whether they are worth keeping, that is, if they are
an asset or a liability. Joan described her experience:
When morning arrived I had carried very heavy luggage, including
where, GIs were typically around 22 years of age; Greiner 2010: 114–115.) The high percentage
of adolescents is both an effect of demographics (half of Uganda’s population is below 15 years
of age; World Health Organization 2015) and recruitment strategy (young people were targeted
because they were easier to impress). On the LRA’s recruitment strategy, see also Chapter 4.5
starting on page 148.
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groundnuts [peanuts] that overpowered me. They gave me two basins
of shelled groundnut seeds to carry. I couldn’t handle that weight. At
some point I couldn’t move with the luggage anymore, my neck hurt
and I was exhausted. I couldn’t move any longer and at some point
they noted that if I couldn’t move, I’d rather be killed. They said
that if the battle started, I wouldn’t be able to move with them and
there was no one to carry me along the way. One of the girls came
and whispered to me that if I don’t persevere, I will be killed. She
said if I couldn’t move with the luggage I should ask the rebels to
remove the luggage so that I can walk without it. (Joan, ll. 269–287)
While Joan failed to move fast enough while carrying the luggage, she demon-
strated her willingness and capability to keep up with the group’s pace by asking
to be relieved of the additional weight.
The often disproportionate use of violence upon abduction and the constant
threat of it are meant to demonstrate to new abductees that the LRA isn’t (yet)
invested in their survival, and that it will not bother to keep them unless they
manage to meet the LRA’s expectations. The stories of the interviewees depict
an environment in which new abductees are confronted with the fact that any
display of weakness or resistance can put their life at risk. They are challenged
to exhaust themselves, to go above and beyond, to avoid being singled out.
Initiation and registration
After a while – usually between a couple of days and a few weeks – new ab-
ductees were further initiated into the group. They were no longer considered
captives, but new members of the LRA. This initiation was typically marked by
an event. Many interviewees described how they were subjected to a ritual called
registration (coyo imony - to be registered as a soldier):
There was a time we were told to organise ourselves and be recruited
as combatants. We didn’t know what it was like. We were all called
to go. They said that if your name was Julie, they would count the
letters in that name or if it were Faith, how many letters were those.
If you count and tell them, they would tell you to bend your back and
you would think they are interested in doing something not so bad but
they would beat you with a wire lock. If Julie has five letters, they
would beat or flog your back five times. Even on your ankle you would
be beaten. (demonstrates) They would then tell you to stand up and
that would be the end of the recruitment process. (Faith, ll. 232–248)
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When I was in captivity for just one or two months, all new abductees
were taken for what they called registration in the army. They cut a
bunch of canes or sticks. They would call us one by one and four men
caned you using those sticks. We were caned 200 strokes on the back.
They beat us so hard and we didn’t bathe for close to three days.
You weren’t nursed and you were left to suffer with your wounds.
(Jackson, ll. 797–807)
These beatings were described as serious, and often continued until the ab-
ductee lost consciousness, sometimes just stopping short of death. The intervie-
wees told us that they were advised not to show any signs of pain or suffering
during the registration process. If they screamed or tried to protect their but-
tocks from the beating, they would receive more strokes, or more severe beatings.
Sometimes, the performance of their registration involved some kind of fake choice
exercised by the combatants:
[A]nother thing done during trainings is that they hit you with a panga
[machete], and ask you to choose between a chapati6 and a hammer,
which one you want. If you say a chapati, then the panga is put in
the fire and you are hit with it. [...] They put it on fire and when it
is hot enough then they pick it up and beat your back with it, like
this, like this (demonstrating), two lines crossing each other. After
this you go to the other side and you are a qualified soldier. [...] [If
you say hammer,] [t]hey put it [your finger] on a piece of log and hit
it with a hammer. (Charles, ll. 763–790)
As these examples show, the initiation of new combatants happened to a large
extent through violence. Like Charles, some are even forced to play a game they
can’t win, with equally bad outcomes regardless of how they act and decide.
Violent initiation was often not limited to experiencing it, but also included
performing it, for instance, by asking new combatants to do the beating. This
was often a collective task. Armed with sticks, pangas or bayonets, they either
took turns, or beat or pierced the person all at once. If they failed to do so,
or if they tried to spare their fellows by beating them too lightly, they could be
punished as well:
6Chapati is a kind of flat-bread popular in Uganda, often served cut into pieces as a side
dish or filled with eggs and vegetables as a rolex (a derivative from ‘rolled eggs’).
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There was a time I was told to beat one of my close friends. I felt
bad about it so I decided to relax my hands and beat her softly. [...]
I thought I wouldn’t be beaten for acting nice to my colleague. But
they ordered me to lie down so that my colleague beats me. She beat
me without mercy. Her strokes were so hard, I realised I was just
joking with her. They had told her that if she beats me mildly, she
would be beaten harshly in return. She was beaten on the back as
an example of how she should beat me. It was so painful to her. She
beat me seriously. (Scovia, ll. 1092–1110)
These initiation rituals closely resemble the practices of ‘beating in’ and ‘going
on a mission’ in youth gangs (see Decker 1996: 254–255). In these rituals, new
gang members are either beaten up by their fellows or asked to perform a test of
courage that typically includes perpetrating violence (for instance, engaging in a
fight with members of a rival gang). All three kinds of rituals – witnessing, per-
petrating, and being subjected to violence – were meant to initiate new members
into violence. Their registration emphasises the central role violence plays for the
organisation. As Decker (1996: 255) argues with regard to youth gangs, “[s]uch
violence always has a group context and a normative purpose: to reinforce the
ties between members while reminding them that violence lies at the core of life
in the gang”. The violence of initiation in the LRA seems to have served the same
purposes: By experiencing and performing violence, new combatants learned how
they were expected to act, but also what to expect from the organisation.
Moreover, these initiations were tests of toughness, in which new combatants
had to show they are “strong-hearted” (cwiny nwang) (Henry, ll. 673, 679) and
thereby worthy to become part of the organisation. Such subsequent approval
procedures result, as I would argue, from the forced nature of participation. They
replace, so to speak, the mutual binding commitment that characterises organi-
sations that have more or less voluntary members instead of captives.7 In an
organisation, the decision to become a member typically creates some commit-
ment to the organisation’s goals and tasks. People who decide to join an orga-
nisation – for instance, as an employee of a company – know about their terms
of engagement, their rights and duties, and base their decision to become part
of the organisation on their willingness to comply with these rules (Luhmann
1995: 36–38). At the same time, their membership status may motivate them
to do things they wouldn’t have done otherwise, because they feel committed
7As Axel Paul and I recently suggested (Paul and Ha¨rtel 2015), the combatants of the LRA
have to be seen as forced personnel or inmates in the total institution of the LRA.
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to perform even non-agreed upon tasks in their capacity as members. Organi-
sations like the LRA that recruit their personnel through force cannot count on
the same kind of membership-based commitment. Here, rituals of incremental
and performance-based inclusion like tests of toughness step in. They replace
or rather make up for the lack of initial commitment under conditions of forced
recruitment. Through these rites of initiation, new combatants were asked to
make a commitment to the LRA.
Initiation into the group The narratives of the interviewees show time and
again that, by perpetrating and taking up violence, combatants commit to the
rules of the organisation. But they also become more committed to each other
as they suffer through the same ordeals. They sympathise and bond with their
fellows over the painful experiences they themselves endure, and which they wit-
ness being done to others. Here, it is not just the rather passive experience of
violence, but also its exercise that brings new combatants closer to each other.
The perpetration of violence is always a transgression, as it violates the physi-
cal integrity of another person. It is an aversive act that most individuals try
to avoid, and that provokes strong emotional responses (Collins 2009, Grossman
2009). Violence and killing in particular are also serious violations of the norms
of the Acholi, who perform a number of rituals to appease the spirits of people
who died from an unnatural cause (Oloya 2013: 84). The collective or at least
shared transgression of these norms can be seen as a crucial element to strengthen
the in-group identity. In a quantitative study on former combatants in the LRA,
Littman and Paluck (2015) found that members who admitted to having perpe-
trated more violence also reported a higher level of identification with the group.
The interviews show that as violence became part of their everyday lives, new
combatants became further detached from their lives as civilians. They were
encouraged to unlearn to relate to their former life, and sometimes they even
started to resent those who have no idea what it was like to be in their posi-
tion. While their actions became less compatible with the norms of life at home,
combatants recounted how they became somewhat more comfortable with being
in the bush, where people didn’t question or judge them. In this sense, violence
eases their transition from civilian life to life in the bush. Violent initiation is a
central ingredient in this two-sided dynamic of detachment from civilian life and
identification with their group of combatants.
But more than anything, these violent performances of the LRA were demon-
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strations of power. Quasi-decisions like choosing between two bad alternatives
(hammer or chapati) and counting the letters in a recruit’s name to determine
the number of strokes were meant to demonstrate to the recruits that the LRA
was serious, and that its actions were not constrained by appropriateness. Most
importantly, they were designed to teach the new recruits that escape was a high
risk strategy that one shouldn’t pursue lightly:
You see, when they just abducted you and you are new, they don’t
trust you at all. That is why all newly abducted are strictly kept
together, so that you don’t find an opportunity to escape. They also
tell you that if you ever try to escape, you will be killed in front of
everyone. It happened once, a boy who was abducted from X [a place
in Agago district] was caught attempting to escape. He was beaten
with logs while everyone was watching until he died. It was so painful
to witness. I think no one ever thought of escaping afterwards. (Isaac,
ll. 65–79)
What I showed them [the people under my command] was exactly
what they [we] did; so I showed them that anyone who tries to escape
must be killed. So that was the thing I used to do while I was com-
manding the forces. For example, there were three people who tried
to escape and they were brought to me. I made them stand before
the congregation and they were cut into pieces. Nobody escaped after
that. (George, ll. 248–257)
In their narratives, both interviewees made the same point, though from two
different perspectives. While Isaac recounts the incident as a new recruit wit-
nessing the killing of a colleague, in George’s story, he is the one ordering for
escapees’ execution. Both accounts show how violent initiation served as an ef-
fective deterrent against escape. While some abductees tried to escape right away
and succeeded, many said they were too afraid of being caught and severely pun-
ished, even more so since they were monitored closely (see also Annan et al. 2006:
62). Especially in the first weeks, when new abductees weren’t yet used to this
kind of life, and constantly thought about how they could undo its violent turn,
the permanent threat of violence became perhaps the most convincing argument
for sticking it out, if only for the time being.
In their stories, the interviewees emphasised that their transition from ab-
ductee to soldier was also furthered by non-violent rituals of cleansing and com-
munion. Upon joining the LRA, new recruits were considered unholy and unclean,
as their mindset was seen as that of a civilian. Many combatants received some
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kind of baptism, in which they were sprinkled with holy water or anointed with
sheanut oil (moo yaa),8 an essence that was considered sacred and was not used
for consumption. Some were also given amulets with holy stones (Victor 2011:
64). Both rituals were meant to protect the new combatants in battles (hence,
sheanut oil was also referred to as camouflage). Their main purpose, though,
seemed to lie in their symbolic function as rituals of communion, that is, of ad-
mission to a new community of ‘holies’, as senior LRA combatants referred to
themselves. Cleansing rituals were used to make new recruits forget about civil-
ian life and to rebuild them as soldiers. The status of sheanut oil as a rare and
valued ingredient underscored the importance of the anointment as a ritual of
communion.9 As such, “the ritual [of anointment with moo yaa] became a form
of identity card, a signifier that the recruit had crossed the threshold into the fold
of the LRM/A” (Oloya 2013: 87).10
These rituals are not necessarily as schematic and public as described here
and elsewhere, and the interviewees told us that they were sometimes even left
out. This observation does not question the importance of rituals of initiation
and transition. Instead, it proves the LRA’s status as an opportunistic and flex-
ible organisation that cannot afford to stick (and, by inversion, can afford not
to stick) to its institutions regardless of the circumstances. But even if some of
these initiation rituals were modified or omitted, all combatants described how
they were subject to rituals that marked their passage from recruit to soldier.
Among these, one significant ritual is the assignment of uniforms and guns.11
Getting a gun
During their first weeks in the bush, new recruits would be closely supervised
and were typically unarmed. Their initiation into the group was deepened by the
assignment of a gun. In most cases, these were light-weight assault rifles com-
monly referred to as AK-47s or Kalashnikovs.12 This assignment could be part of
8A ritual called wiiro moo yaa (literally, anointing with sheanut oil); see also Oloya (2013:
86–90).
9In this sense, it also served as a prerequisite for commensality (Oloya 2013: 87).
10These initiation rituals are also described in Baines (2005), Hollander (2013), Victor (2011),
and Vermeij (2014). As a social practice, wiiro moo yaa imitates the anointment of rwodi (chiefs
or kings).
11Another important ritual (mostly for the female combatants) is the assignment to a house-
hold and the process of becoming a spouse, which I will detail in Chapter 4.5 starting on page
148.
12For a list of commonly used weapons, see Cakaj (2010: 17–18).
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a ceremony that confirmed their status as combatants (as described in Hollander
2013), or it could be just a casual hand-out. Most combatants handled their own
guns and were responsible for their upkeep and whereabouts.13 Some combatants
described some kind of documentation in which the guns were registered under
the name of a particular person, ensuring that the individual who lost it would
be held accountable:14
In captivity, if you are given a gun and you make the mistake of losing
it or if someone takes it, you are severely beaten. I was beaten twice
for such silly mistakes. Something I won’t forget. On that day I was
given the gun and I forgot it under a tree. When they issued guns
they registered their numbers specifying who received it. They found
out that mine was missing and of course knew for the other people
[missing their gun] too. (Scovia, ll. 587–599)
At a minimum, everybody learned how to dismantle, reassemble and shoot a
gun, regardless of whether they actively participated in battles. At least until the
late 1990s or early 2000s, guns and ammunition were even distributed among the
wives who mostly had no obligation to participate in combat, so they would be
able to defend themselves in case the battlefield shifted into the camps or reached
their temporary settlements.
Most combatants also received uniforms and gumboots, which were usually
obtained in battles (with forces of the UPDF, SPLA, or FARDC), supplied by
the Sudanese forces, or purchased in exchange for other goods (Cakaj 2010: 17).
Sometimes, combatants were requested to take the uniforms, ammunition and
gumboots, “[a]nything that is with the soldiers” (Henry, ll. 619–620), from fallen
enemy combatants. In this case, they served both as a proof of bravery on the
battlefield and as supply for the LRA (in particular, basic equipment for the new
combatants). In other instances, these tokens were picked up by so-called ‘rescue
teams’, whose task was to clear the battlefield after fighting or when the battle-
front shifted.
Uniforms served both practical and symbolic purposes. At night, they were
used as blankets, and during the day, they helped to conceal the combatants’
13This is somewhat less true for the female combatants; for the last 15 years, women were
generally forbidden to carry weapons (Cakaj 2017a).
14At times, weapons were also stored in granaries and would not be assigned to individuals.
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identity from government soldiers and civilians alike. But guns and also, in part,
uniforms had meanings that went beyond their obvious utility in confrontations
with enemy forces. They were perceived as (1) means of identification and dis-
tinction, (2) means of protection, (3) tools of empowerment, and (4) symbols of
success.
Gun and uniforms as means of identification and distinction. A common nar-
rative is that guns identified new combatants as soldiers or, literally, as ‘persons of
war’ (lumony). Handling a gun symbolised, both to others and to the combatants
themselves, that they had left their civilian life and identity behind:
When we stayed there for a while they said that they were going to
register some of us as combatants. I also went for registration. The
registration is done by caning people 100 strokes, so there we were
given strokes. Eleven of us. Then in the evening we were smeared
with sheanut oil. And the next morning, we were given guns, and
then we were soldiers already. (Ivy, ll. 169–178; my emphasis)
Once we were divided [into different groups], me and the other ab-
ductees were trained how to shoot guns. They trained us for about
one week. Afterwards we were given uniforms and guns. All of us
then realised we had become soldiers! (laughs) Do you see how funny
these people are? (Isaac, ll. 88–95)
These narratives show how the gun marks and facilitates the passage from re-
cruit to soldier. The assignment of a gun meant that one was no longer a prisoner
but a combatant, and therefore, part of the community: “everyone was the same,
provided you have a gun” (Ivy, ll. 329–330). By handling a gun, combatants
distinguished themselves from mere captives who had no gun, while becoming
equals among those who had one. Not only is the gun assigned to the new re-
cruit, but it assigns the person to her new profession, her role as a soldier. The
gun does this job better than any other piece of equipment, because it points
without any ambiguity to the task at hand: to perform in combat, to shoot and
possibly kill others. Uniforms worked in a similar, if more subtle manner: By
looking the part, new combatants eased into playing the roles assigned to them.
Guns as a means of protection. Many combatants, women in particular, voiced
conflicted feeling about holding a gun. For them, their gun symbolised two contra-
dictory things: it was a constant reminder of the violent action they were expected
to perform, but also a necessary means to protect themselves from harm. While
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not everyone was expected to go into battles all the time, and periods of heavy
fighting alternated with phases of relative calm, war was always an option. People
were prepared to leave their temporary settlements at a moment’s notice, which
often meant fighting, at least in rearguard action. Janet and Joshua explained:
If you have just been abducted and taken to their site, they teach you
everything about being a soldier, including dismantling and assem-
bling the gun. You are taught how to shoot the gun. You are as well
given ammunition. They say the gun will help you do anything. It is
used during fights and wars. Sometimes wars [fights] suddenly start.
So if you have a gun you can shoot and survive. (Janet, ll. 478–488)
Aah, as a soldier the gun protects your life. So if you don’t have
a gun it means your life is in someone else’s hands. You lived with
your colleagues and in case a fight broke out, there would be a gun to
protect yourself. If you have a gun, you can protect yourself. (Joshua,
ll. 728–734)
Apart from confrontations with the government forces, many combatants con-
firmed the need for guns in other hostile environments, in particular, among the
(South) Sudanese civilians who were portrayed as belligerent and well armed, and
in the national parks that were inhabited by wild animals. Many combatants de-
scribed how they initially felt uncomfortable handling a gun, but soon got used
to it, and even started to become attached to it:
I found life with a gun was so interesting and if I moved without a
gun I felt like some part of me was missing. [...] Where we were
our enemies used to attack us so often. That is why I felt safe and
more secure to have a gun with me. Because at that time if you were
captured by the government soldiers you were killed. If you have a
gun when someone is shooting at you, you are in a position to fight
back. (Charity, ll. 395–409)
In Charity’s narrative, the gun isn’t introduced as an instrument to cause
physical harm, but as a necessary means of protection against those who try to
attack her and her colleagues. And it seems that for many combatants, handling
a gun became not only a routine but a lifestyle. Moving without the insignia of
a soldier’s life caused some combatants to feel not only physically disarmed, but
also debilitated on a psychological level. Without a gun, you “have to live empty-
handed” (John, ll. 1070), without any means to protect yourself from harm, and
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to “fight back”, as Charity said. In an environment that put combatants at per-
manent risk, having a gun meant to reclaim some control over one’s life by taking
measures to protect it. Many combatants kept their guns even upon escape, al-
though they knew that escaping with a gun was an even more serious violation of
the LRA’s rules and also identified them as combatants to the civilian population.
Guns as a tool of empowerment. In the interviewees’ stories, the gun is ap-
preciated not only for what it is, but for what it symbolises: the reclamation
of agency. While registration rituals were about putting new combatants ‘in
their place’, designed to show them that they are powerless and not entitled to
any agency whatsoever, the assignment of a gun partly reversed this message. By
commanding a gun, new combatants not only became soldiers, but gained respect
as persons:
I really prefer being a combatant [over being a housewife], because
most of the time on the battlefield I would feel better. In most cases
we stayed in Uganda, and the commander that we were under was a
very good person. He treated combatants with respect and if things
failed he would encourage the other soldiers to try hard [...]. (Patience,
ll. 321–329)
Having a gun meant to be not only no longer on the receiving end of abuse
anymore, but also to be in a position with (albeit limited) choices. It signified to
others that one was to be treated fairly, and in some cases, combatants made use
of the gun for private ends. Male combatants in particular used their weapons
to exercise power over others, mostly their given wives. For instance, Patience
described how her given husband forced intercourse at gunpoint:
When he [Odhiambo] told me to lie down, I sat instead and he grabbed
me by my neck and said: “I can kill you, and who do you think can
arrest or punish me?” So he grabbed me and cocked his gun and
started to tear my clothes off. He then forced me to sleep with him,
and that was when I got to know sex. (Patience, ll. 150–158)
While Patience’s husband used the gun to enforce abuse and expectations of
subjugation, in other instances guns empowered those in a weaker position. Pa-
tience herself recounted an incident where she was punished by her husband over
allegations of refusing to work. In the course of the argument, he began to stab
her with the bayonet, and when she felt overwhelmed by the pain, she fought
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back: “I pressed the gun down and said to him that me coming here was not his
plan, but Kony’s. So I can make him kill me and I rest my case. I defeated him
and got his gun, I hit his head with it and then I started screaming loud enough
[for others to hear me]” (Patience, ll. 382–389). In the end, her husband was
punished by the high command for mistreating her, which improved her position
for good: “And after that, he never touched me till I came back” (Patience, ll.
421–422). In this scene, the gun worked as an equaliser between Patience and
her more powerful husband. It protected her not only in battle, but also allowed
her to stand up to her husband and his abusive behaviour. Here, the gun even
becomes a positive symbol as it allows her to resist her violation.
Guns and uniforms as symbols of success and legitimacy. Lastly, guns and
uniforms were introduced as tools that endowed both the combatants and the
LRA’s actions with some kind of performance- and identity-based legitimacy.
Carrying and wearing these military insignia meant to the combatants that they
were real soldiers instead of marauding rebels. The steady supply of uniforms and
guns affirmed that the LRA was ‘alive and kicking’, and acting as a proper armed
force. Since uniforms were usually obtained in battles and encounters with other
armed groups and enemy forces, they symbolised the LRA’s military success and
ruthlessness. And they were also used as signs of individual success, as the most
successful and respected commanders had access to more and better uniforms
and guns.
Becoming a committed insider: Training, education and social learning
Military training was part of all combatants’ initiation into life in the bush. At a
minimum, it included learning how to handle a gun: how to shoot, dismantle and
reassemble it. A number of interviewees also described being instructed on how
to parade, march, greet friendly units, and take cover, and that they received
physical training (see also Dolan 2009: 75). From their accounts, it seems that
military training was more elaborate when the LRA stayed in one place for a
longer period of time, but it often consisted merely of some basic instructions
while being permanently on the move or during prolonged periods of fighting.
Most training happened on the job: “things like dodging bullets; you just learn
while doing it” (Gabriel, ll. 121–122). Training included both classical military
training and guerrilla tactics: how to plan and execute an ambush, which goods
are valued as lootables, how to communicate with other units by using high fre-
quency (HF) radios (referred to as ‘radio calls’), how to confirm another group’s
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identity to avoid friendly fire, how to take care of battle wounds, how to detect
and spy on the enemy forces, and how to make a smokeless fire. Combatants also
acquired a set of physical skills – most of all, walking for long distances. Along-
side this more formal military training, they also learned a number of practical
survival skills. These included how to construct trenches (adaki), how to cover
their tracks so they wouldn’t be followed, how to cross large bodies of water, and
how to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Whenever combatants stayed in
one place for an extended period, they recounted that they spent much time in
gardens cultivating crops. Some combatants also received some medical training
on treating wounds or illnesses with both conventional medicine and herbs (Oloya
2013: 141–142).
While combatants often said that they did not learn any skills in captivity,
some of them elaborated at length and not without pride on how they excelled
at shooting exercises or endurance tests, reaped a rich harvest, or returned from
combat without casualties. Where did this dedication to their tasks come from?
Some interviewees argued that commitment was a requirement for survival; “be-
cause if I were not committed I would be the one to die” (George, ll. 620–622).
Showing dedication in performing the assigned tasks both decreased the level of
abuse and improved one’s immediate living conditions, for instance, through ac-
cess to better nutrition and health care and exemption from the most dangerous
missions on the battlefield. But I would argue that there is more to it. As I see
it, there is no shortcut from force to commitment. At least in the long run, sheer
force is insufficient to explain why people complied with and even excelled at
their assigned tasks. At some point, the combatants themselves had to find some
internal motivation to do what they were expected to do. The question then is at
what point external motivations become internalised, that is, when combatants
not only comply, but commit.
Becoming part of the LRA did not happen only through initiation rituals
(which challenged the new recruit in a rather passive capacity), but also through
the incremental inclusion in its tasks, the acquisition of vital skills, and the mas-
tery of all the physical and psychological challenges that came with it. In this
stage of apprenticeship, both the acquisition of knowledge and the socio-emotional
involvement in a shared task were vital for the new abductee to become, as Hun-
deide (2003) put it, a “committed insider”. People became more attached to
the group as they showed commitment towards their given tasks. This task-
bound commitment might initially or primarily have been a consequence of fear
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of punishment. However, the interviews allow for the interpretation that many
combatants became genuinely motivated to do a good job, to show some level
of proficiency and mastery at what they were doing. This shouldn’t be surpris-
ing; combatants do, as much as any human being, try to find meaning in their
actions, and a degree of immersion in human activity, thereby connecting with
others. Communities and organisations have always evolved around and made
use of this genuine desire to connect, participate, and create. This might be even
more true for communities like the LRA, which are less about finding the most
talented and resourceful members and more about creating a certain level of com-
mitment to the community as such. At the same time, training and education
demonstrated to new combatants that the group was invested in their survival
and future (Haer et al. 2011: 419–420). This may have incited expectations of
reciprocity; combatants might have felt that they ‘owed’ it to their colleagues to
try their best.
Recruits and soldiers
What does it mean for combatants to be part of the LRA? When do they start
to see themselves as soldiers? In their narratives, former combatants very clearly
differentiated between new abductees (kurut, meaning recruit, or mabuc, meaning
prisoner or captive) and genuine members of the LRA (lamony, meaning soldier,
or adwii, meaning rebel, terrorist or enemy).15 The high command encouraged
such attitudes through the incremental and performance-based incorporation of
new combatants into the everyday life of the organisation, i.e. its tasks, routines
and benefits. During their first days and weeks, new combatants typically didn’t
have a lot of responsibilities. Basically, they were restricted to walking, giving
directions and carrying goods. And they didn’t have many privileges, as they
had to eat separately from the rest of the group and were not allowed to carry a
gun or to speak unless spoken to:
That time [right after the abduction] we stayed [in one place] for a
week. While staying there we were not allowed to move anywhere, we
were under strict custody for one week. Sometimes if you wanted to
drink water and you asked, nobody would respond to it. You had to
wait until someone reacted [...]. (Ivy, ll. 138–144)
15On terminology, see also Oloya (2013: 95).
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Some even describe being used as commodities:
When I had just been taken into captivity, we [I and my later co-
wives] wouldn’t relate easily. When it was raining during that time,
they ordered me to sleep and act as a tent atop their bodies to guard
them, to prevent rain from pouring on them. It would rain on me
and they would mock me saying I was their tent. Even when you are
sleeping someplace where rain can’t reach you, you are forced out of
the tent to go into the rain. (Scovia, ll. 289–299)
Before abductees became full members, they were often fair game; senior
members didn’t shy away from confronting them with burdensome requests, or
physically abusing them without any prior offence, so they “develop that bad
heart of torturing new recruits as well” (George, ll. 297–298). Offences were also
punished more severely: “For abductees there is no punishment; they just kill
you” (Simon, ll. 170–171). While the abuse of young girls by the head of their
household or his wives was often sanctioned, many instances went unreported
because people feared repercussions, and decided to stick it out:
I used to relate with them [my co-wives] very well. But for them they
used to torture me so much. In most cases they overloaded me with
work, such as washing their children. And if I refused they beat me
up. [...] [O]ne time, I reported them to my husband. And he made
them beat each other until they all beat each other. But after that I
couldn’t rest, I was tortured so much afterwards, so I never reported
again. (Ivy, ll. 437–489)
Becoming a full member of the group meant to move up from such a position
of powerlessness and routine abuse. Rituals of initiation – being registered as a
soldier, getting a gun and receiving some military training – contributed to the
incremental inclusion of new combatants into the LRA. While the assignment
of a gun was the most visible and intuitive marker of their newfound combatant
identity, their registration and training were central to alienating them from their
civilian life and to initiating them into a new community. Moving up into the
group from its peripheries, they learned and strived to ‘dance in the middle of
the dance floor’16, trying to find a place they could handle, with regard to both
what they were expected to do and what was done to them.
16I owe this picture to my dear colleagues Philip Mader and Cornelius Moriz, who engaged
it in a discussion on the rules of academic life.
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Receiving a rank
From the organisation’s side, this process of becoming a full member of the LRA
was not only secured through negative sanctions (most importantly, corporal
punishment), but also through a system of positive incentives. To a large ex-
tent, these incentives hinged on the conferment of military ranks. The LRA’s
chain-of-command is almost an exact copy of the Ugandan army’s system of
ranks, with the following ranks in order of increasing authority: lance corporal,
corporal, sergeant, sergeant major, second lieutenant, lieutenant, captain, major,
lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier, and major general (Cakaj 2010: 7). Soldiers
with a rank and personal responsibility for a troop were referred to as comman-
ders, whereas soldiers without a rank were called privates. Though ranks were
open to both male and female combatants, women typically didn’t rise above the
rank of second lieutenant or hold more responsible positions.
Ranks were for the most part based on seniority and performance on the bat-
tlefield, and were assigned or at least approved by Kony himself.17 Promotion
to a higher rank usually came with greater privileges and responsibilities. Com-
manders led a team of soldiers and abductees, and were typically protected by
bodyguards. They commanded their team on the battlefield and in missions to
loot and abduct, and had to ensure that no one escaped. They were authorised to
make decisions about affairs concerning their unit (for instance, punishments, de-
ployment in battle, and the distribution of looted goods), and only had to consult
superiors for more far-reaching decisions. They could be punished if somebody
under their command seriously violated one of the rules or managed to escape, or
if they had too many casualties. Nevertheless, commanding a group was perceived
as one of the perks of being a commander rather than a burdensome responsi-
bility. Ranks were aspired to not as signs of bravery and badges of honour, but
for what they made possible. They allowed combatants greater freedom of move-
ment, personal authority over a group (instead of being pushed around at will by
a senior commander), better protection, and, most importantly, access to better
nutrition. Commanders got to choose the best food, especially meats like smoked
chicken or beef. Higher-ranking commanders would set up their tents or houses
closer to the centre of the settlement, where Kony and his entourage presided, and
17See also Cakaj (2010: 7–8). For the highest ranks, promotions and demotions also happened
for strategic reasons (Cakaj 2010: 9, Lancaster and Cakaj 2013: 15–16).
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in the event of a sudden attack were better protected both through their location
and by security personnel. On occasion, they were also allowed to listen to the
radio, where many of them were confronted with often conflicting information on
domestic politics and – perhaps most importantly – calls to return home.
Male soldiers with a rank were also allowed to stay with a wife,18 and a
varying number of domestic aides and babysitters (often referred to as ting-ting).19
According to the interviewees, male combatants could either ask for a specific
woman or be assigned to one. Their assignment was also status-related: “Once
you have abducted women for wives, the commanders first get the beautiful ones.
Only then the other soldiers can get the remaining ones, the remaining ones who
are not beautiful” (Simon, ll. 87–91). Higher-ranking commanders were entitled
not only to the most prized women, but also to multiple wives (Annan et al. 2009:
11–12). As ting-ting were usually turned into wives of the same commander who
headed the household, and wives were supported in their duties by a number of
ting-ting, senior commanders could have quite a large household. While male
combatants often hastened to state that they had wives to help them with the
household and other chores, the main attraction of having a wife seems to have
been their availability for sexual activities. One female combatant described this
kind of ‘appreciation’:
We went to a place where we were to celebrate Christmas. Kony was
already having the girl we were abducted with as his wife. He had
already had sex with the girl. One day, the girl was seated conversing
with the man I was living with and she was listening from a distance.
He [Kony] said, “Jal,20 I see your wife looks as if she still is a complete
whole, strong, bold and able-bodied. Have you worked on her [have
you had sex with her]?” And Omona replied: “I will have her as my
Christmas present.” (Janet, ll. 284–297)
Organisationally, ranks served as a reward and as a means to bind people to
the LRA. A female combatant who was a wife to Kony for several years soberly
commented on the use of these incentives: “We were only blindfolded [by the
18Among the male combatants questioned for the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY), a
survey of more than 1’000 households in northern Uganda conducted in the years 2005 to 2007,
almost all of them stated having one or more wives in the bush (Annan et al. 2008: 42).
19Tingo means to lift or to carry; in a civilian context, it refers to the carrying of babies, i.e.
being a babysitter. Its use is more widespread in the context of the LRA, where ting-ting were
also in charge of a number of other, mostly household-related activities.
20Jal means fellow or friend; it is usually used to draw somebody’s attention.
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ranks] so that we stayed in captivity. These praises were only to keep us longer in
captivity. They were to relieve you of too many thoughts” (Scovia, ll. 641–644).
While ranks were less about inclusion and more about distinction, they were, as
such, a sign of the successful inclusion of individuals in the group. People didn’t
get ranks by accident; they had to engage with and commit to the business of
being a soldier, at least partially. The incremental and performance-based incor-
poration of new members into the LRA made combatants not only compliant, but
complicit in their own initiation and socialisation as soldiers. While compliance
can be guaranteed (at least in the short run) by force alone, complicity requires
that the combatants became invested into their however limited choices.
Summary
Abduction and recruitment into the LRA were described as events that broke
radically with people’s everyday lives. Right from the beginning, new combat-
ants were forced to prove their strength, resilience and unconditional obedience,
and were subjected to high levels of violence. While compliance was initially
a mere consequence of force, senior members made efforts to commit new re-
cruits to the organisation through various means. In this chapter, I argued that
commitment was created through a number of rituals of incremental inclusion
or status passages. Through these status passages – initiation, getting a gun,
and learning the business of waging war – combatants crossed the threshold from
recruit to soldier. Their compliance with organisational demands was enforced
not only through negative (force) and positive (rewards) sanctions offered by the
LRA, but through a number of task- and group-related psychosocial dynamics
that committed new combatants to the LRA. Combatants became invested as
they tried not only to survive, but to learn the organisation’s rules, and to do a
good job. The gratifications of becoming a “committed insider” (Hundeide 2003)
helped combatants to see themselves as part of the group. As a consequence, I
argue, for many, their focus shifted from trying to get out of the LRA to making
the most of being in it. This shift is facilitated by organisational incentives and
structures that forced combatants to pledge themselves to the LRA, and, thereby,
to become quasi-members instead of remaining mere captives.
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4.2 Finding the everyday in the extraordinary.
Adaptation and resilience in violent lives
Abstract
In the first analytical section, I have highlighted the role violence played in and for
the initiation and socialisation of new combatants into the LRA. Through these
ordeals, new combatants learn not only to live with war, but to reconcile them-
selves with a lifestyle that is characterised by the routine use of violence. That
is not a minor accomplishment considering the magnitude of the transgression
that violence constitutes. While concepts like the violation of a person’s right
to physical integrity are inventions of legal orders, the underlying premise that
there is such a right to begin with is not. Prohibitions of killing are among the
first norms in almost all societies. How do people manage to live with war and
violence, and even in the middle of it, on the battlefield? How do they survive
under these conditions not just physically but emotionally?
In this section, I will show how the integration of violence into everyday life,
into routine action, allows for these processes of normalisation. The adaptation to
violent lives, to “living with bad surroundings”, as Finnstro¨m (2008) put it, is, as
I argue, first and foremost not a symptom of the brutalisation and traumatisation
of forced combatants. Rather, it is proof of their resilience. Not only are com-
batants resilient or ‘tough’ in the face of harsh and inhumane living conditions,
but they are able to carve out spaces of routine, comfort, and even enjoyment.
The aim of this section is thus twofold: “to recover the sense in which everyday
life is a practical accomplishment of the individuals” (Macamo 2006: 199), and
to show how the organisation actively supports the combatants in their efforts
to accommodate to their new living situation, and to create a sense of belonging
to the LRA. In this sense, the creation of normalcy is both an individual and
an organisational accomplishment. The organisation and its individual members
pursue the same goal, but for different reasons: While combatants try to make life
bearable for themselves, the LRA establishes structures and routines to exercise
control and to bind people to the organisation.
Like life at home: Repurposing cultural spaces
Without fail, the presence of war breaks with civilians’ everyday life and routines.
Wherever possible, they try to adjust; they leave their houses at night to sleep in
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the bush, avoid places that put them at risk, and try to obey the orders issued
by the LRA (such as prohibiting the riding of bicycles). “Disaster strikes”, as
Macamo (2006: 217) argues, when living with war becomes unpredictable; when
there is no way to protect oneself from abduction anymore because it can happen
anywhere, any time. So the idea that war and its disruptive effects only enter
people’s lives when they are abducted certainly is misleading. Clearly, everyday
life was already under pressure before the LRA arrived. But abduction broke
even more with its fragile routines and structures. As I have shown, new com-
batants underwent a rapid and radical transformation from civilian to abductee
to soldier. The detachment from their civilian life and identity was one of the
most important goals of their initiation and socialisation into the violent group.
At the same time, life in the bush was characterised by a high level of continuity
with Acholi ways of living. This continuity was created by the integration of
local traditions and institutions. These “repurposed cultural spaces”, as Oloya
(2013: 75) called them, allowed combatants to maintain a sense of normality and
sameness under the conditions of war and violence.
How combatants lived varied considerably depending on the time and loca-
tion of the unit they belonged to. Some combatants described being permanently
on the move, just resting for a couple of hours or a few days at a time to cook
and sleep. As Samuel put it, “There was no home. Our home became the bush.
We always kept moving in the bush” (Samuel, ll. 705–706). For them, keeping
up with routines and traditions of civilian life was an uphill battle: “you sleep
awake” (James, ll. 350). In contrast to these experiences of constant move-
ment, the LRA built more permanent settlements in the bases in Uganda (Aruu,
1995–1997), Sudan (Gong, Luwudu, Palutaka, late 1993–1994; Rubagatek, 1998–
2001; Nisitu and Jebelein, 1997–2002), and Congo (Garamba, 2005–2008) (Baines
2014: 37–38, Lancaster and Cakaj 2013: 14). These bases imitated Acholi vil-
lages, with regards to the set-up both of the settlements and of individual homes
(Baines 2014: 4, Oloya 2013: 90). Whenever possible, people built traditional
houses (ot lum atota). These were circular huts with a grass thatched roof and a
low door made from wood or corrugated iron facing the compound (Oloya 2013:
90). Men and women stayed separately in the otogo (male house) or the jokon
(female house), which often doubled as the kitchen (keno) and sleeping place for
young children. Each senior commander’s hut (gang madit – main house) was
surrounded by the huts of his wives and the ting-ting (Baines 2014: 4).
From there, “people lived a free kind of life” (Faith, ll. 487). While some
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soldiers were sent to Uganda to loot, abduct and fight, for those who stayed in
the camps, life was structured by routines and everyday activities. People spent
their days working in the gardens they had planted, preparing meals, washing and
mending clothes, fetching water and firewood, cleaning their weapons, attending
prayer services and lectures, or just sitting around chatting. Everyday life was as
exceptional as it was ordinary:
Where we stayed, we even had huts like this one. So life has not been
easy sometimes. I used to dream that I was at home; sometimes it
made me even forget that I was not at home. However, the situation
in captivity was just like home, we had a normal daily routine. The
same thing people do at home here is what we used to do there. [...]
[After I woke up in the morning] I brushed my teeth and washed
my face. If we could go to the garden then we went to the garden,
and if we were not going to the garden, then we went to the well to
fetch water and take a bath, before we started cooking. [...] In the
afternoon sometimes we were taken for parade training. But if there
was no training as day activity then we relaxed. (Prisca, ll. 222–248)
Sure enough, life was perceived as hard, but that didn’t set it apart from life
at home. In their narratives, combatants emphasised the continuity in their ev-
eryday life rather than its disruption. People would go about their daily lives as
if war didn’t define them: “When there were no battles, you lived like you were
home there. But you would think about home when you were involved in battles”
(Henry, ll. 717–720). Much like for civilians, war and violence were narrated as
both omnipresent, as a background to their lives and a constant possibility that
structured their routines and actions, and exceptional, as it only became imme-
diate in battle, flight, and violent action that disrupted everyday life in the bush.
Everyday institutions and routines in a total organisation
Throughout the interviewees’ stories, it becomes clear that these efforts of mak-
ing oneself at home, and finding some normality in ‘bush life’ were performed
not only by individuals. Equally important for their process of settling in were
institutions and routines which structured combatants’ lives and, by imitating or
mimicking civilian life-worlds, eased their transition into life in the bush. With in-
stitutions and routines that addressed legal, medical, intimate, religious, cultural,
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and social affairs, combatants found both guidelines and reasons for action.21 In
what follows, I will outline how the organisation’s provisions for every aspect of
people’s everyday lives helped them to adjust to their roles in the LRA.
Figure 4.1: The LRA’s headquarters in South Sudan, late 1990s to early 2000s
(sketch by a female former combatant, source: Dale 2012)
Medical institutions. Though there were exceptions, the combatants typically
did not have access to civilian medical facilities like hospitals. Instead, they built
their own: People who suffered from injuries or diseases and pregnant women
were separated from the group and transferred to the so-called ‘sick bay’. Sick
bays were located in relatively protected and hidden locations away from the
battlefield (such as on top of a hill) and near a water source. From there, people
were taken care of by using a mixture of traditional and conventional remedies
until they were fully recovered and ready to take part in battles again. In some
locations (for instance, in Juba), the combatants even had access to conventional
medical care and hospitals, worked with trained medical professionals, and were
provided with medicine. Some combatants also received basic medical training,
21I understand institutions in a broad sense, as structures and mechanisms that guide be-
haviour. In this definition, institutions encompass both formal (like schools or courts) and
informal ones (like courtship or nursing practices). See also Chapter 1.2 starting on page 3.
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in such skills as treating wounds, administering medicine, taking care of sick and
injured people, and helping to deliver babies. Apart from the nurses and doctors
in the sick bay, so-called ‘sanitation officers’ were responsible for maintaining
high standards of hygiene among the combatants.
Legal institutions: prohibitions and correctional facilities. Organisational rules
played an important part in combatants’ lives. According to the interviewees,
the two most important rules were the prohibition of escape and adultery; both
could be punished by death, and at least resulted in severe beatings if they became
known. Another important rule was not to fight or quarrel, either with colleagues,
spouses, or co-wives. Other rules were security-related: Fires for cooking had to
be made without creating smoke, or during a fixed time slot (that coincided with
the government forces’ cooking hours so as to provide a literal smoke screen);
women had to take care that their children didn’t cry; moving units were man-
dated to cover their tracks on unpaved paths. These rules were enforced not only
by corporal punishment, but also by the set-up of correctional facilities. These
were usually constructed as underground prisons (mabuc pa mony piny, also re-
ferred to as ‘military’), that is, holes that were so deep that prisoners couldn’t get
out by themselves, and that were secured by guards. Imprisonment was typically
accompanied by the withdrawal of other privileges: Prisoners were often demoted
and stripped of their gun. Male combatants could lose their right to have a wife.
Distribution of food was often restricted, and prisoners had to ask and wait for
approval to ease themselves. In short, they lost whatever limited privileges they
had before. These underground prisons mimicked correctional facilities in civilian
and military life, but also duplicated the situation of captivity. They reminded
the combatants that they indeed had something to lose: namely, their recognition
as persons. In this sense, imprisonment was not only a form of bodily punish-
ment, but a means to debilitate and humiliate them.
Religious institutions. As I will argue later, religion played an important role
in people’s lives, on both an individual and a collective level. There were also
places reserved for holding prayer services (namely, ot legga – the house of prayers,
or kanica – church). Prayers were sometimes ordered for those who stayed in the
camps during periods of heightened fighting, in particular, young girls, who were
considered pure. Prayers were at times combined with speeches, sometimes by
Kony himself. These religious performances created some continuity with civil-
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ian life,22 in which both spirit beliefs and Christian practices coexist (Allen 1991,
Behrend 1999: 100–127, Victor and Porter 2017).
Social relationships: forced marriage, courtship, mourning and adultery In-
timate relationships among the combatants were strictly regulated, for different
reasons. Male combatants, in particular young soldiers, weren’t allowed to court
women unless one of the senior commanders gave them permission or assigned
them to a woman. Both men and women had to wait for approval of their union,
although men more often had a say in who became their spouses than women
did. Forced ‘marriage’ was at the same time a system of remuneration for the
male combatants and a means of control. By limiting and sanctioning intimate
relationships, the high command exercised control in different ways. First, these
marriages created committed relationships that bound both males and females to
the LRA. Second, as a form of institutionalised rape and abuse, forced marriage
aimed at preventing internal struggles over women between the male combatants
that could affect group morale and cohesion (Baines 2014, Kramer 2012). Third,
as forced marriages were arranged upon sexual maturity of the female combatants,
they were a means of controlling reproductive health, i.e. the spread of sexually
transmitted infections (STIs), particularly HIV. It seems that out of the many
ways in which combatants died (in battle, or due to a combination of diseases or
injuries, insufficient medical care and malnutrition), the LRA tried to control the
ones they felt were in their hands. With regards to sexual health, they did so by
abducting preadolescent girls and assigning them to male combatants in relation-
ships of forced marriage. Lastly, as a system of remuneration, forced marriage also
was a form of control that aimed at making male combatants compliant fighters.
Consequentially, relationships outside of organisationally sanctioned marriages
were strongly prohibited, even more so when the parties were in a relationship
with somebody else. Forced marriage and the prohibition of adultery were two
sides of the same coin: They were meant to bind members to the organisation
and to prevent divisions between them. When a woman lost her assigned hus-
band (in battle or due to a disease), a period of mourning was mandatory. Some
women recounted that their heads had been shaved, and that courtship was only
allowed once it grew back again (see also Otuko 2016: 139). Sometimes, they
were allowed to choose a new husband for themselves, “so that you live a happy
life. Because if they force you to be with someone you don’t love it might cause a
lot of problems” (Harriet, ll. 346–349). Regardless of whether spouses considered
22Even though these rituals were, at times, also perceived as strange; see Victor (2011: 82).
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their unions as legitimate marriages – the interviewees’ narratives show that many
didn’t23 – being married confronted both men and women with expectations on
how to do justice to this status. Even though most unions were involuntary, it
seemed natural to have an intimate relationship nonetheless,24 at least for the
male combatants.25
Within the LRA, institutions had different functions. For one thing, they
allowed for functional differentiation within the larger settlements, and for their
mobility: wherever combatants went, they had a blueprint for how to set up a
working village. Second, their sheer existence gave institutions some pre-reflective
legitimacy. Just because they were there and preceded most individual initiatives,
people accepted them as given, and adjusted their actions to them. Such “ba-
sic legitimacies” (Basislegitimita¨ten), as Trutz von Trotha (1994b) called them,
allow for “a recognition of the obvious that is as self-evident as is everyday life
because it constitutes the everyday of domination”.26 The power to make things
happen, and to set orders into motion (Organisationsmacht) is one of the most
potent sources of legitimacy. By making people follow their orders, and by sup-
plementing these orders with institutions and routines, i.e. a complete universe
of instructions on how to act, the LRA enjoyed a legitimacy that did not depend
on approval of its actions.
Within these functionally differentiated institutions, people had jobs, i.e. they
were assigned to specific roles and tasks. They were fighters, commanders or
rank-and-file soldiers, babysitters, mothers and wives, and they fulfilled different
war-related functions as signallers, rescue teams, night guards, bodyguards (es-
corts), or spies (intelligence). Other jobs were more relevant to the survival and
daily activities of the group – such as the work as porters, farmers, cooks, sanita-
tion officers, and midwives. These role identities are relevant here insofar as they
23I will detail this in Chapter 4.5 starting on page 148.
24I refer to the forced marriages as intimate (instead of sexual or abusive) relationships
because these marriages create a kind of commitment that goes beyond the women’s availability
for sexual activities, and includes mutual obligations for the children’s and each other’s well-
being (see also Aijazi and Baines 2017). However, this choice of terminology shouldn’t veil the
mostly abusive nature of these relationships.
25A rare analysis of male perspectives on these forced relationships is Aijazi and Baines (2017).
In their paper, the authors make a point that is also central to my argument: To understand
how people can commit these acts, one has to take into account how they are embedded in the
combatants’ life-worlds.
26Translated by the author; in the original: “In der Basislegitimita¨t erfolgt eine Anerkennung
von Evidenzen, die deshalb selbstversta¨ndlich wie der Alltag sind, weil sie den Herrschaftsalltag
ausmachen” (von Trotha 2004: 67).
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were also part of the creation of some kind of normalcy for the combatants.27
The division of labour between those who fought and those who organised and
managed everyday life for the others allowed for a smooth organisational routine,
but it also influenced the mindset of individual combatants. Having a job meant
having a sense of purpose that could be kept separate from questions about the
overall legitimacy of the goals of the LRA, or their chosen means to achieve them.
In this sense, roles, institutions and rules allowed for the organisation of everyday
life under the conditions of war and its inherent unpredictability.
Suspending emergency: Enjoying oneself and sharing light moments
Living with war and violence meant to live in a continuous state of alertness; it
meant being prepared for disaster to strike anytime. Even in the most remote
locations, fights could break out at a moment’s notice, forcing combatants to pack
and run, or to arm themselves and fight. How did they cope with this permanent
state of emergency? The short answer to that is: they didn’t; or rather, not in
the sense that somebody unaffected by war would imagine. That is both because
the sense of emergency was not ubiquitous, and because people couldn’t have
survived if they felt it was permanent. War gave its participants breaks as much
as they had to give themselves breaks from it.
Although all combatants reported episodes of severe violence and hardship,
most of them emphasised that life in the bush wasn’t always like that. Many of
them told us that there were times and places where they could and would enjoy
themselves. Both in their daily lives and on special occasions, they would do so
by dancing, listening to music, sharing stories and jokes, or just relaxing.28 Ivy
remembered:
Sometimes we used to have fun and you would feel like you were at
home. Like one time we had a dance in captivity, we had radios that
were looted from the population and then we used them. Dancing
and listening to radios wasn’t [usually] allowed, and if anyone was
caught it would have been a problem. There was Freedom FM and
27Role identities and identification were also relevant when it came to making their tasks,
especially the perpetration of violence, accountable; I will talk about this in more detail in
Chapter 4.4 starting on page 121.
28George, who became one of Kony’s bodyguards, also recounted how they watched movies
(mostly American war movies) on laptops powered by car batteries during the Juba Peace Talks
(Cakaj 2016: 120).
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the person who broadcasted on that radio station was Lacambel.29
We would dance to traditional songs and sometimes there would be a
competition held between the groups. (Ivy, ll. 867–880)
Interestingly, in this story, the looted radios are not a reminder of the deviant
acts they were expected to perform, but a source of enjoyment: listening to music,
dancing to its tune. The enjoyment is not even marred by the fact that the radio
host is the same one who is known for moderating the ‘come back home’-messages
intended to encourage combatants to escape. Here, the violations against civilians
are not addressed as disruptive experiences, but become part of people’s everyday
lives. As such, they lose their moral reprehensibility. Enjoying themselves, if only
for a little while, allowed combatants to put up with the hardships they faced, to
attribute positive value to their lives. In sharing stories and telling jokes, that is,
by performing the vital tradition of storytelling (bokko lok ; see also Oloya 2013:
3), combatants intermittently suspended the state of emergency they lived in.
However, in most narratives, enjoyment was confined to a protected social space,
in which war is distant enough not to disturb the illusion of ‘life at home’: “That
[you can enjoy yourself] happens [only] when you are very deep in the jungle; that
is when you can play some music” (Fred, ll. 228–230). Moreover, enjoyment was
framed in specific ways to become a legitimate expression. It required emotional
and narrative work to justify enjoyment, both in acting and talking about it.
Enjoyment was mostly attributed to activities off the battlefield, in which
people blocked out the reality of living with war and violence for a while. But
enjoyment or comfort could also come from the work as a soldier, i.e. from
performing well on the battlefield and returning home victorious, as some inter-
viewees argued:
What made me enjoy the work30 was that sometimes we would win the
battle and then some of the soldiers who had no guns in the beginning
got a chance to own guns. And also if you desired to eat different
29John Lacambel Oryema is a radio moderator with Mega FM in Gulu town. He is a pop-
ular figure since he broadcast the ‘come back home’ (dwog paco) messages, in which returnees
addressed active combatants and encouraged them to return home. Though not all combat-
ants had access to radios in the bush, many confirmed that the testimonies of former col-
leagues and friends assured them that it was safe to return, and that this motivated them
to escape as well. A number of these recordings have been archived by The Voice Project:
http://voiceproject.org/radio-resources-volume-1-2.
30By “work”, George refers to the tasks of looting from and abducting civilians. I will talk
about the use of this term in Chapter 4.4 starting on page 121.
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things they were there, for example smoked chicken, or maybe smoked
meat. (George, ll. 628–635)
In George’s account, enjoyment derived from doing a good job and being re-
warded for it go together. Clearly, he was one of the more committed fighters I
interviewed. For him, being on the battlefield was more of a positive challenge
than a reality he needed to escape from. Still, sensual pleasure was inextricably
connected to his overall positive attitude towards violent performances in the
bush. What both accounts of enjoyment have in common is that their violent
lifestyle is both present (in the radios looted from civilians and guns taken from
fallen enemy soldiers) and invisible. It has to disappear, if only for a moment, if
only from their narratives, to make their enjoyment possible. To enjoy life in the
bush, people had to ‘forget’ the pain and suffering their actions caused.
States of belonging: Social identities, relationships, and solidarity
In George’s narrative of the emotional gratifications of being a fighter, another
motif appears: namely, the importance of relationships with colleagues. Because
armed groups are not just task-oriented but also socio-emotional groups, their
social functions and the relationships between their members are vital to under-
standing individual combatants’ engagement in them. Social relationships played
vastly different roles in the interviewees’ accounts. While some stated they didn’t
have any friends or confidants in captivity, most of them emphasised the impor-
tance of friendships. Some reported that they related well with their spouses and
co-wives (so much that they cried over their loss, or took care of their children
afterwards); others reported mistreatment, rape, and mistrust.
Men were more likely to describe their relationships with their given spouses
as good. Women more often reported abuse, rape, and ruthless behaviour. Where
women gave a positive assessment, they evaluated their relationship not in terms
of affection, but of protection: “It [the relationship] was good because he took
care of me” (Hope, ll. 380–381).31 This sentiment is not unrelated to how people
31That women’s narratives typically go one way or the other – describing their husbands as
either abusive or caring – might have to do with the desire to create narrative coherence or
cognitive consonance (see also Chapter 4.4 starting on page 121). Moreover, where women saw
their relationships as overall positive, instances of sexual abuse might have been experienced
as less transgressive. In these cases, women often recounted only the first sexual assault as
traumatising (Anett Pfeiffer Tumusiime, February 2016, personal conversation).
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understand love and relationships in civilian life. Acholi love is less about the
idea of romantic love that dominates Western discourses, and more about mutual
care, respect, and shared activities and attitudes.32 As such, it is a result of the
efforts people put into the relationship rather than a contingent emotional state.
Sometimes, spouses built loving and caring relationships in which they shared
their feelings and thoughts, and decided to escape or stay together. But more
often, it was not their assigned spouses, but other soldiers (of the same rank),
co-wives, and members of other households that became friends and confidants.
Combatants often showed solidarity with others even if it put them at risk of
severe punishment. For instance, several interviewees reported that they or others
were punished for cooking unsavoury food, a mistake that commonly happened
to new abductees who did not (yet) know how to cook, or how to prepare certain
foods they got to know abroad. A typical punishment was to force the person to
eat all the unsavoury food and drink a jerry can (typically, 10 litres) of water on
top of it. Joyce recounted what happened to her:
Even I experienced it one day, in my case my sauce was well cooked
but the problem arose when I was cooking posho33 and firewood went
out and it was raining. In captivity we used to cook in groups of
maybe ten people, and when that thing happened to me some of the
people I cooked with came and helped me. They took a huge share
of the posho and left me with a small share only. And even the water
I was given, they came and carried it away and poured it out, thus
when the other rebel soldiers came and found that the posho was gone,
and no water was there, they didn’t do anything to me. There was
some small portion left, but I pocketed it. (Joyce, ll. 627–643)
In some cases, those trying to help and support others by violating the rules
had to suffer the consequences:
There was a lady who was a wife to Kony’s escort; she is my cousin.
At that time, she had just given birth to her firstborn, and they had
nothing to eat. She asked me whether I have some food in the house
and I said yes. I did just return from raiding and so I gave her five
mugs of sim-sim [sesame] and five mugs of peas. But unfortunately
32See p’Bitek (1997) and Porter (2013: 178–179); see also Chapter 4.5 starting on page 148.
33Posho (also known as ugali in other parts of Africa) is a popular Ugandan staple, typically
made of maize flour mixed and boiled with water. It is served with meat or fish, sauce, and
vegetables or beans.
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these other girls who became wives to Odhiambo after me saw me
[giving it to her]. And they reported me to the guy [who took care
of me while Odhiambo was abroad]. He came and took me to a
grass thatched hut where I was locked in and had to stay for one
week without food. They gave me water but I refused to drink it.
(Patience, ll. 520–535)
In her narrative, Patience emphasises her solidarity with her colleague and
relative. Consequently, she also refused her punishment by rejecting the water,
because she felt she did nothing wrong. In contrast, the fact that the food was
looted from civilians – civilians who very possibly went hungry instead – isn’t ad-
dressed as problematic. Here, one’s own needs and those of one’s primary group
override moral inhibitions and even orders from the superiors. As Charity argued,
“[T]hose rules [not to loot from and harm civilians] are also hard to follow. For
instance, you are told not to enter the huts of civilians and not to steal anything
from them, and at that time you are very hungry (laughs) (...)” (Charity, ll. 766–
771). These examples show that solidarity among the combatants was seen as
more important than that vis-a`-vis civilians.
When reflecting on their time in captivity, some interviewees said that they
miss the kind of community they shared with the other combatants. Often times,
these relationships outlived their engagement with the LRA (see also Hopwood
et al. 2008). Many of them stayed in contact and provided each other with
emotional and sometimes material support – for instance, by taking care of
each other’s children. Some combatants (both male and female) choose to live
with somebody they met in captivity (sometimes, but not necessarily their given
spouses). Prisca explained why she decided to pursue a relationship with a man
she met in captivity:
When I came back I found lots of bad things happening in Uganda,
and lots of [HIV] infections. But for us who have been in captivity, we
had those strong rules [concerning intimate relationships] and those
rules really helped and kept us safe [from contracting STIs]. The kind
of punishment given to us helped to limit the spread of the infection
among the people in captivity. Most of all the people who have never
been in captivity do not like us. They can relate with you but if they
get a child from you they start to hate the children you returned with
from captivity. They start calling these children rebels or Kony, and
all kinds of bad things [accusations] are thrown at them. So to me
I thought it is better I be with someone who has gone through the
same thing I have gone through, and also in order to ensure my safety
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health-wise. (Prisca, ll. 769–790)
Here, Prisca turns the stigma of being a former combatant into a virtue:
because she and her colleagues learned to live with stricter rules regarding sex-
ual relationships, she knows how to protect herself from contracting potentially
life-threatening diseases. Apart from such rational (or rationalised) reasons for
staying with their spouses or colleagues from the bush – the risk of contracting
diseases, but also the challenges of taking care of joint children – combatants said
that they felt more accepted and understood by them. They knew first-hand
what they had gone through, and wouldn’t confront them with fear, prejudice
and insults. As a community of fate, the LRA gave rise to these close relation-
ships even where it tried to undercut them (for instance, by forcing colleagues
to punish each other or by separating those who appeared to be too close to one
another).
Finding solace in God
But even those combatants who struggled to make friends and felt rather isolated
from their group of peers found sources of strength – most importantly, in their
religious convictions. As noted before, it is a common misunderstanding that
the LRA is a Christian fundamentalist terror group.34 Rather, most Acholi are
devout Christians (Baines 2010: 419, Ward 2001: 194), which was also visible in
the rules and institutions of the LRA. Beyond these organisationally confirmed
displays of religiosity, faith in God played an important role for many combatants
before, during, and after their time in captivity. For instance, many interviewees
tried to make sense of their abduction by seeing it as part of a divine plan:
Some time back if I thought of what I went through, I would cry end-
lessly. When I had just returned, I met those guys who abducted me
and also killed both of my parents. If I think about it even now, I start
to cry. It is even made worse when someone annoys me. Secondly,
the colleagues I studied and grew up with nowadays are grown up,
have good jobs and are educated. Meanwhile I didn’t attend school
as expected. At times when I think about it, I get sad but I know it
was God’s plan. (Faith, ll. 1633–1645)
34The interpretation has also been refused by the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), the
political wing of the LRA, in its statements; see Finnstro¨m (2008: 123–127).
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Faith presents a sober analysis of her life through captivity. Her assessment
is marked by missed educational opportunities, lost loved ones, and traumatic
encounters. Still, she is able to console herself with the thought, the faith even,
that her suffering is not meaningless: “I know it was God’s plan”. For many,
their beliefs were a source of strength in difficult and threatening situations, both
in the bush and upon return. One of the interviewees, Joan, recounted how her
given husband nearly beat her to death because he suspected her of having an
affair:
He fired a bullet that passed above my head. I was quiet and trembled
strongly. He kept talking but I didn’t answer him, I was crying. I
prayed in my heart that if it was my day to die then let it be it. I
asked him to do whatever he was doing because God was watching his
actions. “God doesn’t shift a person’s day to die. I will not respond
to you and I will not say anything. I’ll only wait for your actions”, I
told him. (Joan, ll. 599–609)
In Joan’s narrative, it was her faith that gave her the strength to handle the
abuse and the prospect of possible death she faced. By confronting her husband
with her belief in God’s authority, she both denied him the power to decide her
fate and reminded him that he will be judged by God for his actions. Thereby,
she resisted her subjugation through her husband to forces beyond their control.
Faith was also very much present in people’s decision to escape, which they knew
would put their life at tangible risk. Prisca, for instance, reflected on her decision
to escape:
Life became so difficult, because fighting was intense. I had two chil-
dren already. And the kind of beating I received there made me feel so
bad. I told myself that even though I am going to die someplace, let
me die, but I don’t want to be killed by them. The beating I received
was because of this man who escaped, and I thought of leaving that
place as well. But one thing I kept in mind was that there’s nothing
and there’s no one above God. He made me be captured and brought
in captivity, so he has a reason why he let that happen to me. (Prisca,
ll. 687–700)
Not only did these religious convictions inform combatants’ narratives about
their decision to return, they also strengthened their trust that they would return
home safely: “So when it reached the day God had set for us to return, he opened
the road for us and we left at 11 pm at night” (Hope, ll. 1347–1350). Here, the
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faith in God becomes a means to handle a situation of existential uncertainty
that cannot be controlled through other means; one simply has to believe that
everything happens the way it is supposed to happen, and that it will, therefore,
turn out well.
For the interviewees, their religiosity was not a way to abdicate agency by
attributing it to a higher authority, but, as Sverker Finnstro¨m (2008: 201–202)
and Letha Victor (2011: 84) have argued, a means of reclaiming a sense of control
over their everyday lives. Seeing their experiences of abduction and life in the
bush as part of a plan that exceeds their understanding helped them to survive
their harsh living conditions and the arbitrariness of their experiences. In this
sense, agency is not limited to physical acts, but importantly includes acts of
meaning-making, through both their stories and their beliefs. As Oloya (2013:
69) argued, religion became important “as a source of personal strength rather
than an instrument of control perpetrated through indoctrination”. Through
their faith, former combatants found a means to make sense of and thereby to
exert control over their life stories. Their faith helped them to accept their fate of
abduction, to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and personal risk,
and to manage their lives upon return.35
Summary
The interviewees’ narratives show how violence became part of their everyday
lives, which continued despite and alongside to it. Why, and how, did combat-
ants put up with this? I argue that their adaptation to and normalisation of
violent lives was not only, and not even primarily, an effect of brutalisation or
trauma, but also an effect of their resilience. This resilience is a protest against
the hardships of life, “their insistence upon their right to live, to take up space,
to take pleasure in the sentient world” (Scheper-Hughes 2008: 27). To do that,
combatants commanded a number of resources that helped them to get used to
their harsh and sometimes inhumane living conditions. They did so by temporar-
ily lifting the state of emergency they lived in by finding sources of enjoyment:
telling stories and jokes, dancing and singing, or just relaxing. Moreover, they
found strength and emotional support in relationships with colleagues and friends,
or by turning to God. At the same time, the organisation itself made efforts to
make ‘bush life’ less extraneous and disruptive by establishing institutions and
35I detail this argument in Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
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routines that imitated life at home.
This creation of normalcy happens not only in people’s violent pasts, but
also in their speaking about them. People cope with the singularity of their
experiences both situationally and after the fact, through their stories. In this
sense, narratives are sense-making devices, which make the biographic rupture of
their abduction accessible. They create continuity between their past and present
selves. This continuity helps combatants not only in understanding their past,
but also in mastering their present lives, where home receives a meaning different
from their lives both before and during captivity.
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4.3 Engaging with organisational demands:
Agency in resistance and compliance
Abstract
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that the process of immersion in the
LRA posited a new and comprehensive reality of living with war and violence;
a reality that was as exceptional as it was ordinary. It was, or rather became,
ordinary because individuals, groups and the organisation itself strived towards
making life in the LRA liveable for them. They made these efforts because there
was no refuge, no retreat, from this reality. Just as for inmates of correctional
facilities (or even more so), for the combatants there was no life beyond their in-
volvement in the organisation’s activities. And there was tight control over almost
every aspect of it. In this chapter, I would like to argue that even though com-
batants were severely restricted in their actions, there were times and situations
that allowed them to undermine the organisation’s grip, and to make individual
decisions. This scope for decision-making was created equally by the organisa-
tion and by the combatants themselves. In many cases, these opportunities for
decision-making allowed combatants to negotiate their role in the organisation,
and this could turn into a vehicle for their identification with these roles, their
primary group, or even the LRA.
Individual agency in a total institution
In many regards, the LRA is comparable to any other armed group. However,
it is also different in important ways from many other armed groups and organi-
sations more generally. When looking at combatants’ agency, two determinants
need to be taken into consideration: the organisation’s mode of recruitment, and
its total character. More than anything, the LRA is characterised by the forced
recruitment of its members. Most combatants in the LRA didn’t choose to pursue
a ‘career of violence’ (Sutterlu¨ty 2004) on their own terms. The involuntary na-
ture of their participation was emphasised by many interviewees: “I never wanted
this forceful kind of life” (Henry, l. 1306). Their forced conscription means that
combatants understood themselves, at least initially, not as soldiers (lumony) or
rebels (adwii), but rather as recruits (kurut) or prisoners (mabuc). Participation
was a matter of gradually becoming, rather than being forced at once to assume,
the role of a combatant. But it is not just the forced nature of the combatants’
participation, but also the denial of their personhood and individual agency that
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characterises the LRA as a total institution. From the organisation’s perspective,
the combatants were mere place holders identical with the functions and roles as-
signed to them. Their everyday life was structured by the routines prescribed by
the leadership. But against these structural limitations, combatants found ways
to live with war and the violence they experienced and co-created. Beyond sheer
survival, they tried to make the best of it, and to carve out spaces of personal
comfort. These efforts to improve their living conditions, and to gain control over
their lives in the LRA, were part of the former combatants’ agency.
What does agency mean for forced members of a total institution? With-
out doubt, their agency is different from that of those who join an organisation
voluntarily, are free to leave at any time, and have a life beyond their institu-
tional engagement.36 However, even forced combatants command what Honwana
(2000) has called ‘tactical agency’: the capacity to make choices that affect their
immediate living situations. Combatants could and did make decisions on things
that made a difference for them in the specific situations they found themselves
in. These singular decisions served combatants in the short term, but could con-
tribute to a course that worked against their long-term ambitions. For instance,
combatants would try to excel on the battlefield to prove their value and to profit
from better treatment; however, their employment as fighters might also have
put them at greater risk of dying in combat. As they didn’t know what their
future might look like, combatants tried to make the best of the opportunities
and choices within their reach. These micro decisions were a powerful means to
cope with organisational expectations, and to reclaim a sense of agency against
an environment that controlled almost every aspect of their lives.
What does this agency look like? Agency is visible where actors develop a
stance towards their actions (forced or not), where they try to make a difference
or even engage in subversive practices, where they “manipulate the events in an
effort to turn them into ‘opportunities’”37. It could be present in both acts of
outright denial of and enthusiastic compliance with orders, and everything in be-
tween. In this understanding, agency includes strategies of (hidden) resistance
(Strategien der Widersta¨ndigkeit, von Trotha 1994a,b), of open or covert non-
36Although, in most cases, people are faced with situations somewhere in between deliberate
choices and situational pressures (see for instance Honwana 2006, Richards 2008, Utas 2003,
Vigh 2006).
37Translated by the author from the French original, where the full sentence reads: “Comme
de Certeau le montre tre`s clairement, la tactique est bien l’art du faible qui doit constamment
manipuler les e´ve´nements dans l’objectif de les tourner en ‘opportunite´s’” (Honwana 2000: 75).
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compliance through inefficiency, calling in sick or pretending to lack talent on
one side of the spectrum, and cooperative strategies of preemptive obedience,
dedication and zeal on the other side. As Baines (2009) has argued, combat-
ants resisted and dealt with orders as they ‘played stupid’ or ‘played smart’. By
consciously undercutting or exceeding organisational expectations, they exercised
agency. In doing so, combatants did not just passively react to an organisational
impulse (such as the threat of violence), but actively engaged with the organ-
isational demands. They acted instead of, or alongside, being acted upon. In
what follows, I will detail a few of these strategies of exercising agency under the
conditions of (almost) total organisational control.
Subversive practices: Hidden and open resistance
From the interviewees’ narratives, it seems that combatants only rarely openly
resisted commands. Typically, they gave one of two reasons why: either they had
already experienced being harshly punished for it, or they had witnessed others
being punished for non-compliant behaviour. Often times, witnessing or experi-
encing punishment was sufficient to discourage them from open resistance later
on. Rather, they tried to circumvent the rules and commands secretly, without
anyone noticing. These strategies of hidden resistance were a central element
of the combatants’ exercise of agency. They often went unnoticed because, in
contrast to mutinies,38 they didn’t have to be organised and coordinated among
the combatants (von Trotha 1994a: 431). Every breach of a rule was enforced
through the initiative or inaction of a single person. However, strategies of hid-
den resistance often became shared patterns of behaviour. In this section, I will
highlight a few of them.
Upon abduction, most combatants already had a rough idea about the LRA’s
actions and identity. This picture was nurtured by first-hand experiences, reports
and rumours. Among these was the knowledge39 that the LRA violently retaliates
against those who attempt to escape and their home communities. The intervie-
wees entered the LRA with such knowledge, and it also informed their actions
38Which is why mutinies are rare events that often point to a weakened leadership; for reports
of mutiny in the LRA, see Cakaj (2015a).
39By knowledge, I refer all states of knowing that not only are based on valid arguments, but
includes all information that informs people’s attitudes and actions, such as own and relayed
experiences, rumours, and knowledge that has been passed on (see also Berger and Luckmann
2007).
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upon abduction. A couple of combatants admitted that they tried to mislead
the LRA about their identity right from the start, for instance, by introducing
themselves with a made-up name, like Faith did:
I changed my name. I didn’t tell them my real names. There was
a boy – I was older than he was – who told me not to tell them my
real names for the reason that if I had told them my real names, they
would find ways to go to our home and kill my parents. He was just
being childish. So I asked him what name to use, and a colleague of
mine said I should be called Julie. They later started calling me that
name.40 (Faith, ll. 221–232)
Combatants told us that they used a pseudonym, and that they sometimes
even lied about their homestead to protect themselves, but also their families and
communities from retaliatory action. Choosing to do so was perceived as a risky
strategy. It was not uncommon for combatants to meet later on acquaintances
or family members, who could have uncovered their lie. It was, in sum, a bet
with high stakes. However, hiding their identity and descent became a means
to deal with rumours, reports and threats of violence against their communities
and families. And it was also a strategy to protect themselves from harm. For
instance, Joyce recounted how she managed to escape once, but was abducted for
a second time afterwards. Although she was not re-abducted by the same unit,
she chose a new name for herself so she wouldn’t be detected and punished for
escaping before.
Moreover, the interviews show that combatants made decisions on their places
and roles in the organisation, most visibly in the realm of intimate relationships.
Though there were no direct orders to procreate, building a family was encouraged
and expected (Baines 2014, Kramer 2012).41 Some combatants secretly resisted
these expectations for different reasons. Janet, for instance, recounted how un-
happy she was when she found out she was pregnant. For her, the pregnancy
meant that she wouldn’t be considered for fighting missions in Uganda anymore,
a task that came with the chance of finding an opportunity to escape. As she saw
her pregnancy as an obstacle to her return to civilian life, she tried to terminate
40Many interviewees described how, upon abduction, other recruits advised them on how to
deal best with the expectations of the organisation, and how to avoid corporal punishments.
These acts of kindness, solidarity and friendship are discussed in Chapter 4.2 starting on page
90.
41I will discuss this in more detail in Chaper 4.5 starting on page 148.
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the pregnancy:
I felt I should have lived without the pregnancy because they would
select people from Sudan to come to Uganda. When they went to
Uganda, we would hear they escaped back to their homes. So I felt if
I hadn’t been pregnant I would have been selected to be among the
standby42 and would have gone to Uganda. It would have been possi-
ble to escape like my other colleagues did. I didn’t like the pregnancy.
I tried to abort the child when it was four months old [when I was
four months along]. I tried so hard to abort but George [my assigned
husband] couldn’t accept me to try everything. (Janet, ll. 649–663)
By deciding that she didn’t want to bear a child in captivity, Janet put her-
self at risk both for punishment from superiors and for potentially life-threatening
complications from an unsafe abortion. She took this risk, as she argued, because
she didn’t want this potential route for escape to close.
For some, pregnancy and motherhood felt like a burden; a further barrier to
returning to civilian life, and a responsibility that was even harder to manage
considering their youth and the living conditions in the bush.43 While most
couples went on to have children anyway (provided there was no fertility issue),
some, like Charles, consciously decided to avoid parenthood:
That one we [my wife and I] decided together and agreed not to have
any children; we realised the lifestyle in the bush is very hard for
raising children. Because there I witnessed [what happens if] you
have your child immediately (...) you should know that child is going
to be very astute. It is a young goat born in dry season, that goat
just after a week will want to begin to climb [mount] the mother, it
wants to go and do anything. [...] So the children who are born in the
bush are like that, they start to carry guns when they are just this
size (shows with his hands), and these young children are the worst
and most dangerous in the bush. When they are sent to fight a battle
(raised voice), they finish the UPDF (reduced voice). They aim very
well because they are used to holding guns. They have guns with
them all the time like something to play with. If they don’t fight they
are not happy. (Charles, ll. 1196–1221)
42Those who were selected as standby soldiers were not assigned to a specific mission, but
were supposed to wait for orders from superiors to move and act. Being among the standby
came with the possibility of fighting and moving across borders.
43I will talk about this in more detail in Chapter 4.5 starting on page 148.
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Charles offered an elaborate narrative on his (and his spouse’s) decision to
avoid pregnancy: not only is “the lifestyle in the bush [...] very hard for raising
children”, but it is also seen as detrimental for their moral development. In his
perception, children born in captivity couldn’t tell right from wrong, and, as a
result, didn’t have any inhibitions when it came to the use of violence.44 Conse-
quently, Charles and his wife (successfully) avoided pregnancy and parenthood.
They did not abstain from intercourse, though, but seemingly used some kind of
rhythm method: “You know there is a specific period for pregnancy [...] So if I
knew it was this period for getting pregnant, I did not do anything” (Charles, ll.
1272–1276).
Some female combatants, though, had a more positive perception of the
changes that pregnancy and parenthood meant for them. In contrast, they em-
phasised how their pregnancy and motherhood alleviated their living conditions:
expecting women and mothers weren’t obligated to participate in battle, received
better care and protection from casualties, and were to be treated with respect.45
Women and men narrated how they either sought or tried to avoid pregnancy
and parenthood, depending on their personal evaluation. While resistant couples
could quite easily get away with such a decision – provided no one knew the
assumption would be one of them was infertile – former combatants said it was
more difficult to hide resistance to other, more explicit expectations and tasks,
such as on the battlefield. The interviewees felt differently about opportunities
or requests to participate in battles. While some, like Janet, saw them as an
opportunity to escape, others tried to avoid participation by all means. Joyce,
for instance, admitted how she dreaded those requests: “I was a coward” (Joyce,
ll. 379–380). Some volunteered, but others tried to resist imperatives to fight.
A common strategy was to pretend to be too sick to support the fight: “I could
pretend that I was not feeling well; I would tell them that I was feeling some ab-
dominal pain. If they asked me of what I ate, I would tell that I ate the normal
sauce and some millet bread” (Herbert, ll. 1201–1206).
44The same judgement was made by a number of combatants about preadolescent combat-
ants more generally: “As adults, there were some things you would try to dodge from doing,
unlike children who did everything they were commanded” (John, ll. 1927–1931). Here, the
interviewees also make claims to a self that children born and raised in captivity cannot access
since they are not (as firmly) grounded in a civilian identity. Thereby, the interviewees dis-
tance themselves from those young combatants who are portrayed as being capable of atrocious
acts because they don’t know right from wrong. I will elaborate on this narrative strategy in
Chapter 4.4 starting on page 121.
45I will detail this in Chapter 4.5 starting on page 148.
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Former combatants also described how they occasionally avoided participation
in unpleasant tasks by creating a diversion. Asked whether they ever had to
participate in the punishment of anyone, Prisca and Joyce recounted how they
avoided these tasks where possible:
Well it is like this; if someone did something wrong, for instance one
time there was a girl who tried to escape and she was brought back.
I didn’t face her directly, I dodged giving her the punishment, but
if you want to dodge you have to be very smart. [...] The man I
used to stay with never allowed me to go where people congregated.
These congregations were full of new people, and if you are caught
escaping, they take you there and they ask the newly abducted people
to punish you. The punishment involves beating and sometimes even
killing. But for me when people were there I got my jerry can or axe
and went to fetch water or firewood in the jungle. That’s how I have
been dodging. (Prisca, ll. 444–467)
There was one time (. . . ) I and six other women were picked to go
and punish a girl who tried to escape and was caught. I told those
people that I was going to defecate and I then took very long there.
When I got back I was told to go and beat the girl too. But the good
thing was that a certain commander showed up and told me to go and
boil water for treating her [instead]. (Joyce, ll. 653–661)
From these narratives, it becomes clear that combatants were well aware that
they had to decide carefully when to try their luck. As Prisca explained, “[I]f
you want to dodge you have to be very smart”. Strategies of hidden resistance
could always backfire and lead to severe punishment if they were discovered by
superiors.46 Sometimes, combatants chose a highly probable punishment over the
assigned task; but often, this wasn’t a wise strategy since they would have had
to perform the task anyway.
A number of female interviewees also described how they resisted abuse from
their assigned husbands. While there was no explicit order to obey their spouses’
demands, resistance to sexual advances could be a risky strategy, depending on
how much abuse they were expected to take, and how much authority their
assigned husbands had to discipline them. Female combatants recounted that
they were usually unsuccessful in defying sexual abuse (as they were expected to
46As was the case for Scovia, see page 75.
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have intercourse with their spouses), but sometimes they succeeded in protesting
against other forms of physical maltreatment. Joan, for instance, recounted how
her husband tried to kill her for reasons of jealousy, and was punished and sep-
arated from her when she reported the abuse to his superiors. Open displays of
resistance like this were perceived as particularly risky and only rarely pursued
by the combatants.
In contrast, the interviewees’ narratives show that expressions of hidden resis-
tance pervaded everyday life in the organisation; “resistance is a daily struggle”47
between those in charge and the rank-and-file combatants. It is one of the most
powerful “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985): These forms of resistance are not
disruptive, but continuous (von Trotha 1994a: 431); and there is no need for
them to be organised. Thereby, they evade the institutions that aim to under-
mine organised resistance and solidarity among the combatants. Through acts
of hidden resistance, combatants responded to the perceived omnipotence of the
leadership and its orders. Combatants lied – or, rather, resorted to “defensive
communication” (von Trotha 1994a: 434–439) – to handle questions where they
couldn’t assess the consequences of their answers, or where they feared honesty
would hurt them. They evaded ever so secretly the organisation’s expectations
of family life where they felt these put new constraints on them. They resisted
participating in tasks that contradicted their moral convictions or put them at
risk. In doing so, they took care of themselves and others, trying to avoid physical
and psychological harm. Many of these efforts were, in fact, attempts to limit
the organisation’s level of control over them. By lying about their homestead,
for instance, they resisted the detachment from their families and communities
that lies in the credible threat of retaliatory action against them. By avoiding
pregnancy, they resisted their further immersion in the group through building
and becoming a family. While the leadership tried to block their routes for re-
turn and to make the bush become their new home, many interviewees actively
obstructed this process and thereby distanced themselves from the organisation.
Interestingly, these strategies of hidden resistance mostly corresponded to a
narrative of unconditional obedience. The interviewees rarely admitted to deviant
acts when asked head-on if they had ever acted against the rules.48 However, com-
batants did recount instances of hidden resistance, only they didn’t define them
47Translated by the author from the German original, which reads: “Widersta¨ndigkeit ist ein
allta¨gliches Gegeneinander” (von Trotha 1994a: 431).
48This observation has also been made by Baines (2016: 27).
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as such. One reason might be that such an admission would have somehow ques-
tioned the narrative of the LRA as an omnipotent organisation, a narrative the
combatants themselves had become invested in because it supported their claims
to victimhood. At first inspection, this proposition seems to be at odds with
the idea of agency. But to make experiences of victimisation an important and
driving element of their narratives is part of the storytelling agency of the com-
batants. By using their experiences of powerlessness and forced action to tell their
stories, they, in fact, exercise agency. Utas (2003: 22) has referred to this agency
of presenting oneself as a victim as “victimcy”. Victimcy allows combatants to
cope with the ambiguous experience of having been drawn into war and violence,
where they were forced to make challenging decisions.49 Here, their narratives
also become a means to rewrite the past by fitting it into a unified narrative, i.e.
one that reconciles their present with their past.
Cooperation as agency: Practices of active compliance
Agency was present not only in acts of deviance, but as much so in acts of active
compliance. By active compliance, I refer to acts of compliance that are not only
motivated by fear, necessity or a desire to conform, but by a conscious decision
to comply. Where compliance becomes more than sheer obedience, the extrinsic
motivation of individuals becomes intrinsic. Combatants would not only follow
orders, but also contribute to the organisation’s goals and anticipate their su-
periors’ expectations. In short, they tried to make their lives easier by making
the organisation’s rationale their own. This active compliance did not necessarily
rest on positive identification with the tasks at hand – though that certainly hap-
pened – but an understanding that they would somehow profit from complying
with orders, and, as a consequence, at times they even showed ambition. Among
such strategies of cooperation, two themes repeatedly surfaced in the combatants’
narratives: (1) becoming a wife and mother, and (2) getting a rank.
Apart from some of the ‘originals’ who became part of the LRA in its early
years, the female combatants typically didn’t have a choice whether they wanted
to become a wife (Baines 2014: 5). Among the female combatants I interviewed,
all were assigned to a male combatant at some point.50 But to a limited degree,
49I will talk about these narrative strategies of coping in more detail in Chapter 4.4 starting
on page 121.
50See Table 1. This is confirmed by analyses of larger samples; see Annan et al. (2008: 40).
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female combatants could influence the point in time when they transitioned from
ting-ting to wife (Baines 2014: 10). Depending on their experience and evalua-
tion, female combatants tried to either speed or slow the process of becoming a
wife. For instance, they would hide their first menstrual bleeding (that indicated
they were ‘ready’ for marriage), or proactively engage with a man to encourage
their union. Some female combatants, for instance, agreed to marry a senior
commander to profit from his protection and care (Baines 2014: 9). Married
and pregnant women in particular recounted that they received more reliable and
generous nutrition and medical care and didn’t have to perform tasks on the bat-
tlefield anymore (see also Baines 2014: 5, Victor 2011: 73; for Sierra Leone, see
Park 2006: 327). Young girls often understood marriage as a means to escape
their abuse by senior wives (Baines 2014: 11). Moreover, some of them reported
that they could influence who became their later companion (Baines 2014: 5).
For the women, an important part of becoming a wife was being subjected
to their husband’s sexual demands. More often than not, intercourse was forced,
even where women strongly defied their husband’s advances. In most cases, how-
ever, combatants ultimately complied with these demands due to experiences of
abuse and fear of corporal punishment: “you only persevere so that you don’t
get killed” (Faith, ll. 1279–1280). Many female interviewees described how they
put up resistance to their sexual abuse at first, but gave in once they saw that
their resistance only led to more threats and physical abuse. These acts and con-
siderations show that compliance is not just a reflex, but the result of a decision
process, albeit one with limited options.
But maybe the most important means to improve one’s living situation was
to aspire to a ranked position. Though interviewees told us that there was an
element of caprice to it, ranks were mainly based on seniority and bravery on the
battlefield. Combatants could work up to them, and many of them did. A lot of
combatants confirmed that receiving a rank gave them some peace of mind. For
instance, combatants who held a rank were not suspected of trying to escape (at
least not without giving some indication), which meant they were threatened and
monitored less closely. They described not being pushed around by the senior
commanders anymore, and having some, though clearly limited, room for making
decisions: “when you are a commander, [...] everybody follows your command.
Anything I wanted to do be done was done” (Isaac, ll. 120–123). In contrast,
as new combatants, not only were they excluded from these privileges, but their
actions were judged more strictly; as Simon said: “For the abductees [who com-
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mit an offence] there is no punishment, they just kill you” (Simon, ll. 170–171).
People with a rank, however, were treated as equals, and as valuable assets to
the LRA whose lives wouldn’t be put on the line for a minor transgression, just
to set an example for others. They became, as Oloya (2013: 107) argued, dano
adana, worthy human beings.
Concurrent with the risk of being targeted by colleagues, the risk of dying from
war-related causes also declined. Combatants with a (higher) rank were usually
exempted from particularly dangerous jobs like fighting at the forefront of the
battle, or being part of the bomb disposal unit. By aspiring and receiving a rank,
combatants also realised some freedom of movement. They were entitled to carry
a gun or even an arsenal of weapons that offered them at least some protection,
and were often also protected by escorts or guards. Since they received more
nutritious or generous rations of food, they were less affected by malnutrition,
and suffered less severely from simple diseases like diarrhoea because they were
in a better general state of health. Moreover, they were included when strategic
information was shared or decisions made, which could also affect their chances
of survival.
Individual agency and organisational control
Though combatants were subjected to high levels of violence, they were anything
but helpless victims of or passive bystanders to their fate. Through acts of both
resistance and compliance, combatants rejected the LRA’s claim to total control
over them. Why does an organisation that lives on a reputation of omnipotence
allow for what seem to be control deficits? Why does it tolerate and even en-
courage displays of individual agency when it seems to be invested in proving to
the combatants that they are powerless and replaceable? First, coercion can only
achieve so much. Exercising power by force alone is limited both in its reach and
in its efficiency; ‘power of action’ (Aktionsmacht) doesn’t threaten those who are
out of the leadership’s reach, and violent threats have to be reinforced continu-
ously to retain their power (Popitz 1992, Schlichte 2009). So one reason why the
LRA allows for displays of individual resistance is because it has to. It would be
too cost-intensive to monitor and sanction every little transgression. But more
importantly, from an organisational perspective, such attitudes to coercion can
become functional. It’s not a bug, it’s a feature – or rather, it’s a bug that turns
out to also be a feature. That is because the exercise of agency on the part of
the combatants resolves the conflict between forced recruitment and the need for
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commitment. Because combatants were given some leeway in decision-making,
they were compelled to identify with the LRA, because they felt that they had
some say in the role they would play. By including individual combatants in de-
cisions that were about them, the leadership managed to transfer accountability
for violent actions, thereby making forced combatants complicit (see also Ku¨hl
2016: 71–73). In this sense, control deficits served the same aims as rituals of
incremental inclusion: they compelled combatants to commit to the organisa-
tion through affirmative actions. This is not to say that control deficits were a
deliberate strategy for creating commitment, but that they had latent functions
(Merton 1957) that may have overridden their disruptive effects.
This idea is key to understanding the rationale behind some of the rituals that
the LRA performed: for the combatants, they created the illusion of being in a
position where they could influence their fate. In this sense, agency was not just
a tool of self-empowerment for the combatants, but a means to create allegiance
to the organisation. One of these rituals is the assignment to a spouse, as Ivy
described it here:51
I was made a wife. All the new captives who were female were forced
to remove their shirts, and then they take you to where new shirts
are. And when you pick any blouse from there you just know that
you have picked a man for yourself with that shirt. And there is no
way you can resist it. After that, they tell you that the shirt you have
picked belongs to your husband. (Ivy, ll. 291–300)
Ivy describes two seemingly contradictory things: how she “was made a wife”
by “pick[ing] a man for herself”. Becoming a wife is something that happens
to her, but also through her: after all, she is the one who picks up a particular
shirt, the shirt that belongs to the man who will become her husband. Why were
spouses assigned in this manner? Clearly, it won’t be based on a conviction that
the random assignment of spouses leads to the most sustainable unions. Partly,
as I argued in Chapter 4.1, such procedures are demonstrations of power: the
LRA does this because it can, and because it wants its members to know it.
But that’s only part of the story. By giving combatants some false authority
to make choices – choices that are not genuine because they offer only equally
bad alternatives, or because they preclude informed decisions – the LRA impli-
51This procedure has also been described by Annan et al. (2008: 40–41) and Victor (2011:
72).
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cates its members in the things that happen to them. By exercising fake choices,
combatants become complicit in their fate. Many of the decision processes com-
batants described follow a similar pattern, and have to be understood as means
of control rather than as transferrals of authority or dysfunctional control deficits.
Individual agency could also play out more directly, as compliance with or-
ganisationally prescribed routes for promotion that potentially gave combatants
leeway to make genuine decisions. To be sure, rising in the ranks was not ex-
pected, and many combatants survived without committed action, by following
orders and trying not to attract any attention, positive or negative. Still, or-
ganisational incentives to excel were pretty high. Interviewees who had a rank
described how they enjoyed a number of privileges when it came to the distribu-
tion of food, personal security, freedom of movement, and living arrangements.
Apart from the material incentives offered for cooperation and dedication, com-
batants argued that promotions allowed them to make decisions on things that
mattered to them, for instance, by releasing individuals and sparing one’s home
area from attacks:
[To do so,] [y]ou needed to have a rank. If you didn’t, you wouldn’t be
able to safeguard your home area. [...] You wouldn’t be listened to.
If you had a rank, you would be listened to. If someone was abducted
from your village, as a commander, you had the right to release that
person at your own wish. He could tell such an abductee to go back
home. (Samuel, ll. 818–831)
In part, such statements can be read as self-serving declarations, as attempts
to reinterpret opportunistic aspirations as heroic actions. Still, the sense of em-
powerment they portray is instructive: being in a leadership position allowed
combatants to do things on their own initiative, i.e. to choose the means they
saw as appropriate to realise a particular goal, and to enforce their ideas of just
action. These liberties were not just privileges, but they also had a symbolic
meaning for many combatants. They meant that the leadership trusted them not
just not to escape, but to successfully lead units and missions; to be, in short,
good fighters. This trust in the combatants’ capacities as soldiers often instilled
some sense of pride and self-value in the combatants that pervades many of their
narratives, especially those of higher-ranking combatants.
In this sense, the violent demands of the organisation double as sources of
identity and power (see also Honwana 2006, Richards 2008). By choosing their
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level of participation, combatants committed to the project of the LRA, at least
partially. They came to perceive themselves as powerful, and their decisions as
a result of who they were. John, for instance, attributed the assignment of a
rank to his kind nature and his capacities as a fighter (John, ll. 1216–1289);
Henry attributed it to his being “strong-hearted” (Henry, l. 673). In his study
on youth in the Liberian civil war, Utas (2003: 53) has argued that the partic-
ipation of many young women and men in civil wars can be understood as “an
active move towards power and influence”. To pick up the gun and fight allowed
them to seize opportunities not available to them in civilian life. This argument
still holds true, I argue, under the conditions of forced recruitment. While most
combatants joined the LRA by force, motives for retention may not be based on
violent threats alone. Combatants’ decisions to stay, or their indecisiveness about
seeking out chances to leave, were based on mixed motives (including existential,
opportunistic, and value-based motives). In a context where civilian life is per-
ceived as humiliating and debilitating, participation in war and violence can feel
empowering even for those who never chose, or never would have chosen, to fight
in the first place.
Summary
Reading the abundant stories of how everyday life in the LRA was marked by
force and the threat of it, one might get the impression that combatants were
devoid of agency, that they were nothing but “empty vessels into whom violence
was poured” (Honwana 2006: 73). But the fact that combatants were severely
limited in their alternatives for action did not preclude them from engaging with
the organisation’s violent demands. This engagement could result in different
strategies for action: combatants could either try to resist these expectations
(openly or secretly), or follow or even master the rules of the game. These strate-
gies of resistance and cooperation were not mutually exclusive. The interviewees’
narratives confirm that they engaged in one or the other depending on the situa-
tion and their perceived opportunities for action. But why do these opportunities
for decision-making and the combatants’ agency matter?
First of all, they change the discourse. Much of the research on young com-
batants and involuntary participation in civil war has addressed its protagonists
as mere victims, thereby precluding questions of agency, complicity and account-
ability in violent actions. It is these questions that resurface in the aftermath of
violent conflict and in confrontations with the civilian communities that suffered
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from their actions, and that need to be addressed to overcome the conflict’s legacy.
Second, while passive compliance might be the predominant mode of action, it is
the combatants’ agency that offers an important key to understanding why and
how they participated in war and violence for reasons that went beyond the use
of force. By trying to make the organisation’s rules work for them, combatants
became (subconsciously) complicit in their fate. This dynamic might provide
another clue to understanding how combatants lost sight of their long-term ob-
jectives – most importantly, to escape – and focussed on “mak[ing] our lives a
little better” (Prisca, l. 319), on making the most of living in and with the LRA
instead.
At the same time, these acts of resistance and renegotiation can be under-
stood, as Baines (2016: 30) has suggested, as “ongoing contestations of what a
human life is worth”. Talking about their agency also confronts the interviewees
with a narrative challenge: while they object to their portrayal as completely
powerless actors, the admission of too much agency confronts them with ques-
tions of accountability: Why didn’t they escape (earlier)? Why did they comply
with violent demands? These questions will be further addressed in the next
section.
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4.4 ‘Me, I am not a killer’: Linking and
decoupling identity and action
Abstract
One of the biggest challenges the interviewees faced throughout their engagement
with the LRA, and upon their return to civilian life, was to make sense of their
experiences in the bush, or more specifically, of their participation in war and
violence. How do they understand themselves as actors in armed conflict? What
do their actions mean for their sense of self and their identities? In this chapter, I
show how combatants cope with violent action and identity by means of their nar-
rative, that is, how violence became part of their stories. I argue that combatants
at least partially manage to cope with the conflict between their claimed moral
selves and their immoral actions by negotiating and resolving them narratively,
in both the past and the present. I will identify and detail two overall strategies:
(1) to distance oneself from one’s violent identity, and (2) to commit to this vio-
lent (role) identity in one way or another. These two strategies are not mutually
exclusive, but may overlap in individuals. In sum, they help combatants to make
sense of themselves and their actions. They also provide a key to understanding
how combatants can both resist immersion in the LRA and become committed
fighters after all.
Decoupling identity and action: Techniques of neutralisation
This chapter builds on the premise that combatants strive to be, and to be ac-
knowledged as, good persons. Indeed, the stated internal conflict only exists if
people feel conflicted about their transgressions and their moral implications. I
argue that this premise does not only hold true for former LRA combatants who
– by the forced nature of their engagement – are no more prone to violence than
any other person. In fact, almost every person tries to be good, even while pur-
posely committing crimes. As Sykes and Matza (1957) have shown, the idea that
delinquents and other criminals reject values commonly held by society, such as
honesty or abiding by the law, is faulty. The criminologists argue that the morals
of people engaging in crimes don’t differ from those of the ordinary person – with
one important caveat: They are convinced that their actions are not violations
of this moral order. Delinquents understand that the misdeeds they are accused
of are just that – except that, in their particular case, they are exempted, justi-
fied, or negligible. These argumentative techniques ‘neutralise’ the reprehensible
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quality of their offences. They allow delinquents and other criminals to reframe
their deviant behaviour in a way that it does not harm their self image as decent
persons. The authors identify five such “techniques of neutralization”: (1) denial
of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3) denial of the victim (i.e. their victim-
hood), (4) condemnation of the condemners, and (5) appeal to higher loyalties.
I will quickly introduce these techniques before exploring their relevance for the
study of combatants’ narratives.
(1) Delinquents might admit to deviant acts, but deny personal responsibil-
ity for them. They will argue that the actions or the resulting harm were not
intended, or blame their actions on socialisation, bad influences, or structural
incentives. By positioning themselves as being “more acted upon than acting”
(Sykes and Matza 1957: 667), delinquents surrender responsibility to forces be-
yond their control. By using this technique, delinquents position themselves as
victims whose deviant acts are a product of their own violation.
(2) In denial of injury, the delinquents deny neither their actions nor their
responsibility, but question that there is a resulting harm that needs to be ad-
dressed. One person’s vandalism is another one’s art, hooligans beating each
other up really is just consenting adults’ choice of how to spend a Sunday after-
noon, and occupying an empty house in a place with a housing shortage comes
down to the re-appropriation of public space. With this technique, delinquents
acknowledge the unlawfulness of their actions, but refuse to understand them as
morally reprehensible.
(3) The delinquents can also deny the victim in two ways. First, they can
question the differentiation between victim and perpetrator. They may argue
that the inflicted harm is not an unpremeditated offence, but that it serves as a
rightful punishment or retaliation for something the victim did. Second, the of-
fender can also make the victim disappear. This one is easiest and most tempting
when the victim is invisible in the first place, that is, in the case of offences that
happen without any physical confrontation or identification of or with the victim.
This is evident for cases of shoplifting, where delinquents don’t know who has to
pay for the damage done and assume that whoever it is doesn’t suffer from the
loss, be it because they are insured or because they are too wealthy to be bothered.
(4) In condemning the condemners, delinquents shift the attention away from
their own actions to those accusing them: Who are they to judge? What right
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do they have to question them? Are their actions any more moral? How would
they have acted in the same situation? By focussing on the attitudes, arguments
and identities of their condemners, delinquents try to change the topic so that
the nature of their actions gets lost in debate. More recently, this technique has
re-emerged under the term ‘whataboutism’.52
(5) Appealing to higher loyalties covers a range of strategies. The argumenta-
tive figure is that a norm is (temporarily) suspended by the application of more
important norms. For instance, most people would agree that stealing in general
is wrong, but might be excused under particular circumstances, such as not being
able to buy food to take care of one’s children. If a person cannot do justice to
two or more conflicting imperatives, they will prioritise which one to violate in
order to abide by the other. These dilemmas do exist, but they are also created
by the delinquents themselves through their stories.
Delinquents will strive to find ways to neutralise their crimes, thereby less-
ening the internal conflict between believing in particular rules and norms and
violating them – that is, between moral attitudes and immoral actions. We find
these and other narrative strategies towards violent action also among former
combatants. They are always more then purely self-serving declarations. They
are central for the combatants’ self image, as displays of their attempts to control
their stories, and vivid examples of how they try to make sense of their expe-
riences. In the following sections, I will detail four techniques of neutralisation
used by the interviewees: (1) vilifying others, (2) proving one’s own goodness,
(3) undoing one-sided violence, and (4) reframing violent actions.
Evil others: Necessary and unnecessary violence
When asked about violence they had perpetrated themselves, combatants were
typically less forthcoming than they were with questions about violence they
witnessed or experienced, or questions on non-violent actions.53 Those who ad-
52Most prominently, whataboutism referred to the Soviet Union’s practice of discrediting any
critique by pointing to failures or neglects in Western politics instead of addressing the issue
at hand. Whataboutism became a central argumentative figure in the leadership of the 45th
president of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump. See also Merriam Webster (2017).
53While some combatants might not want to reveal their own participation in violence, the
magnitude of forced killing in particular seems to be overestimated. In their large-scale surveys,
Annan et al. (2008, 2006) found that about one-fifth of the abducted male and female youth
were forced to violate a civilian, and about one-tenth were forced to hurt a family member
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mitted to having perpetrated violence were often quick to add that none of this
happened voluntarily (thereby denying responsibility), and often talked at length
about how they avoided or limited violence whenever possible.54
In an environment where the perpetration of violence became largely unavoid-
able, combatants came to understand that not all violence is the same. In their
narratives, they emphasised the differences between what they saw as necessary
and unnecessary, good and bad, forced and deliberate violence. One of the tech-
niques former combatants used was to distance themselves from “authentically
violent” perpetrators (Hochstetler et al. 2010). For them, morally reprehensible
action happened where people enjoyed violence and even exacted punishments
where there was no offence:
Based on what I witnessed in captivity, normally orders were given
not to commit brutalities. But some people became very enthusiastic
and they committed atrocities. [...] If you disobeyed orders to not
commit atrocities, you would become very famous and people would
see you as someone who defied orders and performed out of his own
will. [...] Even when there were no orders barring people from caus-
ing suffering to civilians, some people still committed crimes out of
insanity. (Joshua, ll. 862–894)
[T]hose things [like mistreating civilians] highly depended on the kind
of person [you were]. Personally, I didn’t have such kind of a dark
heart. I returned without having hurt anyone. The repercussions of
acting inhumane can be so bad, that is why I distanced myself from it.
Most of these rude people vanished and perished. I had that feeling
that if I acted that way, I would also perish. It wasn’t my will to
go into captivity, so there was no reason to act weird and badly. I’d
rather be killed for failing to execute a duty that I am forced to do
like killing people. (Hope, ll. 741–754)
Even though Hope and Joshua were involved in violations of civilians (in par-
ticular, looting), they distanced themselves from those who they saw as being
or friend. The proportions of abductees forced to kill a civilian, family member or friend
are slightly lower; about one-eighth of all combatants said they were forced to kill a soldier
in combat. Even though survey data faces the same caveat that it only shows self-reported
incidents, the researchers are confident that under-reporting of violence is not a major issue;
see Annan et al. (2006: 54).
54The perpetration of violence is a textbook case for the difficulty of judging whether research
participants are telling the truth, but it also shows the value in moving beyond questions of
truth and lie. See Chapter 2 starting on page 15.
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“out of sanity” and having “a bad heart”. Their narratives follow a logic of
“justification by comparison” (Cromwell and Thurman 2003), in which their own
actions weren’t understood as morally reprehensible. They argued that they only
perpetrated as much violence as they were asked or forced to, in contrast to others
who seemed to have developed a taste for it. This narrative strategy also allowed
them to address their participation in violence without accusing themselves. By
referring to and comparing themselves to more serious offenders, antiheros (Copes
et al. 2008: 259), and evil others (Presser 2008: 93), they relieved themselves of
the weight of their deeds.
While some combatants attributed acts of unnecessary violence to individual
mad men (and women), others identified instances of atrocious behaviour with a
particular grouping within the LRA: namely, child soldiers (lutino mony). Typ-
ically, these accounts came from older combatants who had been abducted as
adults. They argued that the younger combatants had fewer moral inhibitions
about following violent orders: “As adults, there were some things you would try
to dodge from doing, unlike children who did everything they were commanded”
(John, ll. 1927–1931). As adults, they reasoned, they understood the nature of
their actions better, and therefore acted with more restraint. Interestingly, youn-
ger combatants used the same argument as a defence; they didn’t know better:
“[W]e were abducted and trained to be child soldiers, so as a child you tend to
master anything you are told. So we thought those were really good things we
did” (Charity, ll. 851–855). Here, Charity also resorts to another narrative strat-
egy: By identifying herself as part of a group of combatants – “we” who became
“child soldiers” – she escapes addressing her own actions by disappearing into a
more or less defined group.
Evil others are conceptualised both as authentically violent perpetrators,
those who are “out of sanity” (Joshua, l. 842) and enjoy, or feel no moral inhibi-
tions about committing atrocities, and as child soldiers who, due to their young
age, don’t know better because they haven’t yet internalised moral imperatives
not to hurt others. On the other side, violence was often portrayed as necessary
where it addressed needs of self-care (in particular, food and sex) and of self-
defence. In their narratives, combatants tried to distance themselves both from
authentically violent personalities and from individual acts they saw as morally
reprehensible. A striking example is that of sexual violence. In their studies
of sexual violence among combatants of armed groups in the DRC, Baaz and
Stern (2009) found that combatants didn’t think of all sexual violence as being
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equally reprehensible. In their accounts, the male combatants did not generally
condemn or condone sexual violence against women, but differentiated between
somewhat excusable (or at least understandable) ‘lust rapes’ that stemmed from
necessity and lacking resources to properly court women, and ‘evil rapes’ that
weren’t committed to satisfy sexual ‘needs’, but were aimed at humiliating and
hurting the victim (for instance, by penetrating women with inanimate objects
such as sticks). While they had no sympathy for those who committed ‘evil
rapes’, the satisfaction of legitimate sexual ‘needs’ justified, or excused, taking
shortcuts under circumstances that prevented male combatants from getting the
women’s consent.
In a similar manner, sexual violence in the LRA was only under certain cir-
cumstances coded as such. Men especially did not address forced marriage in and
of itself as reprehensible; it had to be qualified to be understood as a violation.
For instance, Henry voiced his disapproval of the sexual abuse of young women
and girls that he had witnessed:
The other bad thing I saw was mostly scorning women. [...] I saw
it with my very own eyes, they captured students and pupils and
then they sexually abused them, that was sad for me to see. [...] It
so happened that other little children could be abused by very old
people and were forced to marry or have sex with them. (Henry, ll.
1151–1169)
Henry emphasised how upset he was about the sexual violence young women
and girls were subjected to. Yet he himself was married to two women in captivity
– one died during their escape, and the other left him upon their return. Henry
is evasive about the terms of their separation, yet points out that he didn’t take
his wives forcefully, but lived with them based on mutual agreement. In any case,
he clearly differentiates between the relationships he had with these women and
the sexual abuse of young women and girls that he had witnessed. One of the
criteria for his disapproval seems to be the young age of the female combatants,
and the big age difference between “little children” and “very old people”. When
asked whether he himself had a wife in the bush, Henry answered defensively:
“I got a wife there, so she could help me by cooking” (Henry, ll. 762–763).
Having a wife was seen as normal, even necessary, to go about one’s everyday
activities. Clearly, Henry’s relationship with his given wives didn’t seem to fall
126
4.4. Identity and action Chapter 4. Analysis
into the same category of morally reprehensible sexual violence.55 In the same
way, women often rejected their relationships not just because they were forced,
but because they violated other norms, such as their own young age or the age
difference between the spouses:
I was four years into babysitting after which I was given to a man and
gave birth to a child. It wasn’t easy. I was abducted when I was very
young and I didn’t know most of the things. And when they told me
to be a wife to that man, I was heartbroken because I was young and
the man was old. (Faith, ll. 392–399)
Besides such ‘inappropriate’ relationships within the group, combatants also
harshly criticised sexual violence and rape that was perpetrated by other armed
groups (most notably, the NRA/M) against male and female combatants of the
LRA.
Similarly, violence against civilians was seen as legitimate and at times neces-
sary where it addressed basic physical needs of the combatants. In these instances,
it could even be perpetrated against explicit orders from the leadership, as Char-
ity explained: “So those rules [not to loot from civilians] are also hard to follow.
For instance if you are told not to enter the huts of civilians and not to steal any-
thing from them, and at that time you are very hungry (laughs) (...)” (Charity,
ll. 766–771). Acts of theft weren’t seen as major offences, both in comparison
to other, unnecessary acts of violence and because they resulted from necessity:
“[O]nce they gave me a group of people to lead I gave orders that forbid the
killing of civilians. But we continued to loot food because we needed food to sur-
vive” (Isaac, ll. 172–176). Here, Isaac excuses these acts of theft by emphasising
how he forbade unnecessary violence (the killing of civilians). Moreover, both
interviewees appealed to higher loyalties (namely, their own hunger and survival)
to justify the dispossession of civilians. Apart from these reasons of self-care,
violence was in some instances understood as necessary to defend oneself against
enemy forces and armed civilians. George, for instance, recounted how he and a
colleague accidentally met a government soldier while looking for usable goods on
the battlefield: “We cut that guy into pieces because he was a potential threat
to us” (George, ll. 732–734). In his account, this lethal act of violence was war-
ranted because the enemy soldier could have become a threat to their lives as well.
55This understanding is facilitated by the institution of forced marriage, as I will argue below.
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These narrative efforts to position oneself as morally decent – for one reason
or another – also offer a key to understanding how individuals with different lev-
els of commitment can come together and act unified. The relationship between
engaged and hesitant perpetrators not only encourages the former, but also helps
the latter to become involved with less moral hazard. The existence of enthusias-
tic combatants made it easier for others to identify themselves as morally decent,
as different from “authentically violent” (Hochstetler et al. 2010) perpetrators.
As such, the dynamic between the ‘violent few’ (Collins 2009: 370–412) and those
who just ‘tag along’ is crucial for the group’s propensity towards and its use of
violence. It allowed individual combatants to find their place in the LRA, and
to negotiate their engagement through positioning themselves, thereby upholding
claims to moral decency.
Proving one’s essential goodness
Combatants were not only trying to distance themselves from authentically vio-
lent comrades; they were also using their narratives to confirm their own decency
and moral integrity. This could happen in passing, while explaining or justify-
ing singular actions, or it could become a powerful storyline driving the whole
narrative. John opened his narrative with the following statement:
[W]hen I was first abducted and taken into captivity I was a mature
man already and old enough. [...] What prevented me from returning
home was the fear of being captured in the process of returning. I
didn’t want to have a wife because I did mind only about myself
and how I could get out of captivity. I always felt if there came an
opportunity, I would escape. One other important thing I was doing
was to help other rebels and abductees. It is the reason my wife finally
lived with me. If I tell you the story, then you will understand better.
I was so merciful and pardoned people. I was given a leadership posi-
tion even though they barred me from reaching Uganda, thinking I
would escape and return home. Despite that I was digging seriously
[cultivating crops] to sustain me. (John, ll. 80–102)
Throughout the interview (which lasted for more than two and a half hours,
and was continued on another occasion), John emphasised how he remained a de-
cent person in captivity and upon his return – resisting his immersion in the LRA,
protecting his colleagues and the woman who would become his wife, speaking up
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to the leadership about injustices, being honest and forgiving even in the face of
personal violations. It is “the story” he wants us to “understand better”; it is the
story through which he asserts his personhood and asks us to do the same. Upon
his return, he became engaged as the chairperson for a group of returnees, trying
to help them to readjust to civilian life. These claims to decency were at odds, or
least seemed to be for him, with the fact that he held a leadership position, being
promoted to the ranks of second lieutenant, lieutenant, and eventually captain.
When we asked him how he came to receive a high rank, he explained: “I kept
people well and I didn’t have any bad report. People didn’t escape from my
camp and I didn’t torture or mistreat people. I didn’t order for the beating of
people. It didn’t happen. Not even once” (John, ll. 1219–1224). The implicit
assumption that John struggles with is that leadership positions are given to the
most ruthless fighters – a group he doesn’t want to be counted in. Against this
perception, he tries to emphasise the good he could do from his position of power
and recognition. For instance, he recounts how he made a personal call to Kony
to save his future wife from being killed on the suspicion of attempting to escape:
When I heard about it I reported [via radio call] to Kony that I
had heard over the radio that this lady was to be killed although
she hadn’t done anything wrong. I stood atop a hill to ensure the
radio transmission was clear. I told him that this lady was a polite
person and that some other people only wanted to escape with her
properties [...]. I convinced him that this lady wasn’t going to escape
back home. If she did, I would take full responsibility. [...] He said
that I worked hard for the rebels. So killing that lady would hurt me,
and subsequently I would also escape. [..] He ordered Otti Vincent to
leave that lady and that she shouldn’t be taken away. [...] They were
called back and she was finally released. (John, ll. 186–230)
In this account, John emphasises his initiative and the trust and respect he
gained from his superiors, and argues how he used them to rescue the woman
who eventually became his wife. He made a bold and, as he later adds, some-
what risky move to save her from being killed. In his narrative, the power and
agency he has are never opportunistic; they are instead assets to protect those
around him, and to enforce his ideas of just action.
Others made claims to decency by referring to their identity as civilians, or
their ‘civilian mindset’. Joshua contemplated his time in the bush:
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I sometimes think God didn’t mean to have me in captivity because
I was so grounded in being more of a civilian than a combatant while
there. A soldier must inflict pain all the time on someone who doesn’t
listen to people’s advices [obey orders] as well. That qualifies someone
to be a soldier. I was so much absorbed by the civilian kind of life.
I felt that torturing people hurt their feelings and it hurt mine too.
(lowered his voice) (Joshua, ll. 632–643)
During his time in the bush, Joshua was mandated to take care of the wives
of a high-ranking commander, and rose to the ranks of sergeant himself. In
his narrative, Joshua refuses to understand himself as a combatant, positioning
himself as “being more of a civilian” than a soldier even while being part of
the LRA. To him, being a good soldier required being indifferent towards other
people’s suffering; one had to lead and command without showing compassion.
Against this backdrop, he doesn’t, or more importantly doesn’t want to, ‘pass’
as a soldier. His narrative is a rare instance of someone who openly shares his
negative feelings. It shows how much it means to him to be acknowledged as a
good person. This effort also guides his life upon return:
I want to try as much as possible to be an example to those who
returned from captivity in living a transformed and dignified life. I
want to be a good example and not a bad one. Apparently, some of
the people who returned from captivity are in prison because they
started to do bad things.56 Some are being abused and stigmatised
for committing heinous atrocities. I want people to think that if all
returnees were like me, everything would be good. I want to do my
personal things. I don’t want to disgrace my name in the community.
I don’t want to use any abusive language against anyone. [...] I do
not to want to acquire things from my friends. I don’t like free things.
I want to work hard on that. (Joshua, ll. 1680–1707)
Joshua emphasises that he wants to lead an exemplary life, being the best
version of himself, but also of a person who returned from captivity. He is com-
mitted to convincing his community that the bad experiences they may have had
with other returnees don’t apply to him; that he is as good and hard-working
a person as anyone else. His narrative shows how he holds on to a ‘desirable
identity’ (Oloya 2013: 77) while still struggling with the shadow of his violent
56Most likely, Joshua is referring to the case of Onen Kamdulu, who together with six others
resorted to armed robbery upon his return. He was charged with aggravated robbery and spent
nine years in Luzira Maximum Security Prison in Kampala.
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past.57
Still others were more determined to refuse the label ‘combatant’ altogether,
on both personal and general grounds:
We saw that the government didn’t protect us when we were abducted
and taken to the bush. When we returned they gave us amnesty in-
stead. But in the amnesty bill, Act II spells out clearly that amnesty is
offered to a combatant. But we were abducted when we were young,
because the government didn’t protect us. And when we returned
home we should be given amnesty? We received it for reasons of for-
mality. I even told them, when I went to get the amnesty card, that
possibly the card would help me in the future as evidence, because I
know the government didn’t protect us. Can a ten years old child be
a combatant or soldier? Can they make such a profound decision in
life? I just took the amnesty card for reasons of formality and went
back home. (Faith, ll. 897–917)
You know, me, I was abducted and it was not in my interest. I was
abducted, and most of the things the rebels were doing are bad things
and I don’t like it. You cannot influence what you are supposed to do
because you have to do what they need. [...] I was very sad when I
was forced to kill someone, because I am not a killer. But I was forced
and they could have killed me if I had refused. (Isaac, ll. 166–179)
For Faith, this refusal was not just about her, but about everyone who was
abducted at a young age. She questions the applicability of the label ‘combatant’
on formal grounds: for her, young combatants simply lack the capacity to make
informed decisions about something as profound as being a soldier. By invoking
her young age, she attempts to recover a childhood that has been forcefully taken
away from her. She rejects being ‘forgiven’ by the government that she sees as
responsible for her situation, as it failed to protect her from being abducted in the
first place. Isaac, by comparison, refuses to see himself as a combatant, or more
precisely, as somebody who kills people; because that is not how he sees himself:
“I am not a killer”. Since he didn’t choose to become part of the LRA, and was
forced to commit violence against his will, he sees himself not as a combatant,
but as a captive. His refusal is also visible in the use of the term ‘rebel’ (adwii)
and ‘they’; clearly, he doesn’t understand himself as one of them, but emphasises
57I will talk about these narrative efforts to hold on to a desirable, pre-abduction identity in
the face of adverse action in Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
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his forced situation as an abductee.
These accounts have a common narrative goal, namely, to show how com-
batants resisted their brutalisation and remained decent human beings, in both
acting and understanding their and the LRA’s actions. In doing so, they make
claims to a stable moral self throughout the experiences they had in captivity.58
These narratives aim to show how their authors actively resisted moral decay,
trying to stay moral in an immoral place. These narrative claims to moral de-
cency can also be read as an appropriation of the past. Telling their stories also
allows former combatants to make up for past failures to do justice to the identity
of one’s imagination. In this sense, the narrative becomes a site for reconciling
one’s past and present self.
Reciprocity and retaliation: Undoing one-sided violence
Combatants witnessed and partook in different kinds of violence: within the
group (against their colleagues), against other armed actors (like the UPDF),
and against civilians in the affected areas. Among the three, violence against
civilians was perhaps the most ethically challenging, as it affected people who
were not members of the warring parties and, as a consequence, were typically
unarmed. That is, civilians lacked both the means and the intention to defend
themselves with potentially lethal violence. This lack of reciprocity makes vi-
olence against civilians particularly hard to justify (Ha¨rtel and Schwalb 2016:
1–2). At the same time, combatants were civilians themselves before they were
forcefully drawn into the conflict. They know first-hand about the challenges
civilians face in confronting armed groups, and often feel closely connected to
them through the similarity of their experiences or their shared ethnic identity.
How do combatants deal with the apparent moral dilemma of having to hurt
unarmed members of their own social group?
When former combatants were asked about the rationale behind atrocities
against civilians, we received five kinds of answers:
(1) They said that they weren’t aware that this was happening or thought of it
as a misunderstanding or intentional misinformation (that is, they assumed that
58Lois Presser (2008) has coined the term “stability narratives” for narratives that make
claims to an unchanged moral self through episodes of delinquency. I will elaborate on this and
other ‘grand narratives’ on the place that war and violence occupy in combatants’ life stories
in Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
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the real culprits were with the government forces or other armed actors).
(2) They saw this as a result of individual misbehaviour that was either encour-
aged or tolerated by the leadership, and sometimes even slipped its attention.
Some combatants even emphasised that the leadership and Kony himself were
strongly against it, and would order severe punishments when such instances be-
came known.
(3) They thought of civilian casualties as an unfortunate but largely unavoidable
by-product of waging war, sometimes referring to an African proverb: “When
the elephants are fighting, the grass and the trees are the ones to suffer” (Joel,
ll. 493–496). One interviewee even argued that sexual violence, for instance,
happened because there are other priorities in wartime than enforcing the high
level of discipline necessary to prevent these violations.
(4) Violence against civilians was understood as an indirect communication strat-
egy vis-a`-vis the combatants and the government forces. As such, it was meant to
remind the combatants of the risks associated with escape: “This [the mutilation
of civilians] also frightened the rebels who wanted to escape and join the UPDF.
Through this they got reminded that if they escape, they will be killed” (John, ll.
898–901). For the government and the civilian population, attacks and massacres
were meant to prove that the LRA was still strong and capable:
They will send maybe only ten rebels to cause a terrible havoc. They
would do a very memorable attack so that the BBC would get to know
about it. It will be done intentionally through Kony’s orders. They
would shoot cars and people and then return [to the bush]. They
would burn properties, including houses, so that people know Kony
is still active. It would be a reminder. They would commit atrocities
to remind people. (John, ll. 2323–2334)
(5) But the most common response was to reject the premise of one-sided vio-
lence. Many interviewees argued that civilians brought violence upon themselves
in one way or another, thereby neutralising their violent acts by denying that civil-
ians are, in fact, innocent and vulnerable victims. According to the interviewees,
violence against civilians was at least partly caused by the civilians’ behaviour
because they (a) cooperated with the government forces, (b) harmed the LRA
in another way, (c) presented a threat that warranted preemptive violence, (d)
were uncooperative, or (e) behaved disrespectfully. Moreover, combatants tried
to neutralise their actions by (f) emphasising their own victimisation and (g) ab-
dicating responsibility for them.
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Cooperation with government forces. Interviewees justified violence against
civilians as a form of punishment or disciplinary measure for cooperating with
the government forces. They reported how civilians took sides in the conflict, for
instance, by informing the UPDF or other armed forces about the approach or
the whereabouts of the LRA:
Whenever the LRA passed close to the villages, the civilians would
run and report to the SPLA. The SPLA would in the same manner
move with the person who reported the LRA to their locations so that
they were attacked. That was the reason there was a fight between
them [the LRA and the civilian population]. It was the same way
of launching attacks against each other [as in Uganda]. (Jackson, ll.
663–673)
Not only did the combatants feel betrayed by these actions, but it changed
the civilians’ status in their eyes. As they argued, by sharing this information
with the enemy forces, the civilians gave up their neutrality and became involved
in the war. Civilians were not solely considered as victims of the LRA’s violence
anymore, but as warring parties “launching attacks against each other”. There-
fore, civilians couldn’t count on the good will of the LRA anymore.59
Causing harm by making noise and attracting attention. The former com-
batants took issue not only with what they saw as collaboration with the enemy.
As the interviewees argued, civilians also brought harm upon themselves uninten-
tionally by attracting attention when the LRA approached. Instances of symbolic
violence in particular were framed as necessary or legitimate responses to civilians
who behaved erratically:
I would like to say that these things [mutilations of civilians] happened
right around the time when I was abducted. An incident happened
near our home in F [a place in Gulu district] before I was abducted.
It is the civilians who provoke the rebels to cut their lips. Such tem-
per arises when civilians provoke rebels. For instance, if the rebels
are bypassing your home on a nearby road, and they have not even
come to your home to cause any atrocities, and you start to ululate
“wulululu!” This sound alerts the government forces and indicates the
location of the rebels to them. So then the rebels cut your lips off.
(John, ll. 873–887)
59This dynamic has also been described by Olsen (2007).
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With this statement, John pursues a number of narrative goals. First, he
provides an explanation for why he did not resist his abduction though he was “a
mature man already and old enough” (John, ll. 81–82), as he said in his opening
statement. Since mutilations “started right around the time I was abducted”, it
wouldn’t have been wise to do so. But second, and more important, he gives a ra-
tionale for committing such atrocious acts: Mutilations were both a punishment
to deter civilians from attracting attention in the future, and a means to ‘shut
them up’, with no hesitation about causing permanent harm. For John, what
causes the offence is the perceived provocation on the side of the civilians, who
“provoke the rebels to cut their lips” by making unwarranted noise, even though
“they have not even come to your home to cause any atrocities”. Here, the civil-
ians’ efforts to protect themselves from anticipated harm turn from a defensive
into an offensive move. The interviewees didn’t question the proportionality of
such measures. For them, it was a life-and-death situation as well. Even if civil-
ians didn’t mean to betray the LRA, their erratic behaviour put combatants at
severe risk of being detected and attacked by the government forces. Therefore,
their punishment or violent silencing was seen as justified.
Preemptive violence. Many interviewees who spent some time in Sudan em-
phasised the propensity towards violence among civilians. The Lutugu especially
were perceived as a belligerent and routinely armed tribe: “These Lutugu com-
munities were like soldiers, most of the people have guns” (Flavia, ll. 1158–
1160). Because combatants found that civilians in Sudan very likely possessed
guns themselves, they became “like soldiers”. In this situation, the combatants
presented arming themselves and opening fire as a necessary measure to keep the
upper hand in the confrontation with supposedly equally well armed and hostile
civilians who wouldn’t hesitate to fire the first bullet if given the chance.
Uncooperative behaviour. In other instances, combatants argued that they had
to resort to violent measures because civilians wouldn’t respond to their requests
otherwise. In their view, civilians provoked a violent response by refusing to
give food and other resources to the combatants when they asked nicely for it:
“Sometimes the [LRA’s] orders weren’t rude. [...] If a civilian gives what is asked
from them, they are forgiven. But if they don’t, their possessions are forcefully
looted” (Hope, ll. 708–714). In this argument, the blame for acts of violent theft
is shifted from the combatants who loot to the civilians who are robbed of their
possessions: If they had agreed to share their provisions, there would have been
no need to steal from them and to apply force; “they [would be] forgiven”. Under
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the conditions of scarcity, the civilians’ resistance to these orders ‘forced’ the
combatants to take things violently. Likewise, the failure to obey other orders
issued by the LRA, such as to avoid movement or to stay in certain places, also
warranted their violation:
If I have gone to spy where my people live, I can easily tell them that
the rebels might pass here today, so it will be upon them to evacuate
the place, because I have already told them. So if you keep staying
and they come and get you, it will be upon you not me, because I have
already told you what to do and given you the information. (Moses,
ll. 469–481)
Here, the orders given by the LRA are understood as an attempt to protect
civilians, who are in turn seen as being responsible for their violation where they
‘choose’ to ignore these instructions: “it will be upon you not me, because I have
already told you what to do”.
Retaliation for disrespectful behaviour. Some interviewees also argued that
violence was a warranted retaliation for disrespectful behaviour on the part of the
civilians. By conducting attacks and massacres, they simply reacted to claims
that the LRA was vanishing, an insult that could not go unanswered. It was
not perceived only as a humiliation. Since the LRA lives to a large degree on its
reputation to wreak havoc wherever they go, such a statement of weakness could
have become a self-fulfilling prophecy, thereby threatening the LRA’s existence.
This is why, as John argued, people were attacked even in the camps, where they
had little contact with LRA forces:
Even in the camps like Lukodi you hear them talk that people were
massacred. The rebels were provoked by the words people said. Like
for example they said the rebels were no longer strong and vanishing
for good. The government troops had started jubilations thinking that
the war was over. Immediately Kony ordered for child soldiers who
could not escape back home easily and were of use to the rebellion.
[...] They came here and did a lot of atrocities. People wondered
how the rebels resurfaced [...]. It was all because of that. (John, ll.
2338–2357)
Form John’s account, it seems unclear or irrelevant who spread this misinfor-
mation, i.e., whether it was the government or civilians who were to blame in the
first place. By adjusting their behaviour to this information – becoming more
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relaxed about attacks, dropping some of the precautionary measures in place,
returning to normal life – civilians provoked a violent response by the LRA.60
Next to these efforts to undo one-sided violence, to make their offences ‘go
away’, combatants resorted to a number of other techniques to neutralise their
and the LRA’s violations:
Emphasising one’s own victimisation. Some combatants questioned the status
‘non-combatant’ altogether, both by drawing civilians into the realm of war and
by taking themselves out of it. They did so by emphasising their own status as
(former) civilians and abductees. Janet, for instance, explicitly compared her and
her colleagues’ situation to that of the civilians:
We [abductees] do share ideas and we feel we are equal to other peo-
ple in the community who didn’t go through what we went through.
While we were in captivity, those who were at home also had serious
problems and challenges. They were in camps. In the camps, life
wasn’t easy so I feel there wasn’t any difference to people who were
in captivity. Life was equally hard for everyone whether they were in
captivity or not. (Janet, ll. 1417–1428)
By comparing her fate of abduction with the civilians’ displacement, Janet
gets around talking about the fact that the civilians’ suffering is caused by the
LRA’s actions. Comparing her suffering to that of the civilians allows her to speak
about the latter’s suffering within addressing her role in it. By emphasising her
own victimisation, her status as a perpetrator of violence becomes invisible.
Abdicating responsibility. Many combatants did not deny that atrocities by
LRA forces happened, but instead of blaming the LRA for its atrocious acts, they
emphasised the government’s shortcomings in preventing them. This strategy
shares characteristics of two neutralisation techniques: denying responsibility,
and accusing the accusers. Interviewees argued that the government failed to
protect them from being abducted by the LRA, and was therefore to be held
accountable for the damage done. This argument was often brought up in the
context of the trial of Dominic Ongwen:
60However, those who commit the worst violence are identified as child soldiers. Here, John
also distances himself from perpetrating this kind of violence by attributing it to a different
group of combatants.
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Dominic was just sent to do these heinous acts while in captivity.
It’s hard to know for sure that he committed those acts. Like any
other person, he was just captured. It was the role [of the Ugandan
government] to protect his life, but instead he was left to suffer in
captivity. The government neglected his life, so he was exposed to do
those cruel things. Dominic also did these things to protect himself.
(Hope, ll. 1599–1609)
In her response, Hope defends not only Dominic Ongwen, but first and fore-
most herself: “like any other person, he was just captured”. Since he didn’t
choose to become a combatant, she argues, he cannot be held accountable for
the acts he committed in captivity. Not only did the government fail to protect
him and everyone else from being abducted – a point that was emphasised by
many former combatants – but their inconsistent and half-hearted fight against
the LRA exacerbated the suffering of the civilian population:
The government is inciting citizens and rebels alike. Yet this war is
not the mandate of some of the rebels in captivity. The government
even goes ahead to share information on all media platforms that the
rebels are already powerless and the civilians start to become relaxed
about the war. Thereafter you hear that 40 people have been abducted
from a certain place. The rebels do this to avenge. The government
should be made responsible for that. If the government was telling
people to be aware that the rebels are still strong, and that people
should limit their movement, people wouldn’t have been abducted in
large numbers like it happened. (John, ll. 2363–2379)
In this statement, it is – at least primarily – not the combatants’ actions that
violated the civilians, but the government’s instigation of revenge by the LRA,
and its insufficient measures to protect them from being targeted. While it some-
how acknowledges that civilians are caught between a rock and a hard place, the
consequence is not to spare them from war violence. Rather, John emphasises
the government’s role in bringing the conflict about, and its failure to prevent a
violent backlash against innocent civilians. The problem is not that this is not
a correct diagnosis of the government’s poor handling of the conflict. What is
problematic about it is that it deflects blame and thereby responsibility from the
combatants who commit the crimes to the national authority who should protect
its citizens from them. And there is truth to that. But, as a narrative strategy, it
legitimises the use of violence against civilians, because it excuses the combatants
from their deeds.
138
4.4. Identity and action Chapter 4. Analysis
Reframing action: Soldiers and spouses, punishments and work
Throughout this thesis, I have mostly referred to my interviewees as (former) com-
batants, or tried to use other neutral terms to describe their engagement with the
LRA. In particular, I have tried to avoid the use of the term rebel. What is prob-
lematic about referring to non-state armed actors as rebels and state-sponsored
armed actors as soldiers is the implicit connotation on the legitimacy of their use
of violence. While soldiers are thought of as legal and thereby legitimate repre-
sentatives of the state, with a clear mandate to fight armed opposition, rebels
not only question the government’s claim to power, but stand outside the law.
Not only are they illegal, but they are often simultaneously described as having
no legitimate cause to fight. Most importantly, former combatants themselves
refused to be addressed as rebels because they saw it as a negation of their per-
sonhood: “We are being labelled as rebels but we are not rebels. We are the same
as people at home” (Herbert, ll. 735–737).61 These connotations also have an
influence on how combatants see themselves and how they and others evaluate
their own actions. The attribution of role identities that are culturally coded as
legitimate helps to reframe actions that belong to these role identities as good,
normal, or necessary. A soldier killing an enemy in combat is not understood
as somebody committing a capital crime, but as a person fulfilling a duty that
comes with the job title: “it is what soldiers do”, as Kony was recalled to have
said on numerous occasions (Cakaj 2016: 7). Being able to resort to these role
identities and frames offers combatants access to established narratives or ‘for-
mula stories’, as Brookman et al. (2011) call them. By selectively resorting to
role identities, combatants can shift between subcultural and more conventional
narratives (Sandberg 2010), adhering to their specific morals one at a time.
Having a vocabulary that defines actions and obligations helps in finding an-
swers to the question Goffman (1986: 25) so famously posed: “What is it that’s
going on here?” Reframing roles and actions as legitimate is another technique to
distance oneself from a violent self-image, and to neutralise the violence one expe-
riences, witnesses and perpetrates. In the following, I would like to show how the
adaptation of frames and role identities has the potential to change perceptions
about the legitimacy of violent actions. Here, I will focus on two aspects: (1) the
61In the Acholi original, Herbert says “Waco ni wan adwii ento wan bene pe adwii. Wan wa
dano adana calo dano ma gangi” (Herbert, ll. 731–732). Oloya (2013: 16–18) has suggested
to translate ‘dano adana’ as ‘human being’ or ‘human person’. Following Oloya, the second
sentence could be more accurately translated as “We are human beings [just] like people at
home”, a translation that supports my argument.
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adaptation of role identities as soldiers and as spouses, and (2) the framing of
violent actions within the group as punishments and against civilians as work.
As I have argued above, it matters whether combatants are addressed as sol-
diers or as rebels; not least because it matters to them.62 The interviewees mostly
addressed themselves as soldiers and not as rebels. If they used the word ‘rebel’
at all, they used it to refer to their experiences before and upon abduction, where
rebels signified the unknown, those who came at night.63 Once part of the LRA,
they typically referred to themselves and their colleagues as soldiers (mony) as
opposed to the government soldiers (mony pa gamente) who were sometimes also
called adwii, enemy or terrorist, the same term which is used to mean rebels.64
Their use of language illustrates how combatants try to think of themselves
as legitimate (as opposed to illegitimate) participants in war. This revaluation is
a common motif of subcultural narratives. In their study of the street economy,
Copes et al. (2008) show how its protagonists want to be understood as hustlers,
an identity that is constructed in opposition to that of crackheads. While both are
clearly outlaws, they strive to be acknowledged as legitimate, even noble outlaws.
In a similar manner, combatants describe themselves not as rebels, but as soldiers
(or by referring to the military position they held as intelligence, escorts, guards,
or rescue). I would argue that this has something to do with the common readings
of the two terms: while rebels are understood as being in the business of waging
a destructive and self-serving war, soldiering is imagined as an honest profession
of brave men and women. It is, in short, a role ascription combatants more will-
ingly identity with. Its usage importantly changes how combatants understand
the actions they perform. In particular, violence perpetrated as a soldier, or in
fulfilment of a military duty, becomes invisible. That becomes clear from their
statements on their own violence. As Fred and Nathan put it: “I never killed
anyone. Except in battle while exchanging gun fire with the soldiers” (Fred, ll.
62To be sure, language usage is somewhat arbitrary, especially when working with translated
narratives. For instance, combatants only rarely used the term rebel (adwii) to refer to LRA
combatants, but for reasons of clarity, the interpreters often choose to translate gin (they),
olum ([those who live in the] bush), (mony pa) Lakwena (Lakwena’s soldiers), lumony (persons
of war, or soldiers), and lulweny (those who fight) as rebels. To address problems of translation
and cultural and language conventions, I focused on connotations and connections made by the
interviewees in addition to the exact phrasing.
63Beyond practical reasons for abduction at nighttime, the night has a special meaning in
Acholi culture. It is the time when all bad things, including illnesses, death, and sorcery, happen
(Oloya 2013: 79).
64A similar observation has been made by Oloya (2013: 95).
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340–342) and “I was already indoctrinated into becoming a fighter, but I did not
want to kill anyone. I would only intend to kill when it was a battle” (Nathan,
ll. 405–408). What both mean by that is that killing on the battlefield doesn’t
really count, because it belongs to the realm of warfare, of acting as a soldier in
war. At the very least, violence on the battlefield becomes a moral afterthought;
it is not the kind of violence the interviewees struggle to explain.
By making the perpetration of violence part of a role identity (namely, as sol-
diers on the battlefield), people not only frame violence as part of their job, but
they compartmentalise. That is, they differentiate between the morals of their
private and their professional identities. Robert J. Lifton (1986) has argued that
this compartmentalisation allowed Nazi doctors to do their jobs, i.e. to perform
cruel and absurd medical experiments on Jews and other targeted social groups
while being loving and caring parents and spouses at home. This points to a
certain identification with the combatant label, in contrast to the refusal of a
combatant identity that is visible from the narratives of Joshua and Faith. How-
ever, these strategies are not mutually exclusive, but may overlap in individuals’
narratives.
Role identities are not only taken up, but also assigned to others. Quite im-
portantly, this happens within the institution of forced marriage, through which
the combatants became husbands and wives to each other. Spouses start to live
“like husband and wife” (callo lacoo ki dako). They were confronted with expec-
tations of family life, mutual care and, for the women, obedience. While they
resisted these norms and expectations on numerous occasions, they had to justify
their resistance and were, or became, aware of its consequences. The organisation
facilitates this understanding by making it an institution: namely, forced mar-
riage. Forced marriage allowed male combatants in particular to speak and think
about their affiliations not as sexual violence, but as legitimate unions between
consenting adults. While experiences of sexual abuse in their forced marriages
feature prominently in the accounts of female interviewees, male combatants only
rarely addressed it, but rather talked about ‘inappropriate’ relationship or sexual
violence perpetrated by other armed groups. Sexual violence that happened in
forced marriages hardly appears in their narratives. Not only does it not become
part of their stories, but it is also genuinely not perceived as such. As an in-
stitution, forced marriage renders sexual violence invisible, except for those who
experience it.
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Another example of such processes in which violence is reframed is how com-
batants talked about violence within the group. Most interviewees only hesitantly
answered when they where asked about violence they and others experienced and
participated in, but they spoke with more ease about what they understood as
punishments. Here, combatants buy into the logic of the LRA: that the violence
they and others experienced was justified for transgressing the organisation’s
rules. In their accounts, they argued how they or their colleagues ‘had it com-
ing’ by transgressing the rules, or transgressing stupidly. For instance, Joyce
recounted how a friend attempted to escape and was beaten to the point of un-
consciousness. Though she felt sorry for her, Joyce was harsh in her verdict: “I
pleaded her to forgive those who tortured her, because they didn’t choose to do
so and I even told her that it was her fault to plan an escape during daytime. It
should have been at night!” (Joyce, ll. 680–684). By addressing violence within
the group as punishments, combatants gave in to the notion that these acts were
legitimate, and that they could have avoided being subjected to them by follow-
ing the rules strictly. In this sense, it allowed them to regain a sense of control,
however deceptive.65 Moreover, by understanding the beatings of colleagues as
punishments, they relieved themselves of the moral weight of having to hurt oth-
ers.
There are other example where the use of particular terms points to an un-
derlying mindset. For instance, combatants often stated that they were ‘going
for operation’ or ‘to work’ (wacito ka tic – we went to work) when sent to attack,
abduct or loot from civilians. By using these terms, looting and abducting new
combatants became part of their jobs as soldiers. In a similar vein, delinquent
actions were framed in a way that they didn’t seem as morally reprehensible. For
instance, combatants often said that they took or picked (kwanyo) things from
civilians instead of saying they looted or stole (kwalo) them. By choosing their
words carefully, combatants tried to avoid the moral repercussions of admitting
to actions that were, even without further qualification, commonly understood
as wrong. As a consequence, deviant acts became somewhat invisible.
65Though some interviewees emphasised that almost all actions could be punished, and that
there was no way to reliably avoid punishment through obedience. Violence could always be
used to set an example irrespective of any transgressions, and high-ranking commanders in
particular were authorised to treat the members of their household as they pleased.
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Linking identity and action: Role identities and committed action
Frames and role identities are not just means to neutralise violent action. To
understand oneself as a soldier and the war of the LRA as a legitimate strug-
gle over power is also part of identifying with the organisation and becoming
a committed fighter. That is, as combatants tried to distance themselves from
violence and violent identities, they became further entrenched in the organisa-
tion and its ideology. People became the roles they played. How did that happen?
Here, I would like to look at the psychosocial dynamics at play, in particular,
the concept of cognitive dissonance as developed by Leon Festinger. Festinger
et al. (2011) looked at how eschatological cults deal with and survive the frustra-
tion of their prophecies. What happens after the announced date of apocalypse
passes uneventfully? How do their followers manage to keep believing in the
face of counter-factual evidence? Why do these cults not only survive these dis-
appointed expectations, but become stronger through them? Festinger (2001)
argues that the key to understand these dynamics is the desire to disentangle
cognitive dissonance. By cognitive dissonance, he refers to a state of mind in
which individuals experience a mismatch or incompatibility between the world
as perceived and the world as believed, or between what they say or do and how
they feel about it. This mismatch, or cognitive dissonance, between actions and
attitudes (and, by prolongation, identity) is also very much present in the narra-
tives of former combatants. Their struggle to prove their essential goodness, and
to distance themselves from authentically violent comrades, is part of their ef-
forts to resolve this internal conflict. Basically, people can resort to three distinct
strategies to reduce cognitive dissonance: they can (1) change their behaviour in
a way that it becomes more compatible with their attitudes and identity claims,
(2) change their cognition – for instance, about the moral reprehensibility of
their actions, or the relevance of these actions to their identity claims, or (3)
keep themselves from exposure to information that confirms or increases their
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 2001: 1–31). Since combatants had only limited
leeway to change their behaviour and to ignore or access new information, I will
discuss how combatants came to change their cognition, that is, their attitudes
towards violent action.
First, actions create new and genuine commitments that aren’t necessarily
identical with the individual’s prior attitudes. These obligating effects of actions
might be particularly dire considering the severity of initiation (Aronson and
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Mills 1959).66 While reports of combatants being regularly forced to harm and
even kill their family members seem to be overblown in magnitude,67 initiation
procedures were often traumatising and gave combatants the impression that
they could not return home. At the same time, they may see their survival as an
achievement and an obligation to persevere. The resulting role identities typically
do not replace but supplement their prior identities. Combatants hold on to their
desired identities (as civilians, daughters and sons, devout Christians, etc.) while
adapting to stigmatised identities that allow them to become functional members
of the LRA (Oloya 2013: 77). At the same time, role identities help combatants
to figure out what to do – not in a moral but in a practical sense. Role identities
serve as guides to action, both in the sense of scripts (what should I do?) and as
enforcements (what are my options?).
The narratives of former combatants support the idea that, once they had
accepted their roles as soldiers, they tried to live up to the expectations and
hopes that commanders articulated, and that their obedience was not purely a
result of fear of punishment. When asked how she felt about punishing others,
Charity replied: “If you are taught how to be a soldier, you can never feel bad, no
matter what happens to anyone (laughs) (. . . )” (Charity, ll. 736–738). Such self-
identifications were encouraged by the organisation and may have fostered some
kind of professional ethics. Combatants became ‘committed insiders’ (Hundeide
2003) as they started to learn and master the rules and tasks assigned to them.
As they became committed to their roles within the organisation and started to
identify with these roles, their definitions of justifiable action changed. Violence
became coded as good or necessary where it was understood to serve a higher
66That initiation procedures – that is, whether membership is easy or hard to realise –
impact people’s assessment of a group has been experimentally studied by Aronson and Mills
(1959). In their study, the researchers assigned research participants randomly to one of three
groups, and asked them to perform tests of varying difficulty to be admitted to the group. The
research participants viewed the group more positively if they had to perform a more difficult
initiation test. This phenomenon can be explained through the theory of cognitive dissonance:
People who had to make an effort to become members cannot give a negative assessment of the
group without admitting that their efforts were a waste of time and energy. To upgrade their
perception of the group is a means to rationalise their investment into it. These observations
have been confirmed by a replication study by Gerard and Mathewson (1966).
67None of my respondents reported this, even though these narratives are clearly incentivised
by the advocacy sector. This is not to claim that these things didn’t happen or affect the
way combatants and civilians acted. Unfortunately, there aren’t any good statistics on violence
against family members upon abduction. In the SWAY sample, 18 percent of male and 5
percent of female abductees said they had been forced to kill a family member or a friend, but
the survey does not differentiate between violence upon abduction and violence during their
time in captivity (Annan et al. 2008: 28).
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purpose. George’s account gives an instructive example of this dynamic:
Interviewer (I): How did you make sure that those people who were
under your command followed the orders you gave them?
George (G): What I showed them was exactly what they [the LRA]
did; so I showed them that anyone who tries to escape must be killed.
So that was the thing I used to do while I was commanding the forces.
For example, there were three people who tried to escape and they
were brought to me. I made them stand before the congregation and
they were cut into pieces. Nobody escaped after that. [...]
I: Well it seems as if to make an example to the others as a warning
not to escape was more important than protecting their lives?
G: It is more important than protecting their lives, because if they all
escape you will not be able to get new guards or soldiers. If we do
not kill those people who try to escape then we will end up with no
fighters, so it was necessary to kill. (George, ll. 244–257, 277–288)
By framing the killing of new recruits as a necessary measure to prevent oth-
ers from escaping, George legitimised the use of lethal violence: a more lenient
reaction to these escape attempts could have hurt the organisation in the long
term. As the LRA’s survival is understood to be more important than that of
a few individuals, it was justified in setting an example by killing them to pro-
tect a higher good. This statement shows how techniques of neutralisation (here,
the appeal to higher authorities) and processes of identification are intertwined.
By buying into the organisation’s logic, George was capable of absolving himself
from the moral repercussions of his decision: it was necessary. George described
how he eventually became a committed fighter: “because if I were not commit-
ted I would be the one to die” (George, ll. 620–622). But, as he admits, his
commitment was not only about survival: “It even reached a point where living
and working for the LRA was nice” (George, ll. 622–623). George offered two
explanations why life in the LRA was, at least at times, enjoyable. First, his
profession allowed him to live a good life, to eat treasured foods like smoked
meat and chicken. In the literature, this participation in the spoils of war has
been repeatedly identified as an important factor to understand why combatants
choose to fight (see for instance Richards 2008, Utas 2005, Weinstein 2009). But
it isn’t the only explanation George gives. Second, and maybe more important,
he enjoyed the successes he had on the battlefield, and the positive changes they
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meant for the group – for instance that a large group of combatants was equipped
with weapons. By “work”, George referred to the tasks he was given as a combat-
ant of the LRA, his ‘job’. Their successes on the battlefield instilled some kind
of worker’s pride in him. By becoming a committed insider and doing a good
job, George was able to feel good about himself, and about the part he played
in the LRA’s successes. Over time, he also came to identify with its agenda to
overthrow the government, and only began to think about escape once he realised
that it wouldn’t happen.
For others, like Charity, this appreciation of life in the bush was also based
on an identification with the rules of life in combat:
To be honest, if there was a way I could go back to be a soldier, I would
go back to be a soldier. I say this because soldiers are so respectful
and loyal, but civilians here are not loyal at all. Soldiers would listen
to what someone is saying and follow rules. For instance when you
told them to stop, they stopped immediately without making even
one more step. (Charity, ll. 735–748)
Interestingly, Charity brought up this topic herself, when we asked her whether
she was at some point punished for transgressing the LRA’s rules – which she con-
firmed just to continue with the above statement. For her, military life seemed
somewhat easier to handle; there were rules to be followed and sanctions for
transgression. As soldiers, they would honour a code of conduct, unlike civilians,
who, as she argued, sometimes behaved unpredictably and unfairly. Charity em-
phasised that she did not identify with the goals of the LRA – in fact, she felt
remorseful over the pain and suffering their actions had caused – but she became
very much comfortable with life as a combatant and its rules. She even tried
(but failed) to join the UPDF after returning from captivity. For her, life as a
soldier seemed more rewarding than life as a civilian. This kind of alienation from
civilian life is a central achievement of the socialisation within the LRA, whose
effects often outlived people’s time in the bush.
Summary
In this chapter, I have tried to show how former combatants cope with the violent
demands of the organisation by means of their narrative. I have argued that they
routinely engage in techniques of neutralisation to make their offences or their
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moral repercussions disappear. Why do combatants engage in these techniques of
neutralisation? First, they are invested in maintaining a positive self-image – an
effort that is constantly challenged by their past violent lifestyle. In this sense,
their stories are vivid displays of their “struggle against place” (Presser 2008:
115), that is, their efforts to claim moral decency under conditions that allowed,
forced, or tempted them to behave immorally. Second, the interviewees’ accounts
show how they tried to create cognitive consonance between their actions and
their attitudes. These efforts to create coherence might, as I have argued, also
give way to the adaptation of violent role identities and, for some, their identifi-
cation with the LRA. Here, the use of techniques of neutralisation interlocks with
and fosters processes of self-identification with the group.
At the same time, former combatants’ identity work is a means to cope not
just with violent demands in situ, but also with their return to civilian life. By
situating their violence, former combatants’ stories become a means for them to
reconcile themselves – or better, their selves – with their violent past.
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4.5 Wives at night, soldiers during the day: The
roles and positioning of female combatants
Abstract
In this chapter, I will take a step back and address the particular challenges faced
by female combatants. Women play a vital role in today’s armed conflicts; in fact,
around 40 percent of all combatants in contemporary civil wars are female (Hob-
son 2005: 1). Yet, their roles are often obscured or misunderstood. This is no
less true for the case of the LRA, where women have often been portrayed as ‘sex
slaves’ (see for instance Human Rights Watch 2009, Jackson 2002, Schmitz 2013,
Vinci 2005) or mere spoils of war, i.e., means of remuneration for their male,
fighting compatriots. In this chapter, I show the importance of female combat-
ants and gendered roles for the creation of everyday life in the LRA. Women’s
presence and the roles they play both confirm and challenge Acholi notions of
gendered roles, intimate relationships, and family life. Female combatants are far
from being mere subjects in and victims to these dynamics, as they make active
decisions on the roles they play. They are important assets for everyday life in
the LRA, but they are also vital fighting forces. While they are often even more
restricted in their actions than their male colleagues, they command a number of
resources that allow them to exercise agency, for instance, by withdrawing them-
selves from the war zone, both literally and narratively.
Women in the LRA: Recruitment, retention, return
How important are female combatants for the LRA? As is true for many other
armed groups in Africa and around the world, women and girls are vital to the
group, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms.68 The SWAY (Annan et al.
2008, 2006) suggests that around one-third of male youth and one-fifth of female
youth in northern Uganda have been abducted at some point, with abduction
length ranging from one day to more than two decades. The fact that females
have been abducted in smaller numbers is a consequence of the LRA’s recruit-
ment strategy. For one, young boys were the primary target of abductions, since
they were assumed to be both easy to impress and physically fit enough to be-
68That applies, for instance, to armed groups in Congo, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. See
Cohen (2013), Coulter (2009), Marks (2013) on Sierra Leone; West (2000) on Mozambique; and
Baaz and Verweijen (2013) on Congo.
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come capable and loyal fighters. Girls, on the other hand, were abducted only
if they fell into a more narrowly defined age bracket, being not too young and
weak to keep up with the group’s pace, but also not old enough to have their
own family yet. As argued before, limiting abductions to young, preferably pre-
pubescent girls was part of the LRA’s strategy to prevent the spread of STIs.69
The majority of women experienced their first abduction between 10 and 18 years
of age, and abduction rates peak for girls aged 11 to 16 (Annan et al. 2008: 33–34).
While abductions of girls and women lasted on average for a shorter period
than those of boys and men, females stayed for a longer period once they had
remained in captivity for more than a few months (Annan et al. 2008: 26). That
is, if women didn’t succeed in escaping early on, or weren’t released after a cou-
ple of days or weeks, their chances of returning to civilian life diminished at a
greater rate. The female interviewees included in the study had spent between
3 and 19 years in the bush (see Table 1). There are several reasons for that:
For one thing, women were more closely supervised even when they had spent
more time in the group. In part, their supervision was ordered for reasons of
safety: Many women did not have their own gun,70 and were accompanied to the
fields or the well by escorts tasked with protecting them from other armed actors
and with preventing them from escaping. At the same time, a smaller share of
women actively participated in battles, especially when they were already visibly
pregnant or had given birth. This was an important factor for escape. From the
accounts of many combatants, battlefield situations seemed to have offered the
best opportunities to take off without anyone noticing.71 As a result, for many
women, opportunities to escape were limited to night-time. Moreover, escape
became more difficult once they had given birth, both on an emotional and a
practical level. By becoming mothers, women were severely “inconvenience[d]”
(Nancy, ll. 1083) in their motivation and attempts to escape. By comparison,
men didn’t feel obligated in the same way to take care of their children, and
usually didn’t consider them in their plans to escape back home.72 While some
69Though HIV infection rates in Uganda have famously declined for the last decades (a trend
that has been reversed only recently, with new infection rates rising by 21 percent between
2005 and 2013, but decreasing again since 2011), overall prevalence is, at 7 percent, still high,
and young women between 15 and 24 years of age are affected disproportionally (Uganda Aids
Commission 2015, UNAIDS 2014: 31, UNAIDS 2017: 43–44).
70According to the SWAY, the proportion of youth that was given a gun varied significantly
with age and length of abduction, between 26 and 81 percent (Annan et al. 2006: 55).
71In the SWAY sample, approximately one-third of combatants escaped while left alone, and
roughly the same number escaped in battle or during an ambush (Annan et al. 2006: 62).
72Among the male interviewees, one reported giving his child to a women to return home
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women decided to commit their children to the care of other female combatants
who escaped or were released, they rarely left them behind. Return to civilian
life was not only complicated by forced marriage and motherhood, but was also
perceived as less rewarding: In captivity, married women had someone to take
care of them and their children – a situation that was, in sum, often favourable
to what they expected from civilian life. Under these circumstances, escape was
seen as a high-risk strategy with insecure gains.
While it seems to have been harder for women to escape, they were released
more often than their male colleagues. Among the SWAY respondents, 27 percent
of women who were abducted for more than two weeks stated that they had been
released, while less then five percent of all male abductees did (Annan et al. 2008:
31–35). After women were given to a man as wives, their chances of being re-
leased dropped to seven percent (Annan et al. 2008: 36). Typically, releases were
ordered when the group was in a state of crisis and couldn’t afford to take care of
inactive (especially injured) fighters anymore, or when women and mothers lost
their husbands in combat and, thereby, their support system. Pregnant women
and mothers of young children also couldn’t keep up with the group’s pace and
lacked the strength needed for the arduous marches. In these cases, their children
were mostly released with them.73 Among the 19 women included in the study,
six reported that they had been released, while none of the 24 male interviewees
did (see Table 1).
We don’t have any reliable numbers on the percentage of female combatants in
the LRA, but judging from the abduction, retention and survival rates, it seems
legitimate to assume that women made up at least one third of the combatants.
While abduction rates were and are considerably lower, and return through release
was reported more often for female combatants, retention rates can be assumed
to be higher. That is both because fewer women died in captivity (in particu-
lar in combat) and their opportunities and incentives to escape were fewer. A
number of combatants confirmed that there were more men than women in their
group (without being able to give a more precise ratio). Taking into account that
– at least until the early 2000s – almost all male fighters had at least one wife
(Annan et al. 2008: 42), male combatants shouldn’t outweigh female combatants
with her.
73Though this might not have applied to children born in captivity who reached recruitment
age; unfortunately, I don’t know of any reports on that scenario. From past releases, we know
that children below the age of ten were usually released with their mothers (Ronan 2016: 15).
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by much. Whatever the exact numbers, women clearly played, and continue to
play, an important part in the LRA, both in numbers and, as I will show below,
in effect.
Female roles: Soldiers, ting-ting, wives, and mothers
As part of the LRA, women took on both military and supporting (mostly do-
mestic) roles. In the military sphere, they acted as fighters and other military
personnel: spies, guards, and intelligence officers, among others. In the domes-
tic realm, they were ting-ting (domestic servants and babysitters) or wives and
mothers. Which roles women and girls were assigned to depended on their age or
assumed maturity. Young girls, usually up to the age of 14 or 15, were assigned to
a household to help the wives with their duties – cooking, fetching water, washing
clothes, and taking care of their children. They didn’t keep this role, though, but
were usually married to one of the male combatants once they were considered
mature enough. In general, girls were thought to be fit for marriage upon their
first menstrual period. However, some of them reported that they were given as
wives even before that time (as young as 11 or 12 years of age), either because
they looked ‘big’ (i.e., sexually mature), or because the man of the household
they were assigned to decided to make them his wife.
The experiences and narratives of the women we talked to differed vastly:
While some said they where equally soldiers and wives, others were absolved
from responsibilities on the battlefield once they became wives or mothers. The
standard operating procedures on how to handle (impending) motherhood seem
to have differed depending on time, unit, intensity of war, location, and status
of the husband (and, by extension, the wife). ‘Original’ wives recruited in the
early years of the insurgency seem to have more often assumed active combat
roles from which women abducted later on were largely exempted (Baines 2016:
51–76). They lost their autonomy once the LRA shifted up to Sudan, where they
could continue to fight, but were demobilised once they became pregnant (Baines
2016: 38).74 Some women actively decided to pursue a career as a soldier, and the
leadership didn’t seem to have objected to it in general. One of the interviewees
even argued: “Women were our strongest fighters!” (Simon, ll. 194–195). In the
sample of Annan et al. (2008), one-sixth of all women reported having performed
74Cakaj (2017b) has suggested that this withdrawal of women from combat roles in Sudan
was a concession made to their mostly Muslim hosts.
151
4.5. Female combatants Chapter 4. Analysis
in combat roles, i.e., as fighters, fighter’s aides, or spies. However, women could
typically not rise in rank above second lieutenant,75 and did not profit as much
from the assignment of ranks as male fighters did. Among the 19 female inter-
viewees, six reported having held a rank (namely, one as lance corporal, one as
second lieutenant, and two each as sergeant and lieutenant).
In particular, active combat roles didn’t relieve women of their responsibili-
ties as wives. They had to perform competing roles as soldiers and wives and
mothers simultaneously. “[W]e are only wives at night, but during the day, we
are soldiers”, as Patience (ll. 237–239) said. Women who fought were always
required to function in at least a dual capacity: as wives to their given husbands,
mothers to their children, and as fighting forces in combat and in support roles.
These roles could, and often would, interfere with each other: “For instance when
you are under attack from the government soldiers you really find it hard to run
with the child, or the children, depending on the number you have“ (Charity, ll.
689–693). Still, a number of women actively chose to participate in combat. In
part, this decision was a strategic one motivated by seeking out opportunities to
escape. But many women also described how they felt empowered by their role
as soldiers: “If you are trained and given a gun then you know you are already a
soldier. Kony used to say that if you are in captivity you are his soldier, because
you are there and even your husband has no say” (Sarah, ll. 313–317). While
captivity created new dependencies for the women, their roles also allowed them
to assume positions of authority and power. To some degree, their roles in the
military sphere seem to have relieved female combatants from their obligations
in the domestic realm, or at least provided them with some standing.
Hierarchies within: First wives, co-wives and ting-ting
While only a few female combatants held high military ranks and responsibilities,
they were treated with different levels of respect depending on their position in
the community. This position was based, to a large degree, on that of their hus-
band and their place among the wives (if he had more than one). In the domestic
realm, some senior or ‘first wives’ commanded their own staff, which consisted
of co-wives, ting-ting, and escorts. Women married to high-ranking commanders
75More recently, there have been exceptions to this rule, for instance, with the promotion
of Aimee, a Congolese wife to Kony, to the position of a deputy of Lukwang, a high-ranking
bodyguard and intelligence director (Cakaj 2015b: 12).
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could even have the wives and babysitters of lower-ranking commanders at their
disposal.
Wives and ting-ting often shared a hut, and spent their days working together.
For many women, these cohabitation arrangements were a source of both solidar-
ity and shared responsibilities. Life had the potential to become easier when a
husband brought more wives into his household because individual women could
share both domestic duties (like washing and cooking) and expectations of sex-
ual availability. Moreover, it was easier to address severe maltreatment if they
were not on their own. Within their household or unit, women told us how they
provided each other with advice on how to avoid getting into trouble and how
to deal with domestic abuse. They shared goods such as food and soap, but
also thoughts, memories and plans to escape. They provided each other with
comfort and vital assistance, at times even at their own risk. They took care
of each other’s children, and sometimes entrusted them with their lives in case
one of them was released or escaped. These support networks were important
for their physical and emotional survival. It is not surprising that many of these
relationships outlasted the time spent in captivity, and provide a lot of women
with emotional support up to today.
But mutual support, friendship and care was only one side of family and com-
munity life in the bush. In many households, there was also a lot of rivalry and
physical abuse among the women and girls. Though combatants were strongly
discouraged from quarrelling, and could be severely punished if their fights be-
came known, emotional and physical abuse was a common concern. Quite often,
women described having suffered a lot at the hands of their more senior co-wives,
and younger women in particular often attributed their abuse to feelings of jeal-
ousy (nyek, the term used for co-wives, also means jealousy). Typically, it was
the first wife to a commander who had the authority to assign tasks, and some
women described being overloaded with work and pushed around at will. It seems
that many of the senior wives felt threatened in their position by the addition of
more and younger wives to the household (see also Baines 2014: 9–10). Senior
wives, in contrast, justified the abuse of younger wives with their position of re-
sponsibility: in case of any transgression, senior wives were often punished for
the mistakes of their younger co-wives (Baines 2016: 60).
On numerous occasions, women described how they had to hold their ground
against their co-wives, and that they had to carefully weigh their reactions when
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they felt they were treated unfairly. Ivy reported what happened when she told
her husband about the abuse she received from her co-wives: “One time I re-
ported them to my husband. And he made them beat each other until they all
beat themselves. But after that I couldn’t rest, I was tortured so much [by the
other wives] afterwards, so I never reported again” (Ivy, ll. 484–489). What
Ivy described is a recurrent motif in female accounts of their relationships with
co-wives and, as I will show below, husbands: Women came to terms with some
level of maltreatment to avoid being subjected to more abuse. While they clearly
thought of their treatment as unfair or even abusive, they decided to stick it out
rather than to risk a deterioration of the relationship.
When preadolescent girls were assigned to a household, they usually first
served as ting-ting, that is, domestic servants and babysitters. They were placed
under the command and care of the wife or wives of the commander heading the
household. Sometimes, they developed something resembling a mother-daughter-
relationship with these women. Some women said they preferred being a ting-
ting over being a wife, as they could continue living a child-like life and were not
“overused” (Faith, l. 1306) and subjected to sexual abuse in particular. Others
said that they suffered the most while being a ting-ting, and that marriage pro-
vided some relief, especially from their abuse by the wives belonging to the same
household. This seems have been one reason why some girls pushed for an early
marriage (Baines 2014: 10).
Female status passages: Becoming wives and mothers
Among the female interviewees, all of them were married in the bush, and all of
them conceived between one and six children (though two of them only gave birth
upon return; see Table 1). Becoming a wife was a status passage that happened
as women and girls were initiated into the expectations of married life, of “living
as husband and wife” (bedo callo lacoo ki dako) (Janet, ll. 446–447; Harriet, ll.
156–157; and Hope, ll. 341–342). More precisely, women and girls became wives
through their first and often forced intercourse with their given husbands:
We went back and George commanded the first wife to show me how
to lay the bed. [...] I patiently listened, not knowing that it was on
this day that I would start living in that house as a wife. (. . . ) In the
evening when people were passing time in conversation, he returned
home and wanted to sleep [with me in his house]. [...] I told him I
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would not be sleeping there but would sleep where I usually slept. [...]
During that argument and negotiation, I sat besides the interior of the
hut. He was pretending to sleep. Afterwards he started pulling me
at my clothes, scratching me to come onto the bed. I started crying.
[...] He started intimidating and frightening me, saying if I refused
to have sex he would kill me. He took a pistol and placed it on my
cheek as an example and said if I refused to have sex with him then
I would see what will happen next. (With emotions heard of in her
voice) “It’s not a joking matter!” he exclaimed. (. . . ) I took courage
and sat down. He unexpectedly came closer and overturned me on
the bed. After that he started stripping me naked forcefully. I never
wanted it. I was pressing and squeezing my thighs to stop him just
like this (demonstrates) while he was removing my clothes. [...] He
slept with me forcefully. I started making noise, shouting and cry-
ing. [...] In the morning when I woke up, lots of blood started oozing
out, pouring onto the floor. It wet the whole bed. (Janet, ll. 318–381)
In the evening I was told to go and bathe. [...] [W]hen people were
cooking and it was approaching 8 pm in the evening, Odhiambo sent
his wife Patricia to go and call me. [...] I went there and he asked
me whether I knew why I was there. I told him I don’t know. He
asked me again: “Do you think if we went to your parents and asked
them to give you as wives to us, do you think they would? So now
that you don’t know why you are here, you are my wife and you are
going to sleep here tonight.” When he spoke to me like that I kept
quiet. When he told me to lie down I sat instead and he grabbed me
by my neck and said: “I can kill you, and who do you think can arrest
or punish me?” So he grabbed me and cocked his gun and started to
tear my clothes off. He then forced me to sleep with him, and that
was when I got to know sex. (Patience, ll. 135–158)
Most women and girls already belonged to the household of the man who
would become their husband before they became wives. Typically, their marriage
was performed and confirmed through their first (and mostly forced) intercourse.
Sex became the enactment of a “physical marriage”, as one elder woman put
it (Porter 2013: 167). Since they were still very young and sometimes barely
adolescent, their initiation as wives through rape often coincided with their first
intercourse. As Patience said, this incidence “was when I got to know sex” (Pa-
tience, l. 158), and Janet’s given husband even complained to her that “I didn’t
know how to play sex” (Janet, ll. 424–425). Sometimes, girls hadn’t yet experi-
enced their first menstrual bleeding when they became pregnant, thus conceiving
during the first menstrual cycle. Their narratives also show how senior wives
became complicit in the abuse of their younger co-wives as they summoned them
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and showed them how to lay the bed (see also Baines 2016: 96).
As is true for Patience and Janet, the performance of their first intercourse
as wives was often also a demonstration of power by the husbands. A number
of female interviewees recounted how their given husbands threatened to use
violence and even to kill them if they resisted, or continued to resist, their sexual
demands. For most of them, becoming a wife was as consequential and often
violent a status passage as getting a gun and becoming a soldier. And just like
these, it served the purpose of putting (female) combatants in their place, and
taught them to persevere in the face of severe physical and emotional violations.
The most important difference though is that the high command didn’t even
have to execute and monitor their transition from ting-ting to wives, at least not
in detail. They just had to create the institutional setting in which this kind
of violation became legitimate, expected, and even routine. That is, the male
combatants themselves helped to create the institution of forced marriage. Even
though most women understood these experiences as physical abuse, mostly, they
decided to give in to it:
I was four years into babysitting after which I was given to a man and
gave birth to a child. It wasn’t easy. [...] I didn’t know much about
sex. I first refused to go to the man and I was harshly beaten. I still
have the scars on my hand. I was severely beaten. My colleagues
told me that if I refused to get along with the man, I would be killed.
Just accept it, they said. [...] We underwent the same situation, they
explained, if you want to stay alive, you should accept anything that
you are told to do. (Faith, ll. 392–413)
Through the institution of forced marriage, sexual abuse became, though not
accepted, normalised. Women stopped putting up resistance, both because they
were afraid that they might be severely punished, but also because they felt that
their abuse was unavoidable. They expected having to put up with physical and
sexual abuse anyway, either from their husbands or from the next man they would
be given to in case their relationship failed. They reasoned that they would bring
more harm upon themselves by resisting: “Because sometimes if he called me to
go and have sex with him, I would refuse to let him have sex with me, so in that
process he beat me up until I felt like I could not take any more beating. That’s
when he got the chance of having sex with me, this happened because I couldn’t
[resist it anymore]” (Patience, ll. 200–207).
156
4.5. Female combatants Chapter 4. Analysis
However, sexual abuse in and of itself was not sufficient to describe the rela-
tionship as bad. Often, relationships were more complex than the term ‘forced’
would suggest. Women mostly described their relationships as abusive, but also
just as often as caring. Many women judged their relationships based on care,
not affection: ‘It [the relationship with my husband] was good because he took
care of me” (Hope, ll. 380–381). In the absence of proper courtship (cunna) and
kinship rituals, care became a central and probably the single most important
aspect to describe their relationship. Some women became very attached to their
husbands, and even fell in love with them, as Fiona did:
If it was not for my husband’s death, I would have been in the bush
up to now, because I was being taken good care of by him. Life was
a bit fair near him. I never wanted to come back, but because I lost
him, I had no option. (Fiona, extract from an interview with a case
manager at a reintegration facility)
Fiona started to cry when she talked about her husband’s death. They had
planned to escape together, but unfortunately, he was caught and tortured for
weeks until he was finally hanged. She was punished severely and had to watch
him die because the commanders suspected she was aware of his plans to escape.
His death and the loss of his companionship were crucial for her final decision
to escape. With him around and taking care of her, she didn’t even consider
escaping back home. Fiona’s account also points to the crucial role care played in
her love for him: “I loved him so much because he took good care of me.” While
her account of a loving and caring relationship is rather exceptional, some women
seem to have been satisfied with their partners. In this respect, relationships in
the bush didn’t differ fundamentally from those in civilian life, where divorces
require a high level of abuse or neglect on the side of the husband, or severely
strained relationships with his family (Porter 2013: 123).
Among the women who were turned into wives, approximately half gave birth
in captivity (Annan et al. 2008: 43). The rates can be assumed to be higher for
those who spent more time in captivity, as many of the female interviewees did.76
76At least in part, the high proportion of wives and mothers interviewed for this study is a
sampling effect; forced wives who spent on average more time in captivity were also more likely
to have been registered upon their return with a reception centre (Annan et al. 2008: 37), which
was one of the channels we used for finding interviewees. The higher registration rate in turn is
an effect of targeting by the reception centres themselves, which saw more need for assistance
for long-term abductees and more vulnerable populations such as young mothers.
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Female combatants approached pregnancy and motherhood in different ways:
while some were happy to be (partly) relieved from battle-related activities, others
felt trapped and even more restrained by their new-found role and responsibilities.
For some, motherhood came as a relief, as it provided them with a way out of
having to actively participate in battle (Baines 2014). Although being a fighter
and receiving a rank came with some privileges,
[s]ometimes it puts your life in danger because there are other tasks
that are given only to people with ranks. [...] When I got a child life
became a little easier. [...] [As mothers,] we were prohibited from [...]
going to battle and walking from Sudan to Uganda. We were tasked
with only one thing; looking after the children and also leading the
soldiers who remained at home. (Charity, ll. 476–491)
It also came with some other privileges; mothers received preferential treat-
ment, for instance, in the distribution of food and other resources. Others em-
phasised the challenges that came with motherhood. In their homes, women had
a number of exclusive responsibilities, in particular, taking care of their children.
For them, being responsible not only for their own well-being, but for that of
another dependent human being was discussed as an additional burden:
When I got a baby things became harder. I had to carry so many
things, for example jerry cans or cooking utensils. I also had to [do
these things] before that, but it was so hard with a child. [...] If you
are under attack your life can be so hard. Yes, then [before you had
a child] you only think about yourself. But with a child, if there is no
food the child will cry, and if the child cries, they beat you for that.
(Prisca, ll. 355–388)
For many women, pregnancy and motherhood turned out to be a liability,
both in combat and in their everyday activities. While most of them stopped
actively participating in combat once they became mothers, they had to pack
their belongings and run if their hideouts or settlements were attacked by the
opposing forces; “and if you had a child, you had to tie that child very hard
to your body” (Sarah, ll. 468–470). Women also faced a high risk of getting
killed when the battlefield shifted to their settlements, or of being separated
from their children in combat, often without reuniting with them later or even
finding out about their fate. In their everyday lives, women were confronted
with insufficient means to take care of and to protect their children, and with
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unrealistic expectations, such as keeping them quiet at all times:
When bathing a child, it should not cry or make noise day and night.
[...] We were really beaten because of the children we had. Simply
because they cried and reported our location while in the bush. If a
child cries while on your back or arm, you would be severely flogged.
[...] They beat you because you made your child cry. Even if you
covered their mouth, the sound would still be heard. If you wanted
to bathe the child, you should cover the mouth as you bathe it. It is
inevitable and undeniable for the child to cry. I really suffered [a lot
of] strokes because of my child. (Faith, ll. 577–597)
For most female combatants, becoming a mother was not a choice, but a reality
they had to adjust to. This reality created opportunities – such as being excused
from activities on the battlefield, or being given preferential treatment –, but also
confronted them with a number of additional challenges and responsibilities.
Being a wife and being at war: Intimate relationships in civilian life
and in the bush
Organisationally, the institutionalisation of intimate relationships in forced mar-
riages served a number of purposes: (1) to prevent struggles over sexual partners
which might threaten cohesion within the group, (2) to maintain discipline by en-
forcing rules on sexual relations, thereby effectively preventing unauthorised rape
against members and civilians alike (Kramer 2012), (3) to contain the spread of
STIs, which were a common cause of death, (4) to emphasise and enforce the
organisation’s claim to total control, (5) to remunerate male combatants in the
absence of material incentives, (6) to bind both women and men to the orga-
nisation by creating lasting commitments through matrimony and parenthood,
and (7) to build a ‘new Acholi’ (see Allen and Schomerus 2006: 16, Baines 2014,
Olsen 2007: 3) and to rebuild the organisation through procreation.77 Though
not all of these purposes were created intentionally, they proved to be functional.78
77The goal of creating a new Acholi (Acholi manyen) seems to have been more pronounced
during some phases of the insurgency than others, and forced marriage only became standard
once the LRA established more permanent bases in South Sudan (Baines 2014: 9).
78However, forced marriages also had dysfunctional effects, as they created new incentives
to escape from abuse, or with one’s family and children. As a military strategy, the abduction
of females proved to be somewhat counterproductive, since it made fighters more vulnerable
(Aijazi and Baines 2017: 480). Hence, women and young children were often released in times
of crisis.
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But most importantly, I would argue, forced marriages were a means to create
continuity with civilian ways of living and were thereby vital for the constitution
of everyday life in the LRA. Intimate relationships and gender-specific roles in
the LRA both created some continuity with the traditional, “Acholi way” (kit
Acholi) of living and broke with fundamental aspects of it. In this section, I will
try to show how rules and regulations in the LRA both drew on Acholi tradi-
tions and purposively violated them. This “repurposing of culture” (Oloya 2013:
74–78), of adjusting culture to the organisation’s needs, created some normalcy,
but one that was distinct from home and thereby made combatants’ detachment
from civilian life even more complete. Repurposed cultural spaces engaged with
social conventions in a way that combatants could quite easily adjust to, but they
were reminded continuously of the uncircumventable nature of life in the bush.
Forced marriage was maybe the most important field to repurpose culture, and
gendered expectations played a vital part in it. While women held both roles in
the domestic and military sphere, often being wives, mothers, and soldiers at the
same time, gendered expectations clearly dominated their experiences. Women
were expected to be obedient in their forced relationships, and a number of them
shared with us instances of forced intercourse. Typically, these were limited to
their relationship with their assigned husbands. Sexual relationships (consensual
or forced) that happened outside of these approved unions were prohibited and
could be punished harshly. In general, these punishments seem to have been less
about protecting women from sexual abuse than about controlling an intimate
aspect of people’s lives. It was not rape, but illicit relationships that challenged
the leadership’s claim to total control over every aspect of the combatants’ lives.
Forced marriages, though almost always identified with life in the bush, are
not unparalleled in civilian life in Acholiland. As Porter (2013, 2015) has noted,
‘marriage by capture’ was and, in many rural areas, still is a common practice.79
Marriage by capture happens if a man won’t accept a woman’s refusal to be with
him, and consequentially abducts and rapes her with the intention of forcing her
into matrimony. This strategy is often successful because, in this case, rape is
not primarily seen as the violation of an individual, but of a (moral) community.
While tolerance of sexual and physical violence is low, particularly among young
women (Annan et al. 2008: 64), community responses are more about restoring
social harmony than seeking individual retribution. In this context, rape is seen
79Statistics are hard to come by, but for her own sample of two villages, Porter (2013: 232)
reported a prevalence of more than five percent.
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rather as a foregoing of the proper rules of courtship than as a violation of one
woman’s right to self-determination. It is wrong, but for different reasons than
the human rights discourse could suggest. Because the offence is more about the
community than the individual, marriage is often seen as a suitable means to
‘undo’ the crime of capture and rape (Porter 2015: 88).
On the surface, the abduction of young women and girls by the LRA seems
to follow the same pattern: women are forcibly abducted and then turned into
wives by their captors.80 Some of the male interviewees consequently refused the
notion that they were ‘given’ wives: “Wives are not given; you have to abduct
one” (Simon, ll. 86–87). But marriages in captivity didn’t qualify for the same
kind of social approval as marriages by capture in civilian life.81 The civilian
communities didn’t perceive marriages in captivity as procedures that restored
social harmony, but as further violations of the social order. They did not correct
the wrong that was done, but created another manifestation of it. The refusal to
acknowledge their unions as ‘proper marriages’ was voiced by Scovia:
In English, they call it marriage. But what I went through wasn’t
marriage. If it was to mean marriage then we should have had a
wedding in church, or an introduction in church. This would mean
there would be a positive change in the performance of the family, but
with what I experienced, it wasn’t even close to marriage. (Scovia, ll.
791–799)
Interestingly, Scovia does not focus on the lack of agreement and the sexual
abuse she was subjected to (though she talked about it at another point), but on
the foregoing of the necessary rituals. For her, their marriage lacked legitimacy
because there was no ceremony, and no exchange between the involved families
that approved and confirmed their union. Traditionally, marriage is understood
as a union not only between two people, but also between their families (Porter
2015: 166–167); a woman does not only marry a man, but marries into and be-
comes part of his family. She will be married not just to a person, but to a home
(Porter 2013: 195). By becoming forced wives, young women had a husband
and started a family, but were not properly “married to a home” (Porter 2015:
80Though her future husband would not necessarily be the same person who abducted a
woman or girl, since the more senior and high-ranking soldiers had a prerogative on choosing
women for themselves.
81In fact, many people refuse the idea that these two phenomena could be compared at all
(Porter 2013: 263).
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87). Proper marriage would also have required the payment of some kind of luk
or dowry to confirm the relationship not only between the spouses, but between
their families.82 Without the payment of luk, a man will still be “living with
her on credit” (George, ll. 40–41), regardless of the home and parental duties
they share. Their relationship will still be considered volatile, and neither party
will have the same rights or obligations as wives and husbands who have been
properly married. Maybe even more importantly, “luk performs the work [...] of
distinguishing illicit from acceptable sex” (Porter 2013: 196). It is the lack of
luk rather than the lack of consent that excludes marriages in the bush from the
list of socially accepted relationships. In a way, forced marriages are seen as even
worse than rape by strangers (Porter 2013: 256), because they constitute not just
an individual transgression, but a threat to the moral community. As a result,
these unions were often perceived as temporary, ‘bush marriages’ limited in time
and space (Porter 2015: 87).
However, it would be wrong to conclude that these marriages remained mere
orders from above without legitimacy among the combatants. If that had been
true, more combatants would have resisted some of its implicit expectations.
They could have decided to stay as a married couple without having an inti-
mate relationship and conceiving children. That only a minority of them did
so83 points, as I would argue, to the power of norms and institutions that make
the compliance with expectations of family life and intimacy normal, routine,
and unquestioned. This is even more true for a social reality that has, at least
for the time being, no alternative. Although most combatants were aware of
how their way of life differed from life at home, their decision-making capacities
were limited to the options available to them in the bush. While these marriages
might have been understood as temporary, they transcended people’s lives in the
bush, in particular if they resulted in lasting commitments such as children. The
overwhelming majority of combatants annulled their relationships upon return
82Luk, commonly translated as bridewealth or dowry, is a customary payment made by the
aspiring husband to the family of his future wife. There are different forms of luk required during
different stages of the relationship (intercourse, cohabitation, conception), and each payment
confirms and deepens the social bond between the families (Aijazi and Baines 2017: 39, Otuko
2016, Porter 2013: 191–196).
83Accounts of decision-making processes are rare. From the SWAY sample, we can estimate
that more than 50 percent of all women who became forced wives gave birth in captivity (Annan
et al. 2008: 43). Taking into account that some marriages only lasted for a short time (due to
the escape or death of one of the spouses) and that cases of infertility or subfertility on one
or both sides made conception impossible or improbable for some, a clear majority of forced
marriages led to intercourse and parenthood.
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from captivity (Annan et al. 2008: 44), but some decided to stay with their
given spouses. Among the interviewees, one reported that he stayed with his
wife after returning from captivity; two of them told us that they decided to live
with somebody they met in the bush, but weren’t formally affiliated with back
then. In these cases, the relationship was formalised in accordance with custom-
ary rules, with the husband reaching out to his wife’s family, asking for their
approval and paying (or promising to pay) the agreed upon luk. Other women
did not consider remarrying unless they could be united with their husband from
captivity. Even though they did not know whether their husbands were still
alive or would eventually return and continue living with them (or didn’t even
wish to do so themselves), they saw entering into a new relationship as adultery.84
In this sense, the regulation of intimate relationships served as an internal con-
trol mechanism that matched gendered expectations and roles in broader society
(Dolan 2009: 93). This continuity with civilian ways of living was, as I have ar-
gued before,85 crucial for the combatants’ immersion in the group. By mimicking
the paternalistic structures of civilian life, institutionalised gendered expectations
allowed male combatants in particular “to feel at home away from home” (Oloya
2013: 89). For them, relationships provided some kind of normalcy: “Life was
seemingly normal with her. She didn’t have the idea of returning back home,
and I didn’t either” (Joseph, ll. 660–662). Women suffered a lot more from the
dynamics of institutionalised submission and abuse, but they also appreciated
and felt comforted by some aspects of the roles and positions assigned to them.
Women’s narrative (dis-)engagement from the war zone
Though female combatants were less involved in combat situations, they experi-
enced and committed similar levels of violence as their male colleagues (Annan
et al. 2009: 9). In their narratives, however, the violence they experienced figures
more prominently, and only a few of them talked about violence they perpe-
trated themselves. Though we can assume that individuals’ own acts of violence
are somewhat underreported, this seems to be even more true for female than for
male combatants. What explains this difference? Faith’s narrative might prove
instructive, as she explains:
84However, such statements may also be a strategy to fend off expectations of entering a new
relationship and building a new family.
85See Chapter 4.2 starting on page 90.
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[M]ost of the women wouldn’t engage in fights, not even on a single
day. They trained them but never engaged them at the warfront.
This is because most of the women did not take more than six months
before they fell pregnant or had given birth. So at what time would
you get engaged in military fights? [...] The women would help them
do things like cooking, carrying their tin or bullet tins to go to fronts.
That’s it. (Faith, ll. 1209–1230)
Faith argued that women simply didn’t have the opportunity to engage in
fights due to their roles as wives and mothers. As soon as they became wives,
they would inevitably fall pregnant and thereby become unavailable for fighting
roles. Though she makes an important point towards women’s diminished roles
as fighters once they became mothers, in her narrative, women disappear not only
from the battlefield, but as violent actors more generally. Through her narrative,
she disengages herself from violent action both on and off the battlefield. In this
sense, female combatants command another means to prove themselves as decent
persons: namely, to emphasise their role identities as wives and mothers over,
and in conflict with, the violent actions they were expected to perform. Women
not only were less present on the battlefield, but used gendered expectations to
write themselves out of the war zone.
Summary
In this chapter, I have argued that women played vital roles in the LRA, both on
and off the battlefield. As soldiers, ting-ting, wives and mothers, female combat-
ants were challenged to perform in different and often conflicting roles at the same
time. Depending on their assessment and experiences, female combatants would
prefer some roles and tasks over others and work up to them where possible.
Though only a few of them attained high military ranks, some of them held po-
sitions of power, most importantly in the domestic realm. Relationships between
the females belonging to a household and with others could make the challenges
they faced even more daunting, but they were as often a source of strength and
mutual care. By becoming wives and mothers, women were subject to another
status passage or passages that were even more consequential for their immersion
in the socio-emotional universe of the LRA. Women’s roles as wives and mothers
were highly prestructured by the institution of forced marriage. Through it, the
LRA “implicated women and girls in the organization of power and domination
in the group” (Baines 2014: 1). By picking up on and adjusting civilian ways
of building and sustaining intimate relationships, forced marriage became an im-
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portant means to continue everyday life under different terms. Forced marriages
helped combatants come to understand the bush as home while simultaneously
binding them to the organisation. As women were both required in a social and
military function, they were even more restricted then their male colleagues. But
they also commanded some genuine means to make these challenges work for
them; most interestingly, by writing themselves off the battlefield. These strate-
gies show that women were more than mere victims and passive bystanders to
the processes and dynamics within the LRA.
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4.6 Refusing means, not ends: Politics, spirit
beliefs, and legitimate authority
Figure 4.2: Museventh day (photo by Ledio Cakaj)
Abstract
In the preceding chapters, I have shown how combatants were drawn into the
realm of the LRA through their immersion in everyday life – its rules, norms
and routines – and how they coped with and adjusted to their violent lifestyle.
To be sure, their active and passive commitment was not completely apolitical.
Most combatants had and continue to have a conflicted relationship with the
LRA. While they have been forcibly recruited and see their abduction as a viola-
tion, they relate in some way to the organisation’s struggle, and often attribute
some legitimacy to their cause. These legitimacy beliefs are neither uncontested
affirmations of nor enthusiastic commitments to the LRA’s agenda. But they
position the combatants in a space in between, where both their abduction and
the LRA’s fight are not just “wanton and senseless”, as Kalyvas (1999) put it.
These partial legitimacies were, as I will argue, a central element for combatants’
however sketchy identification with the LRA.
4.6. Legitimacy Chapter 4. Analysis
Figure 4.3: Graffiti on a wall of the compound of the NMPDC (photo by the
author)
I identify and detail three sources of legitimacy: (1) oppression and marginal-
isation of the Acholi, (2) spirit beliefs, and (3) authoritative performances. These
legitimacy beliefs were confronted with different sources of delegitimisation – in
particular, violent acts against civilians and colleagues, and the lack of progress
towards the LRA’s proclaimed goals. Legitimacy beliefs were often inextricably
linked to each other. Together, I argue, they provide crucial clues to understand-
ing combatants’ motivations to stay or leave.
Like mangoes standing between two stones: Power struggles and iden-
tity politics
Various actors have branded the LRA an apolitical movement. Indeed, over
the years, it has become increasingly unclear whether the LRA still aims at
overthrowing the government, or if – as some have argued – it is in a mere
survival mode (Cakaj 2017c, Lancaster et al. 2011, Vinci 2007), trying to live off
war and escaping criminal prosecution. For most former combatants, though, the
political dimension of the insurgency was very much vital, even among those who
returned many years ago. When we asked the interviewees whether they thought
Kony or the LRA was fighting for a good cause, most of them answered in the
affirmative. A recurring motif in their answers was the violations perpetrated by
the government forces during the early years of the conflict. Many combatants
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elaborated on how Museveni’s troops have committed a lot of atrocities against
the Acholi people, have been mistreating civilians, stealing and spoiling foodstuffs,
raiding cattle, and raping men and women alike.86 Though they did not get
involved in the insurgency on their own initiative, they saw the fight against the
NRA/M as a legitimate one:
[To overthrow the government,] That was also my personal goal. [...]
Because since 1996 [probably 1986] the government troops have killed
a lot of people here in this village, they came and killed people and
they also raided the cattle in this land. Even here they have raided our
cattle. Back then, people were not running away from the LRA sol-
diers, they were running away from the government troops. (George,
ll. 598–610)
George claimed that he did not join the LRA voluntarily; however, he de-
scribed how he became a committed fighter who also believed in their mission
to overthrow the Ugandan government. For him, the LRA’s fight was legitimate
because it sought to address the large-scale abuse of Acholi by the NRM. This
argument was reiterated by many interviewees. To them, it was all the more valid
since the ICC warrants against high-ranking LRA commanders were still in place
and Dominic Ongwen was tried at The Hague, while atrocities committed by the
NRA were insufficiently investigated by national and international actors alike:
All the issues the ICC was concerned with happened after 2002. All
those crimes and atrocities committed before 2002 were not taken
seriously for that matter. Why did they agree on the year 2002 to
prosecute? This means that all the atrocities the UPDF and NRA
did against the civilians in the 1980s and beyond were not taken into
consideration. Thus not all [wrongdoings] did come out in the open.
[...] As people who were abducted, many things happened to us, we
underwent serious problems but our parents don’t have a voice to
appeal on our cases anywhere. If you lost your child, that’s it. You
need not ask. (Scovia, ll. 1252–1272)
Scovia herself told us that she had lost a child she gave birth to in the bush,
which disappeared as they scattered in battle. Here, she speaks not only as
86Male-to-male rape in particular was seen as despicable, which also has to do with attitudes
towards homosexual relationships and non-reproductive sexual practices (such as masturbation
and anal intercourse) more generally (see Nyanzi 2013: 955–956, Porter 2013: 177). See also
Chapter 3 starting on page 43.
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a ‘lost child’, but as a mother who lost a child. It is a fate she shares with
many of her colleagues who, like her, see a double standard in the approaches to
crimes committed by the NRA as compared to those committed by the LRA. This
perceived bias has made them question the legal basis for and the impartiality
of criminal prosecution, and added to the sense of discrimination against Acholi
in Ugandan politics. As the interviewees argued, these injustices did not end
with the counterinsurgency against the LRA, but continue up to today, with
the exclusion of the North from the national progress: “we are always side-lined
of any development” (Andrew, ll. 1296–1297). The long-standing and lasting
neglect of Acholi in national politics is understood by many as one of the most
important reasons for the insurgency and its continuation up to the present:
I also remember that during the time when I was still in captivity,
Kony said he would not have started this rebellion but what made
him get into it was the regional differences. The Acholi are discrimi-
nated against by other tribes. That was the reason why he decided to
start this rebellion, so that he can become president, leading on this
side of Gulu. Museveni would lead the other side of Kampala and
beyond, because of these differences that have separated us. The way
I also see it, there is inequality on many issues including the roads,
hospitals, and environment. I travelled through Masaka87 and beyond
and realised there is a big difference. There is at least some difference.
(Faith, ll. 1165–1182)
Faith was one of the most informed and vocal former combatants we talked
to. After her return, she became part of a women’s advocacy group, and acted
as a spokesperson for concerns and political claims of former combatants. As
such, she was quite outspoken and determined about the structural violations
she and others witnessed. As Acholi and northern Ugandans, former combatants
saw their rights violated by the incumbent government in multiple forms: The
government had denied equal and non-discriminatory treatment to all Ugandans
regardless of ethnicity, which led to the insurgency in the first place. During the
conflict, it had failed to protect them from abduction, and created debilitating
living conditions for those forced to live in the camps.88 And it continued to
put them at a disadvantage by providing insufficient support and infrastructural
87Masaka is a district and a large town (with approximately 100’000 inhabitants) in the
Central Region of Uganda, 140 kilometres southwest of Kampala.
88See also Chapters 3, starting on page 43, and Chapter 4.4, starting on page 121.
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investments for them to compete on a national stage.89 In addressing these injus-
tices, the interviewees referred to their ethnic identity as Acholi (or, more broadly,
as northern Ugandans). They were keenly aware of the particular challenges they
faced as former combatants, but addressed these injustices as experiences that
they shared with the non-combatant population:
We [former combatants] do share ideas and we feel we are equal to
other people in the community who didn’t go through what we went
through. While we were in captivity, those who were at home also
had serious problems and challenges. They were in camps. [...] We
feel there wasn’t any difference because all these troubles were equally
felt. [...] The troubles, problems you faced while at home are equal
to the problems and challenges we faced while in captivity. So I feel
everything is the same. (Janet, ll. 1417–1451)
Here, the marginalisation and violation of northern Ugandans becomes a
means to offset the structural differences between those who are, as combatants,
at war and those who are, as civilians, merely subjected to it. By comparing
the combatants’ suffering and problems to those of the civilian population, Janet
tries to reconcile victim and perpetrator positions, thereby revaluating the LRA’s
cause. As the interviewees argued, the Acholi people’s experiences of discrimi-
nation, neglect and violation equipped the LRA’s actions with some legitimacy
of just cause by oppression. It also affected how people looked at their involve-
ment as citizens in national politics: “We are like mangoes standing between two
stones; our eyes are seeing, our ears are listening but the question is how are we
going to live? It is a big blow to us who are in the so-called opposition and not
in the government” (Andrew, ll. 1212–1218). Here, Andrew was talking about
his expectations concerning the (at that time imminent) presidential elections of
2016. But more generally, he was talking about the situation of the Acholi peo-
ple. For many interviewees, the situations they find themselves in today – both
as former combatants and as Acholi – shared the same origin with the LRA’s
insurgency. With their marginalisation in national politics still unaddressed, and
the violations by the NRA/UPDF against them still largely unaccounted for,
they felt that the LRA was right to fight. Their narratives, however, were often
ambiguous, and this overall belief was both complemented and questioned by
internal dynamics within the LRA.
89I will describe this in more detail in Chapter 4.7 starting on page 178.
170
4.6. Legitimacy Chapter 4. Analysis
Spirit beliefs, charismatic leadership and performance-based legitimacy
Throughout the last years, the public perception of the LRA has focused to a
large degree on its leader, Joseph Kony. In 2012, a contested campaign by Invisi-
ble Children, an NGO with long-standing engagement in the conflict in northern
Uganda, created a stir in the Global North. Its goal was to ‘make Kony famous’,
and it advocated focusing the fight against the LRA on the hunt for Joseph
Kony.90 The campaign has received widespread attention and criticism for its
saviour motif, its simplified portrayal of the conflict, and not least for its short-
sighted obsession with Kony as the heart and head of the movement.91 It created
the impression that the armed insurgency was caused and kept alive by the actions
of a single mad man, and glossed over the political and ethnic conflict at its roots.
Clearly, the LRA is about more than one person’s grudge over the leadership
of Uganda. But throughout its history, Kony has been a crucial, most possi-
bly decisive figure for the LRA. Without him, ethnic politics in Uganda would
still be as contentious, and someone else might be leading the armed resistance
against Museveni’s government. But the LRA wouldn’t be the same, and it is
doubtful whether it would have survived all the crises it has faced in the past and
present. In the narratives of many interviewees, Kony was a prominent figure
that was met with a mixture of fear, respect, admiration and amazement. Many
of them portrayed him as a person with noble intentions, and believed that his
fight against the Ugandan government was legitimate. This faith was based on
a perception of persistent marginalisation of Acholi in the Ugandan state, but
just as much on the spiritual powers vested in Kony. A number of interviewees
described how all of his predictions so far had become true: “I see Kony as a good
person, because actually everything he told us really happened. My husband was
also killed at that time. He [Kony] foretold us the death of my husband and of
other people” (Sarah, ll. 476–480). Since they had seen his predictions come
true before, they were positive that he would eventually succeed in his plans to
overthrow Museveni’s government:
And at some point I still feel he will take over this government, with
time. Then the Acholi will be recognised better [by the government].
90The campaign and the film can be found on Invisible Children’s homepage:
https://invisiblechildren.com/kony-2012/ (Russell 2012).
91For further reference, see Finnstro¨m (2012), Kagumire (2012), Mamdani (2012), Schomerus
et al. (2012).
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Kony once said that in the time to come, all his commanders will leave
him at some point, others will come back home, and again others will
get killed. But he will eventually take over the government with his
children. (. . . ) He kept saying that over and over again. He also said
that some people who will come back home, they will not benefit from
the support given to them through other people; instead those people
who are supposed to deliver the support will use the assistance for
different purposes.92 Some of these things are happening exactly the
way he said. (Patience, ll. 622–639)
The fact that Kony has survived for such a long time and against all odds,
predictions and threats from powerful adversaries only adds to the myth that
surrounds him. His improbable survival has become an important source of his
legitimacy. Many combatants attributed his seeming invincibility to spirits that
not only inform Kony’s actions and orders, but protect him from harm in mutinies
and during battles:93
The [government] troops may at times see him in the form of a swarm
of bees. [One time,] I stood at a distance and witnessed that it was
his spirits fighting. It wasn’t a human being fighting. If you cross to
where he is fighting, you will be shot dead. Bullets would all turn into
his direction. You should not run towards that direction but move to
the opposite direction and keep at a distance. (John, ll. 2500–2509)
These spirits were sought to protect Kony not only from enemy fire, but also
from mutinies and betrayal from within:
It is not easy to turn against Kony because he gets to know. I earlier
told you that Kony went alone to the bush, so there was something
with him that protected him. He used to say that whoever wanted to
return home was free to do so. [...] But for him it’s the spirit that
binds him and makes him stay in captivity. If you want to return,
leave the guns behind he said. If you tried to escape and in turn also
wanted to kill Kony or cause some harm to him, he would kill you.
Many people tried. But now no one tries anymore because they know
the repercussions. No one tries anymore. (John, ll. 2454–2471)
92Meaning that assistance promised by relief actors (NGOs and governmental bodies) won’t
profit those in need of assistance, but will be used for the self-enrichment of those very actors
instead.
93On the role of spirits and spirit beliefs in northern Uganda and the LRA, see Allen (1991),
Behrend (1999), Finnstro¨m (2008).
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It is higher authority that commits Kony to his mission, and that also makes
any attempt at stopping him a lost cause. His spiritual guidance and protec-
tion add credibility to his fight. Because Kony is imagined to be instructed
and shielded by powerful spirits, it would not only have been dangerous to go
against him, but also misguided, since it would have tempted the spirits that pro-
tect him. Such spirit beliefs are not alien to Acholi society;94 Acholi cosmology
is an intricate web of Christian and spirit beliefs, in which spiritual protection
and vengeance are understood as explanations for the good and bad things that
happen to people (Finnstro¨m 2008, Oloya 2013, Victor and Porter 2017). Here,
spiritual protection becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: “no one tries anymore be-
cause they know the repercussions” (John, ll. 2469–2470); and the fact that no
one tries to question Kony’s grip on power assures people of his spiritual authority.
While spiritual powers and performances are clearly linked – it is Kony’s
spirits that inform him about enemy actions and that protect him in battle
– performance-based legitimacy stemmed primarily from his predictions rather
than from the LRA’s military successes. Where former combatants voiced belief
in Kony and his authority, they did so mainly because he was seen as capable
of foreseeing the future, not because he was able to change its course. Here,
performance-based legitimacy is not only and not necessarily dependent on mil-
itary success. Kony’s performance as the LRA’s leader included not only his
predictions and his (overall modest) successes on the battlefield, but also his lead-
ership qualities. Many combatants described Kony as a charismatic personality
that liked to share stories and jokes, distinguished himself through acts of kind-
ness (especially towards women), spared civilians from atrocities and colleagues
from unfair punishments, and advocated against unnecessary killings. But at the
same time, he was also feared for his erratic behaviour and mood swings, and
those who became his wives reported physical violence and sexual abuse. Both
sides – being both feared and admired, and yet not fully understood – confirmed
Kony’s God-like status.
94For further reference, see Allen (1991), Behrend (1999), p’Bitek (1971), Victor and Porter
(2017).
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Squandering legitimacy: The effects of indiscriminate violence and lack
of strategic action
Against the large number of former combatants who attributed some legitimacy
to the LRA’s fight, some interviewees categorically denied the LRA legitimacy.
They said they do not understand its reasons at all and, therefore, cannot speak
about their justness. This was mostly true for women, who were often excluded
from strategic discussions and lectures, as were low-ranking combatants and new
abductees.95 Others questioned the LRA’s legitimacy mainly on two grounds: (1)
violence perpetrated against civilians and colleagues alike, and (2) a perceived
mismatch between the LRA’s actions and their stated goals. In many cases, these
two motives were closely intertwined. Most importantly, it was violence against
civilians which called the LRA’s credibility into question:
The reason for these people’s fighting is what I have failed to under-
stand. [...] Kony has been in the bush for so many years; shouldn’t
he have overthrown the government by now? There could have been
some changes in the twenty years. [...] But there is nothing apart
from brutality that he is undertaking. (Joan, ll. 1177–1190)
They talk like that [as if they were fighting for a good cause], but in
my opinion we are exhausting ourselves for no good reason. Because
these people they don’t go to attack government bases, instead they
attack civilians all the time. So to me, this fight has no meaning.
(Isaac, ll. 370–375)
Like many of their colleagues, Joan and Isaac did not question the insurgency
as such, but took offence at the means applied, especially the excessive use of
violence against civilians. By addressing the LRA as “they” (gin) and “these
people” (joni), Joan and Isaac narratively distanced themselves from “their”
actions. Not only did these actions cause suffering on a large scale, but, as
they argued, they didn’t seem to bring the LRA closer to its proclaimed goal of
overthrowing the acting government. In fact, many interviewees felt it achieved
quite the opposite, while it violated and estranged civilians:
It [the LRA’s fight] would be justified but they have concentrated on
torturing the civilians. The LRA does have all the fighting equipment
95Though claims to be excluded from this information might have also been a defensive
strategy to abdicate responsibility, at least in some cases.
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and if they would befriend the civilians, they would even succeed to
overthrow the government. They say they are fighting to overthrow
the government because it is bad. But if they would be friendly to
the civilians, I think they would even get good support from them.
(James, ll. 339–349)
By targeting the very people they claim to represent and whose patronage
they need, the LRA has not only lost vital assistance and general support from
the civilian population. It has also lost or failed to generate approval for its
actions in its own ranks. James’s narrative also shows how the choice of means
and military success were linked. Both in Joan’s and James’s narrative, the
rejection of violence against civilians is closely connected to the group’s military
performance. In fact, their military performance was in and of itself a criterion
for assessing the group’s legitimacy:
They told us that they were fighting to overthrow the government,
that was their primary goal. But to me I think the fighting was
useless because if they were fighting to overthrow the government,
they would have captured it by now. [...] Well I think that fighting
was just a waste of time. (Fred, ll. 353–365)
Fred’s account shows how the assessment of the LRA’s legitimacy depended
on its performance, i.e. its progress towards disempowering Museveni’s govern-
ment. For him and others, the failure to make any substantial strides towards
this goal clearly questioned the LRA’s commitment to it, and, thereby, their po-
sition to address the political interests of the Acholi. On the other hand, it was
internal power struggles and severe punishments of colleagues that caused many
combatants to question the proportionality and effectiveness of the LRA’s strat-
egy. Among these, the assassinations of Otti Lagony in 1999 and of Otti Vincent
in 2007 made lasting impressions on many former combatants. Both high-ranking
commanders fell from grace over rumours of disloyalty and intentions to defect.
Though it is not known for sure, it seems that Otti Lagony was about to demo-
bilise, and that he would have taken a large number of combatants loyal to him
with him (Cakaj 2016: 64). He was replaced by Otti Vincent, a well-respected
and popular commander whose assassination unsettled and frustrated many com-
batants: “We were sad. We were angry but we stomached it since we couldn’t
do anything” (Faith, ll. 1477–1478). In both cases, it seems that the assassi-
nations were rather strategic moves to take out a commander who had become
influential enough to pose a real threat to Kony’s grip on power (Cakaj 2016:
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157–158). While former combatants couldn’t always tell rumours from facts, and
were unsure what motivated demotions and lethal punishments, they felt that
these internal fights were a distraction from the political goals the LRA claimed
to fight for. Moreover, they were disheartened by the killing of close colleagues,
friends, and spouses.
It is not coincidental that violence crucially affects perceptions of legitimacy.
The use of violence is probably the most pressing issue any non-state armed group
has to address. Their claim to power vitally depends on the use of force and phys-
ical violence, and part of their legitimacy stems from their capacity to subjugate
others to their will (Popitz 1992, von Trotha 1994b). At the same time, there is
always need to legitimise violence, in particular its most expressive forms. This
is even more true when it affects those who should benefit – instead of suffering
– from the organisation’s actions. Klaus Schlichte (2009) has called this dynamic
the ‘shadow of violence’: armed groups depend on the use of violence and its
credible threat, but the same violence they use to get into a position of power
also has the potential to delegitimise them and their actions. Apparently, this
dynamic also affected the LRA’s power base.
What is telling about these arguments is that former combatants only rarely
questioned the legitimacy of going into the bush to fight the incumbent govern-
ment as such. Instead, their refusal was about the choice of means (especially
violence and abduction), and their questionable relationship with the organisa-
tion’s political goals. That is, former combatants questioned the LRA on grounds
of their chosen means, but hardly ever questioned its right to fight. Given the
fact that almost all of them were forcibly recruited, this is somewhat surprising:
Most combatants do not categorically deny the LRA legitimacy based on their
own abduction. It seems that, in some way, their violation as Acholi is more
substantial than their individual violation as persons. The underlying legitimacy
beliefs are, as I would argue, important variables in understanding the combat-
ants’ commitment. While legitimacy beliefs don’t put combatants in a state of
enthusiastic approval, they do create at least some indecisiveness about their
fight, which allows for their identification with the organisation.
Summary
In this chapter, I have argued that the immersion of combatants in the LRA hap-
pens not just on a practical and emotional level, but has an ideological dimension
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as well. That is, combatants ascribe some legitimacy to the LRA’s fight. These
legitimacy beliefs are crucial to understanding their conflicted relationship with
the LRA. I identified three sources of legitimacy beliefs: political, spiritual, and
performance-based. These sources of legitimacy are confronted with the dele-
gitimising effects of adverse action; in particular, violence against civilians and
colleagues, and the perception of a lack of commitment to the organisation’s
proclaimed goals of overthrowing the incumbent government and improving the
livelihoods of people in the North. Spirit beliefs played a particular role in this,
since they not only provided reason to believe in the movement in and of itself,
but helped to make sense of the LRA’s actions and reasons more generally. As
such, they are not expressions of the LRA’s irrationality, but of their and the
combatants’ need to understand and access their life-worlds.
However, these legitimacy beliefs have to be seen not only in the light of the
interviewees’ past as combatants, but also against the backdrop of their presence
as returnees. They allow only limited access to people’s past understandings of
their engagement as combatants, but rather provide insights into their appropria-
tion and negotiation of this past through their narratives. As such, they are part
of a sense-making project in which former combatants aim to reconcile their past
and their present selves, a challenge that is central to their process of returning
home and becoming ‘like people at home’ again.
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4.7 Looking back and looking forward:
Returning to civilian life
Abstract
In the preceding chapters, I have detailed how combatants became part of the
LRA, and how they learned to cope with their violent everyday life. Their adap-
tation and the organisation’s facilitation thereof allowed them to lead their lives
‘as if’: as if their lives were normal, like at home; and as if violence weren’t an
equally decisive and disruptive part of it. Still, most combatants try to escape
this reality at some point – in most cases, deliberately. How do they make this
decision, and how do they manage to follow through with it? How do they look
back at their experiences in the bush, and how do they see and evaluate their
lives upon return? How do people understand the impact war had and has on
their lives? How do these perceptions affect their present and future? What
do their experiences and evaluations tell us about the chances and challenges of
the demobilisation and reintegration of former and active combatants? In this
chapter, I will look at the larger decision- and sense-making processes involved
in return from bush life, and how their experiences as combatants become part
of their stories and identity claims.
Going home: Decisions and actions in returning to civilian life
In this thesis, I have argued that both the combatants as individuals and the
LRA as an organisation command a number of resources to make life in the bush
habitable; sometimes so much so that it becomes ‘like home’. Still, at some point,
most combatants leave this life behind, either deliberately (through escape or sur-
render) or by accident (through capture, rescue, or release). How do combatants
return from the bush? What resources do they have and use to organise for their
return?
First off, a considerable number of abductees never return from captivity –
either because they are still part of the group (a minority), or because they die in
battle, from hunger or malnourishment, diseases, or complications in pregnancy
and childbirth, or they are killed by the LRA. Annan et al. (2008: 33) estimate
that approximately 20 percent of the male and 5 percent of the female abductees
never returned from captivity. For those who managed to leave the bush, return
from captivity happened in one of three ways: combatants were either captured,
4.7. Return Chapter 4. Analysis
rescued, or surrendered (during battle or in encounters with the UPDF or other
armed forces;96 they were released (by a superior or the LRA’s high command);
or they managed to escape. Among the 43 returnees included in the sample, 8
(4 male, 4 female) were captured, rescued, or surrendered; 6 (all female) were re-
leased; and 29 (9 female, 20 male) escaped (see Table 1). Except for the relatively
high number of released wives, these numbers are close to the proportions given
in larger and more representative samples.97 Thus, the overwhelming majority of
combatants returned on their own initiative, through escape; the other modes of
return never accounted for more than a third of returnees. How, and when, do
combatants decide to escape? The interviewees’ narratives show that, in many
cases, escape was motivated or made possible by a window of opportunity. For
the most part, combatants reported how they escaped in battlefield situations,
at night, or when sent to fetch water, loot, or go to the gardens.98 Some of them
escaped with colleagues or family members, while others escaped on their own
(see Table 1).
For those who had stayed with the LRA for a long time, opportunities to es-
cape presented themselves on various occasions. Many combatants admitted that
they were left unsupervised and could have escaped before they eventually did.
That means that escape is not just about (objective) opportunities. Rather, the
question is when opportunities are perceived as such, and when they are actively
sought out by the combatants themselves. For instance, fear often worked as an
effective deterrent against escape even in the absence of tangible means to pre-
vent combatants’ escape. Combatants were not only afraid of the repercussions
(frequently, death) in case they got caught. Moreover, they suspected that the
high command would get to know about their intent to escape beforehand, either
because of Kony’s assumed spiritual powers or because they were tipped off by
a colleague. Additionally, the way home was perceived as fraught with dangers,
96Terminology – whether somebody was rescued, captured, or surrendered from the battlefield
– is not consistent in the literature; in any of these cases, combatants are freed from the
organisation’s grip by a third party. What differentiates captured from rescued and surrendered
combatants is their mindset, which is typically hard to assess. In the literature and datasets,
these cases are commonly treated as one, and I will do the same.
97Of the forced wives who returned in the sample of Annan et al. (2008: 44), 83 percent
escaped, 7 percent were released, and 10 percent were rescued or captured. Among all females
who stayed in captivity for more than two weeks, 68 percent escaped, while 27 percent were
released and 5 percent were captured or rescued. For the sample of male combatants, approxi-
mately 81 percent returned through escape, while 15 percent were released and 5 percent were
rescued or captured (Annan et al. 2006: 62).
98In the sample of male combatants from Annan et al. (2006: 62), each of these three modes of
return (during battle, at night, on duty) accounts for approximately one-third of the returnees.
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especially from Sudan: “The Dinkas wanted to kill us, the Lutugus wanted to
kill us, the lions and leopards also wanted to feast on us” (John, ll. 1250–1253).
As the interviewees argued, other armed groups and armies, armed civilians, wild
animals, lacking orientation and means to communicate, and not least malnutri-
tion and diseases posed severe threats to their lives upon escape. Women also
faced the risk of being captured by civilians and forced into relationships from
there.99 Outside of Uganda, combatants were often less closely monitored because
they were not expected to escape:100 The environment, at least in combatants’
imagination, was hostile enough to keep them in captivity even in the absence of
continuous supervision and the credible threat of violent sanctions. This shows
that perceptions of risk of return are closely linked to perceptions of risk associ-
ated with escape. Combatants’ decision to stay or leave was informed by their
ideas and knowledge concerning their chances of escaping successfully and making
it home safely, and about their reception by civilian communities, armed forces,
and their home communities.
When we asked combatants what motivated their return, their answers were
in most cases not about the sheer possibility of escaping, or the odds of escaping
successfully. Rather, their narratives showed how such opportunities were actively
sought at some point because circumstances changed in a way that convinced
combatants to take the risk:
When I was in Sudan I also had that thought [of escaping] but the
problem was the long distance. But when my husband died in 1997, I
started having hard and tough times; we used to work like slaves. [...]
We would dig using our hands because if we hadn’t done it that way,
what would the children have eaten? [...] At times we would go dig
with them [our escorts] and have high yields. But when we started
having tough and rough times, I decided to escape together with the
girl we were abducted with on the same day. (Janet, ll. 1134–1160)
While in Uganda, we lived in a place in Teso [sub-region]. Eeh! That
place was fire. It was the worst. It was at that place that I made
a final decision that whether they want to kill me or not, they can
decide. I will escape. (Faith, ll. 603–608)
99Unfortunately, I cannot make a statement on the magnitude of this phenomenon; however,
such cases have been described by some of the interviewees and Victor and Porter (2017).
100In contrast, one high-ranking interviewee (who was not part of the core sample) described
this as an incentive to escape: Since Kony wouldn’t be able to follow him back to Uganda,
threats to retaliate against him and his family were now empty.
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Life became so difficult, because fighting was intense. I had two chil-
dren already. And the kind of beating I received there made me feel
so bad. I told myself that even though I am going to die some place,
let me die, but I don’t want to be killed by them. The beating I re-
ceived was because of this man [who was taking care of me while my
husband was away] who escaped, and I thought of leaving that place
as well. (Prisca, ll. 687–696)
Combatants often decided to escape when life became hard to a point where
they felt they could not take it any longer. In the above statements, the decision
to escape isn’t narrated as a turning point, but rather, as a point of no return
that forced the interviewee to make a decision. Common motives were intense
fights, severe hunger and malnourishment, loss of physical and emotional support
(for instance, when the husband died), and loss of hope for their living situation
to improve, or fading confidence that the political fight of the LRA would even-
tually succeed. The decision to escape was often reached in a situation where
they felt they had nothing left to lose, and that there was a good chance of dy-
ing both in captivity or while trying to escape. Aware that death was a real
option, they decided to try their luck and to rather die ‘from home’ than in the
bush.101 Some interviewees also described having escaped rather spontaneously,
when they found themselves in a situation where they realised that there was
nothing holding them back – for instance, when they separated from the larger
group during a fight, or were sent away to relay a message to the commander
of another unit. In most cases, though, escape was initiated by a decision that
preceded the opportunity to realise it rather the other way around.
In sum, motives for escape were mostly “a mixture of opportunity and will-
ingness” (Annan et al. 2006: 62). Though only a small number of combatants
and none of my core sample of interviewees had made an active decision to join
the LRA, the involuntary nature of their engagement didn’t mean that they con-
stantly thought about ways to escape. Combatants often ‘forgot’ about escape
as they became immersed in the LRA. In this situation, the intention to escape
had to become a decision again before they tried to do so. Such decisions and
actions towards escape were motivated by a combination of opportunities, bold-
ness, a positive assessment of the involved risks and possible gains, and support
101This statement also shows how bush becomes ‘like home’ (see Chapter 4.2 starting on page
90), but does not replace the idea of home as a distinct place.
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and momentum from peers.
Returning home itself was often a journey that took several weeks or even
months, especially for those who escaped from Sudan, Congo or CAR. Almost
all interviewees reported being welcomed by civilians and armed forces alike,102
quite in contrast to what they had been told in captivity: “[M]any times they [the
LRA leadership] told and deceived us that they [the UPDF] killed rebels instead
of rescuing them. They deceived us saying that the UPDF slaughtered the rebels
from top to bottom” (Joan, ll. 1249–1254). Joan told this story giggling, but
emphasised how she back then had believed it to be true. As combatants didn’t
have much access to alternative sources of information except from occasional
radio transmissions, for many, their overall fair treatment upon return came as a
surprise.
Subsequently, many returnees and most of my interviewees stayed for some
time in one or more reception centres.103 As the resources that were available
to the centres differed vastly over time, so did the support that they offered. It
included the documentation of returnees, medical check-ups, psychological coun-
selling, vocational training, finding and reuniting returnees with their families,
and often a follow-up on their reintegration progress (Allen and Schomerus 2006:
40–41).
Challenges of reintegration and post-conflict society
For most interviewees, returning to civilian life itself was not seen as the hardest
part. The process of settling back into their communities came with a number of
practical, existential and emotional challenges. From the interviews, I identified
four main challenges: (1) the stigma of being a returnee, (2) perceptions of legal
102However, among the respondents in the SWAY sample, one-tenth of the male and one-
eighth of the female returnees that were received by the UPDF reported being harmed in some
way (prolonged interrogation, harsh questioning, or beatings) (Annan et al. 2006: 65–66, Annan
et al. 2008: 36–37).
103There is some selection bias in this sample, since 14 out of 43 interviewees have been
contacted through one of the reception centres (see Table 1). From their (more representative)
sample, Annan et al. (2006: 64) suggest that among those males who were abducted for more
than two weeks, two-thirds went through some kind of formal reception process with the UPDF,
and half of the male returnees passed through a reception centre. Among the females, rates
were comparatively higher (which is also an effect of average abduction length); over 50 percent
of forced wives and 70 percent of those who had given birth to children in captivity spent at
least some time in a reception centre (Annan et al. 2008: 44).
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insecurity, (3) missed opportunities and education, and (4) a lack of resources, in
particular, access to land and means to take care of their children.
The stigma of being a returnee. Much of the literature on the LRA, especially
the numerous reports written for and by the advocacy sector, emphasises the stig-
matisation of former combatants in their communities. These reports show how
some returnees have been rejected and approached with fear by their families and
community members (see for instance Eichstaedt 2009, Ladisch 2015). While this
has been a more pronounced issue in the past, only a few interviewees recounted
being outright rejected or ostracised by members of their communities.104 How-
ever, a considerable number of them described how they were confronted with
more latent forms of stigma or prejudice. Faith pondered her experience:
I always tell people (. . . ) they always say people who returned from
captivity are bigheaded, thieves, they are countless wrongdoers etc.
If you were abducted when you were a thief in your mother’s home,
then you are a thief forever. If you were abducted when you were
bigheaded or rude, then you are rude up to now. Do you see! [...] If
I don’t start talking about my experiences in the war, no one would
even know. Because I am free and social to the people around me. If
I am to fuss, I fuss according to the magnitude of the offence or what
brought that issue up. I don’t have words like: “Do you know who I
am? Don’t joke around”. (Faith, ll. 1723–1741)
Although Faith feels she is no different from her age-mates and other members
of the community, and that people’s character shows in their actions and not in
their experience of abduction, she fights against prejudices that say otherwise.105
The interviewees often felt that they had to weight their actions and responses
more carefully than others to avoid being identified with some kind of “mentality
of the bush” (kit me lumi) (Simon, ll. 382–383). Oloya (2013: 77) has argued
that precisely because combatants hold on to their identities prior to abduction,
they suffer through great pain when being identified as ‘bush people’ (olum) and
not as civilians upon their return. They feel that they had, and continue to have,
to prove their essential goodness and detachment from bush life and its subcul-
tural codes not only to themselves, but also to the members of their family and
community, often while coping with trauma and difficulties in adjusting.
104This observation has also been confirmed by Annan et al. (2006: 66).
105It is probably no coincidence that she was one of the few interviewees who explicitly asked
to be interviewed away from home.
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Perceptions of legal insecurity. But community judgement wasn’t the only
one the interviewees worried about. Some of them were also concerned about
potential legal repercussions. While the Amnesty Act is still in place, granting
immunity from prosecution in Uganda to all Ugandan citizens,106 they reported
not feeling safe from any future charges. Since many interviews were conducted at
the time of the pretrial hearings in the ICC’s case against Dominic Ongwen, they
felt that their concerns were more justified than ever. The ongoing trials of him
and Thomas Kwoyelo, and the outstanding ICC warrants for Joseph Kony and
Otti Vincent, created a sense of legal insecurity among them.107 Most interviewees
shared strong opinions on the legitimacy of the trial of Dominic Ongwen:
The trial of Ongwen is hurting me; I feel like I am in his shoes. If his
[case] is done, I might follow [him] because we were all in captivity.
I am predicting something like that to happen, because I was in the
same bush with Ongwen. So, do you think if Ongwen went down the
[same] rough road I went down, don’t you think I will one day follow
him? I guess my time will come soon. (Jackson, ll. 1096–1106)
More than anything, Jackson’s statement shows how closely connected legal
and moral judgement were for many combatants. My interviewees could hardly
talk about Ongwen’s case without addressing their own position as returnees. If
there was any charge that could be confirmed for him, they reasoned, the same
would apply to them. This statement also shows how combatants did not nec-
essarily identify with the LRA, but shared a strong sense of connectedness with
their colleagues.
Missed opportunities and education. Missed education and training was by
far the most common and prominent concern stated by the interviewees. They
were painfully aware that they couldn’t compete with those who were spared
from abduction and had completed their education as planned. These challenges
are not unique to former combatants; in fact, disrupted education and unem-
106Though the Amnesty Act only applies to Ugandan nationals, and is in conflict with inter-
national law (namely, prosecution by the ICC) (Hovil and Lomo 2005), there is – except for
Thomas Kwoyelo – no known case against anyone except for those high-ranking commanders
listed by the ICC.
107The warrants of arrest for Raska Lukwiya and Okot Odhiambo have been terminated due
to the passing of the suspects. Otti Vincent is assumed to have been assassinated by Kony
in 2007 in the course of disagreements over the Juba Peace Talks, but his death hasn’t been
confirmed by the ICC yet (International Criminal Court 2007, 2015, 2016b, Maliti 2017).
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ployment, in particular among the youth, affects large parts of Uganda’s rural
and urban population.108 Only a few people manage to take full advantage of
educational opportunities. Even basic education is prohibitively expensive, and
most parents simply cannot afford to send (all of) their children to school.109 In
addition, many children will drop out early or attend intermittently, mostly due
to a lack of financial means or other obligations, such as helping out at home,
taking care of siblings and elderly family members, or as a consequence of be-
coming parents themselves. The disruption of traditional ways of living through
widespread encampment has aggravated this situation for the civilian population
as well (Dolan 2005). However, schooling rates are even lower for those whose
education was disrupted by their abduction, and who have as young adults an
even harder time acquiring the necessary resources to continue it (Annan et al.
2006: 30–32). While a good number of the returnees profited from some kind
of vocational training sponsored mostly by NGOs and reception centres, only a
few of these trainings resulted in lasting employment.110 The simultaneous lack
of personal resources and employment opportunities puts former combatants at
a comparative disadvantage in an already strained job market: “there is no way
I can even get a job because every time you are looking for a job they ask for
academic papers, and I don’t have any” (Deo, ll. 594–598). This situation is only
partly relieved by programs specifically targeted at them.111
Lack of resources. The lack of resources, in particular to earn money to acquire
cash-bound commodities, puts pressure not only on people’s current lives, but also
on their future. Today, access to and ownership of land is one of the most pressing
issues for former combatants and the majority of civilians who lived in the camps
(see for instance Hopwood and Atkinson 2015, Lenhart 2013, Stewart 2017: 158–
159). This is particularly true for women, whose ‘bush marriages’ didn’t result in
them being ‘married to a home’. In most cases, forced wives refuse to live with
their husbands from captivity, and both they and their children are often rejected
108Estimates suggest that between 62 and 83 percent of the unemployed population are below
26 years of age (Action Aid International Uganda (AAU) et al. 2012: 37; Soucat et al. 2013: 3),
while young people between the ages of 15 and 29 make up 28 percent of the overall population
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016: 14).
109Although in 1997 Uganda launched a Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme that
prohibits public primary and secondary schools from collecting mandatory fees, most schools
ask for fees paid in cash or kind to cover the difference between public funding and monetary
needs of the schools. Moreover, parents and guardians are expected to cover things like school
uniforms, pens and paper, and meals (Mwesigwa 2015, Sakaue 2018).
110Annan et al. (2006: 33–34) have made some suggestions why that might be the case.
111Whose existence, in turn, creates problems of its own; see Annan et al. (2006: 79–83).
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by the husband’s family. Since these women are not considered to be properly
married, they do not have access to land, which in turn means that their sons
have no means of building a family themselves. Joan described this conflict:
I come from J [a place in Nwoya district], the people there didn’t
want me [to stay] [...]. They told me that I came back with children
from the bush that will later start fighting for land here, so it won’t
be possible [for us to stay]. [...] It’s all because of land. I came back
with boys so this tension is very intense.112 They got a panga to kill
me. I also got a hoe and said whoever kills the other is mightier and
takes control of the land. I accepted to die and follow my mother,
because even my mother’s cradle land was given to the people living
there [who settled there since she died]. They don’t accept us to stay
there [either]. (Joan, ll. 1359–1380)
Joan’s account shows how she is affected by land conflict both as a returnee
and as the child of a civilian. Her paternal uncle’s family doesn’t want her around,
fearing that her sons will make claims to the land they own. At the same time,
she cannot return to her deceased mother’s land, since other people have settled
there in the meantime. Like many returnees, she is forced to rent a place. The
lack of land to live on and to cultivate puts a lot of pressure on those who already
have precariously low and unreliable incomes. Apart from difficulties in paying
rent, almost all of them recounted that they struggle to take care of the future and
education of their children – in particular, to pay school fees. In fact, the payment
of school fees was the most pressing issue for male and female interviewees alike.
Education was seen as the key to access a better future, if not for themselves,
then at least for their children: “If I am healthy I can work hard to pay for my
children to attend school so that they have a bright future. I didn’t study, so
they should become my light in the dark” (Samuel, ll. 1667–1671). Education is
also understood as one of the most important reasons why they themselves feel
they cannot work up from their precarious position, as I will show below.
Return narratives between strength and vulnerability
For most combatants, returning home is not an easy feat, either on a physical and
practical or on a mental and emotional level. Not only do returnees have to find
112For parents, boys are more of a financial burden. Since their future wives marry into the
husband’s family, they are expected to pay luk (a kind of bridewealth) to the wife’s family.
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a place in their communities and ways to make a living. They also have to make
sense of their experiences in captivity as these become not only part of their life
in the bush, but of their overall life stories. These narratives of returning home
are both standardised – adaptations of the discursive offers made by a large array
of religious, political, and humanitarian actors – and creative, displays of former
combatants’ own sense-making.
How do people understand themselves and manage to reclaim their lives in
the aftermath of leading violent lives? Lois Presser (2008) has tried to answer
this question in her study of the stories of male offenders – convicted of rape,
murder, or assault – in and out of correctional facilities in the United States. In
her analysis of their stories, she identifies three types of narratives: (1) reform
narratives, (2) stability narratives, and (3) elastic narratives. As blueprints, these
standardised narratives try to provide answers to the question how the offenders’
deviant actions relate to their identities. Reform narratives make a point of the
offenders’ not only changed behaviour, but character. Through such narratives,
offenders make claims to a new and morally bettered self. In contrast, stability
narratives are about conveying a stable and unchanged moral self. Their nar-
rative effort is not about resurrecting a moral self fallen from grace because, as
they argue, they have been good all along, either because they have been adher-
ing to subcultural codes, or because they were (mostly) decent despite navigating
an immoral place (or both). Where offenders resort to both elements of reform
and stability narratives within their stories, using them as they see fit, they are
making use of elastic narratives.
Of course, the way forced combatants approach and build their narratives is
different from violent offenders in the United States. Most notably, the latter
were typically not formally forced into their violent career, but took active steps
towards delinquency (even if they will try to erase their personal agency from this
process). What is similar, though, is that both groups know about the societal
judgement of their actions, not least because they have felt their repercussions.
They are challenged to make sense of their experiences of leading violent lives as
they serve their sentences and return to their former lives. That is, they have to
make these episodes of life outside of conventional society part of their life stories.
To do that, they can and will resort to a set of narratives that the social context
offers them to make sense of their experiences (Sandberg 2010: 458). These nar-
ratives are both creative and standardised. Through the use of ‘formula stories’
(Brookman et al. 2011, Loseke 2007), former combatants can situate their own
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experiences and identity within established and accepted subcultural narratives.
These self-stories serve different narrative goals – for instance, to fend off a dis-
cussion or a level of intimacy interviewees don’t want to have, or to convey a
desired identity both to themselves and the interviewer. I identify three distinct
return narratives former combatants repeatedly made use of: rabbit hole nar-
ratives, narratives of strength through suffering, and survivor narratives. These
narratives are not mutually exclusive; interviewees may use elements of different
narratives simultaneously. They are situated (and, by extension, situate their
narrators) between two poles: namely, strength and vulnerability.
“I am just like a child”: rabbit hole narratives. Rabbit hole narratives, as I
would like to call them, are a variation on the tale of Alice in Wonderland. In
the tale, the young protagonist Alice spends an uneventful day, when suddenly
she finds herself in a new world down the rabbit hole. For Alice, this world with
its own rules and logic is as exciting as it is challenging, forcing her to learn and
adjust to new realities at a moment’s notice. Her engagement with this world
ends as Alice is woken up from what appears to have been a dream, and returns
to her old life. Rabbit hole narratives follow the same storyline, in which fate
strikes and breaks with the routine(s) of everyday life, and forces its protagonists
to quickly adjust to a life they didn’t choose on their own. And just like Alice,
they return to their old life without mediation between the two worlds. But unlike
Alice, their time down the rabbit hole is not just an adventure story; it leaves
them bruised. That is, they disappeared from the face of the earth in their youth
and were spit out into it again as adults and parents, with the only difference
that they are now less well equipped compared to their contemporaries:
Before I was taken into captivity, I was in school and I really wanted
to study so that I would be able to get a job, support my family, and
also the community. That is what I wanted to be before I was taken
in captivity, so right now that I am back from captivity, I am just like
a child. This is because my time has been wasted; in this world you
need to have some academic knowledge and that made me not to be
even close to a chance of getting formal employment, because I don’t
have what it takes to be employed. (Joel, ll. 726–739)
Joel talked about the hopes and plans he had for his future before he was
abducted. For him, the time spent in the bush disrupted his training route
for good and, thereby, his chance of finding gainful employment today. The
disruption of education and its lasting impact on the interviewees’ chances in
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the job market was a common motif in their narratives of return to civilian life.
Not only do they find themselves – like most of their age-mates – in a state of
‘waithood’ (Honwana 2008b, 2012), but they feel that they are last in line when
opportunities for employment and upward mobility open up. Women in particular
expressed sadness and anger about the missed opportunities for getting a proper
education (see also Porter 2015: 84), thereby missing out on other opportunities
as well. By becoming forced wives, women were also forced into early motherhood,
which in turn prevented them from taking up educational opportunities and from
finding a ‘good’ (that is, respectful and educated) husband upon their return:
I will not be happy for a long time, since I didn’t study and can’t
qualify for any job. And there is no educated man who would marry
me, because I didn’t study. Maybe if I was educated someone would
have married me cash113. [...] Maybe if I had gone to school I would
secure a good job and get a good man. (Patience, ll. 812–822)
Patience’s narrative is characterised by the presence of ‘what might have been’
but seems impossible given her history of abduction: getting a proper education,
securing a good job, marrying a decent husband, and, ultimately, finding hap-
piness. Rabbit hole narratives leave their protagonists incapacitated, unable to
undo the damage; but they allow them to make claims to an unchanged, still
innocent self. By understanding their time in the bush as ‘lost time’ without
any personal development, combatants can make claims to a self that is stable
over time and unimpressed by the experiences they had in captivity. In this sense,
their stories contain elements of both stability and vulnerability narratives. They
allow combatants to posit themselves as decent human beings while, and through,
understanding themselves as innocent victims. Here, their ‘victimcy’ (Utas 2003,
2005) is not (primarily) a means to ask for assistance, but to make and uphold
identity claims. In their narratives, there is no place for personal agency and acts
of decision-making, either in captivity or upon their return to civilian life. Rabbit
hole narratives allow former combatants to make use of “discourses of abdicated
responsibility” (Shepler 2005: 25), in which they become unaccountable not only
for their actions in the bush, but also for their lives upon return.
Narratives of strength through suffering. Narratives of strength through suf-
fering, as I would like to call them, have to be understood against the backdrop
113Meaning in accordance with the Acholi tradition of paying luk to her family.
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of the place religion has in people’s lives. Most Acholi are devout Christians, and
both spirit and religious beliefs are crucial aspects of how people understand and
approach their lives.114 Decisions are routinely made in accordance with expecta-
tions of being a good Christian, and whatever happens is understood as a result
of God’s work. Interviewees who adopted a strength-through-suffering narrative
saw their experience of abduction not as a meaningless coincidence, but as part of
a divine plan. While they didn’t understand its purpose, they found consolation
in the belief that their suffering wasn’t pointless; that there is a reason for the
course their life has taken. Faith explains:
[T]he colleagues I studied and grew up with nowadays are grown up,
have good jobs and are educated. Meanwhile I didn’t attend school
as expected. At times when I think about it, I get sad but I know it
was God’s plan. (Faith, ll. 1640–1645)
While Faith’s story picks up on elements of a rabbit hole narrative – recount-
ing how she missed out on educational opportunities that would put her in a
better position today – her evaluation of the course her life has taken is a dif-
ferent one, one that is shared by many of her compatriots. Seeing their fate of
abduction and their eventual return from captivity as part of a divine plan al-
lowed former combatants to absolve themselves from any agency in it, and freed
them to a certain degree to think about what might have been. Their experi-
ences were without alternative; it was always in their cards. As such, they are
rather a source of strength than of vulnerability. By taking such a perspective,
the interviewees feel challenged to make the most of it instead of feeling sorry for
themselves. While they have a similar evaluation of the impact their abduction
had and has on their lives as former combatants who commit to a rabbit hole
narrative, they come up with a different conclusion. Without doubt, their fate of
abduction has made their lives today tougher; still, they argue that they cannot
but push through, not least because it is the challenge they understand God has
chosen for them.
Survivor narratives. Survivor narratives start with terminology; that is, with
someone refusing to be called and addressed as a victim. Using a survivor nar-
rative includes admitting to, and thereby claiming, one’s suffering. As such, it
114For some, their religious beliefs or orientations are a consequence of their abduction expe-
rience; see Victor (2011: 97).
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has become a powerful discourse in the broader context of speaking up about
experiences of sexual violence (see for instance Dunn 2005). By employing a sur-
vivor narrative, former combatants vow to not let themselves and their future be
defined by the experiences they had in the LRA. While they understand their
abduction as a violation, they see their survival as an obligation to try and strive
for a better future, to speak up for others in the same situation, and to be a
spokesperson for everyone who has been violated in the same way. In this con-
text, some interviewees also talked about ways to address their victimisation, for
instance, through the payment of reparations:
There was a time we came up with a resolution that, since there was
a war in Sudan some time back and they were paid [compensated], it
should also be imitated in Uganda so that (. . . ) I know this kind of
payments will cool our hearts but it will not remove the scars on our
bodies. But it will console and pacify the mind. (Faith, ll. 1084–1094)
In Faith’s narrative, their victimisation becomes a starting point to request
not assistance, but compensation, both as an acknowledgement of their violation
and as a means of social repair. Survivor narratives like this are inherently politi-
cal; they are about empowerment and agency, but about the agency of a survivor
instead of that of a victim or a perpetrator. Typically, but not always, they were
voiced by interviewees who were involved in some kind of advocacy activity.115
Survivor narratives are narratives of strength that break with the passivity and
subjection of the victim position. They allow former combatants to tell their
stories of victimisation without disempowering their narrators.
The rejection and adaptation of these narratives is one of the most vital dis-
plays of the research participants’ agency. By using them, they pursue a number
of different narrative goals. They use them to make identity claims, but also to
recover their lives. By employing a survivor narrative, for instance, former com-
batants do not only reclaim agency over their lives, but refuse to be addressed
(and to address themselves) as perpetrators. Strength-through-suffering narra-
tives are an attempt to undo the arbitrary nature of abduction. By linking their
abduction to their religious beliefs, it becomes part of a divine plan, both proof
of God’s care for them and a challenge to be mastered and learned from. Rabbit
hole narratives, in contrast, help former combatants to remove themselves from
115This connection is, I would argue, not coincidental, but shows how narratives pick up on
different sources and discourses.
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any agency in their fate, thereby allowing them to make claims to an unchanged
and innocent self.
Narratives of strength don’t differ from narratives of vulnerability with regards
to the storyteller’s agency. In fact, there is as much agency in understanding and
presenting oneself as a victim as there is in refusing to be called one. There
is a big difference, however, in how former combatants see and approach their
future. Those who adopt a narrative of strength see their time spent in captivity
as something that is in the past:
I have hopes that my future will be bright because if something bad
happens to you once in your life, you cannot be the same person suf-
fering all the time. (Scovia, ll. 1382–1385)
The advice I always give to my colleagues is for them to live at ease,
since these things have happened. Probably it happened for a reason
either bad or good. If it was for the bad, it’s past now, and it can’t
be removed. They should start looking at life from a new perspective.
[...] Just forget about all that happened. (Faith, ll. 1710–1745)
Among the things that happened in the past, I look back at my edu-
cation and I wish I was educated. My education ended. Secondly, I
always think about my parents because they had the ability to give
me advice. They have all passed away. If one of them was alive, they
would have given me advice. My children would stay with them as
I continue with my work. [...] This makes me remember so many
things that made my life really difficult. This does not stop me from
progressing with life though. (Herbert, ll. 1859–1874)
While these narratives show that they are aware of their abduction’s lasting
impact on their lives, they feel free and committed to move on, and to make the
best of the opportunities that present themselves today. Interviewees that adopt
a narrative of vulnerability are unable to do so. Their present is determined by
the time lost and the things that happened in captivity. They feel powerless to
move beyond it:116
116Such a state of powerlessness may also result from or be accompanied by psychological
trauma. While there is an ongoing debate whether clinical diagnoses like posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and their therapeutic interventions can be applied to such cases (see Argenti-
Pillen 2003, Jensen and Shaw 1993, Scheper-Hughes 2008), some studies (see Okello et al.
2007, Pfeiffer and Elbert 2011, Wilker et al. 2016) suggest that former combatants often show
a number of behavioural and neurological syndromes associated with pathological stress and
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The time they abducted me I was under the sponsorship of [a Chris-
tian NGO], so if I were at home I would have continued with my
studies. And maybe I would be working right now. I see some of
my friends with whom I was studying, they finished their studies and
some of them have decent jobs, homes and they are driving their own
cars now. So most of the time I look at myself I feel sad. (Joyce, ll.
826–836)
With the challenges they face and their perception of being powerless to
change anything about it, some of them even expressed regret that they have
returned from the bush:
Sometimes this thought comes to my mind and I feel like I should
have stayed in the bush; I would rather die there. [By the time I
returned,] My mother wasn’t there anymore [was already dead], my
father wasn’t there anymore, my father’s brothers were there (. . . )
[A]t times when fighting broke out I could have been dead. It looks
tiring. Life at home is very difficult. (Joan, ll. 1300–1308)
From Joan’s narrative, it becomes clear that she does not only struggle to
look forward; her inability to move beyond her past traps her in it, and makes
her question her decision to have returned from the bush at all. Though most
former combatants prefer their lives today over those they led in captivity, their
reintegration remains challenging:
[A]s a matter of fact life in the bush was hard. People suffered, but
that was God’s plan. Where we are headed, life is getting worse. We
former abductees always contemplate of whether there is something
good or bad coming ahead. It’s a whole mix. That’s what we think.
(Andrew, ll. 1401–1408)
Even though life as a civilian spares people from war-related violence, from
“hear[ing] the sounds of the gun” (Scovia, ll. 1329–1330), from fearing for their
lives all the time, their assessment is still ambiguous; often, it’s “fifty-fifty”, as
Andrew (ll. 1415) says. With the struggles former combatants face upon their
return, many find it hard to value their lives today over their time spent in the
bush. While programs of demobilisation and reintegration have proved to be
largely successful in reintegrating returnees in their home communities and pro-
trauma.
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viding them with psychosocial support, many still lack the material and emotional
resources to move beyond war.
Summary
In this chapter, I addressed some of the main challenges former combatants face
as they return from captivity. I have argued that return as a decision and action
depends on subjective and objective opportunities as much as on the combatants’
commitment to risk trying to escape. The hardest part in returning, though, is
not escape itself, but readjusting to the realities and mastering the challenges
of civilian life upon their return. In comparison to the war-affected communi-
ties they return to, former combatants understand that they face some genuine
challenges, such as community judgement and feelings of legal insecurity. But
they also share a number of challenges with the other community members – in
particular, a lack of resources to provide for their and their children’s future by
paying school fees or buying a plot of land, and in finding gainful employment.
In their lives outside the bush, they are not only challenged to survive under
these difficult conditions, but to make sense of their time in captivity as part
of their greater life stories. The narratives they come up with are a means to
reclaim their lives upon return, but they do not necessarily help them to move
beyond their past. In any case, their abduction experiences and the effects of war
on their livelihoods continue to shape their present and the hopes they have for
their future.
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Conclusion
Summary
In this thesis, I have tried to provide some insights into the puzzle of armed ac-
tion in the LRA, one of the longest standing non-state armed groups worldwide.
I set out my research to answer two questions (Chapter 1): How do combatants
cope with the violent demands of the organisation, and how does the organisa-
tion manage to enforce their violent demands? To do so, I first introduced the
theoretical concepts and contributions that my analysis is based on.
To find answers to my research questions, I decided to conduct semi-structured
interviews with former combatants living in northern Uganda. These interviews
were preceded and accompanied by talks given by experts in the field. Though in-
terviewing former combatants and analysing their accounts comes with a number
of methodological and ethical challenges, I argue that we can only gain insight
into the dynamics and processes involved in violent action through the partici-
pants themselves: i.e., through their stories of what it means to become, and to
be, a member of the LRA (Chapter 2). This approach entails putting questions
of truth and falsehood aside in order to focus on combatants’ narrative resources
for making sense of their experiences of leading violent lives, and their strategies
for understanding themselves as perpetrators, victims and witnesses of violence.
Against the common assumption that the LRA are ‘rebels without a cause’
led by a solitary mad man, I provided some background to the LRA’s insurgency
(Chapter 3), which can be traced back to Uganda’s colonial history. Though
ethnic or tribal structures weren’t a foreign invention, British colonial admin-
istrative and hegemonic organisation politicised ethnicities on a national stage.
Since then, power has always been a matter of securing access to resources to
represent the interests of one ethnic group while excluding others from political
participation. Since independence, every transfer of power has been enforced by
violent means. Museveni’s takeover in 1986 and his tight grip on power up to
today have ultimately brought some stability to the political landscape, but they
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have also given rise to armed insurgencies that contested the marginalisation of
northern Uganda in national politics. While the LRA has left Ugandan territory
and is not likely to return anytime soon, the root causes for its insurgency still
remain unaddressed. This diagnosis provides a short and necessarily simplified
explanation for the continuous presence of the LRA on the macro level. In the
following, I situated the armed group within the dynamics and processes on the
meso and micro level of the armed insurgency.
Part of the puzzle of the LRA’s existence and extraordinary resilience has to
do with the fact that most of its combatants have been forcibly recruited as chil-
dren and adolescents. But how does the LRA manage to command a personnel
that is primarily made up of under-aged and involuntary combatants? In the
literature, two important elements have been emphasised (Chapter 1): (1) the
use of extraordinary violence against both insiders and outsiders that compels
combatants to comply in order to survive, and (2) the effects of socialisation to
violence that ultimately turns involuntary combatants into committed fighters.
These arguments are part of the answer, and their impact is visible throughout
this thesis. But my analysis shows that there is more to it. Organisations have
other, and it seems more powerful means of committing combatants to it, and
combatants have more agency in this process than is generally suggested. Though
(the credible threat of) force and an identification with the organisation’s goals
or one’s role in it are crucial factors, they tell us only part of the story. Becoming
a committed insider within armed groups such as the LRA depends on a complex
interplay of organisational incentives and individual efforts.
For most combatants, the experience of living with war and violence preceded
their involvement as combatants in the LRA. War shaped people’s living arrange-
ments, especially in the camps, and the organisation of their everyday lives. It
was most visible in the precautions they took to prevent their abduction, and the
rumours about and the experiences they had in encounters with the LRA and its
enemies. Still, becoming a member of the LRA was narrated as an experience
that broke quite radically with their routine(s) of everyday life. Abduction was
regularly followed by walks that often lasted several days, and that created not
only spatial but cognitive distance from their lives as civilians. At the time of
their abduction, the interviewees didn’t see themselves as full members of the
LRA, but rather as captives. Their transition from abductee to soldier was per-
formed through a number of often violent status passages (Chapter 4.1), in which
new combatants had to prove themselves as worthy of becoming members, with
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all the responsibilities and privileges that entailed. Their partial and incremental
integration forced new combatants to commit to the organisation through com-
pliant and affirmative action. At the same time, it allowed them to move from
a position of powerlessness to one of, albeit severely restrained, possibilities to
navigate their fate. Getting a gun and receiving a rank were the most visible
signs of this transition from recruit to soldier. These status insignia not only pro-
vided combatants with means to protect themselves and access some privileges
that improved their chances of survival, but also allowed and encouraged them
to build a new identity as soldiers.
But not only did the LRA provide material and non-material incentives for
the combatants to become compliant and even engaged members. Both the or-
ganisation and the combatants themselves created some kind of normalcy and
routine that allowed the abductees to get used to and even come to enjoy life in
the bush (Chapter 4.2). Routinisation was about the normalisation not only, and
not even primarily, of violence, but of everyday life in the bush. The routines and
institutions that came to structure combatants’ day-to-day activities both drew
on and challenged traditional ways of living among the Acholi. Waging war itself
was only one and, for many, a minor aspect of life in the bush. That doesn’t
mean, though, that war was absent. Its presence was continuously felt, but more
the realities of constant movement; the lack or uncertainty of getting enough food,
water, or sleep; and tight control over every aspect of people’s lives. Combat-
ants found support and temporary relief under these dire realities as they built
friendships; enjoyed themselves by sharing jokes, singing, and dancing; or found
solace in religious beliefs. The efforts to make the bush a ‘home away from home’
allowed them to deal with, get used to, and even come to enjoy aspects of life
in captivity. Many former combatants addressed themselves and their colleagues
as mabuc, i.e. captives or prisoners. Indeed, the comparison to prison life goes
beyond terminology. Both prison and bush life, with their rules, relationships,
routines, and their claim to totality, create spaces that can become comforting,
safe, and manageable, just like – or in contrast to – civilian life.
As a total institution, the LRA closely monitored the combatants’ every move-
ment. Every transgression carried the risk of severe punishment, which in turn
guaranteed a high level of compliance with orders and rules. Still, combatants
were not without agency, and its exercise was central for the combatants’ im-
mersion in the group (Chapter 4.3). Their agency was visible in acts of both
hidden resistance and active compliance, and everything in between. On one
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hand, combatants carefully explored their options to evade orders, and weighed
their chances of getting away with non-compliant behaviour against the risks as-
sociated with being caught. On the other hand, compliance with orders was not
always a defensive move motivated by fear of punishment. Just as often, com-
batants actively decided to comply with orders or even to exceed organisational
demands in order to improve their living situation, their chances of survival, or
their opportunities for eventual escape. That is, combatants exercised agency
both as they surpassed and as they undercut their superiors’ expectations. From
an organisational point of view, both dynamics were functional; and have been, if
not actively encouraged, knowingly tolerated. By giving combatants some space
to navigate their fate, the LRA facilitated their identification with it. The irony
here is that the organisation drew its members closer to it where they tried to
loosen its grip; that the combatants deepened their own commitment when they
intended to achieve just the opposite.
Combatants positioned themselves and exercised agency not only through
their actions, but just as much through their narratives, the stories they tell them-
selves and us about themselves (Chapter 4.4). These narratives help combatants
to make sense of their identity and their actions, both in captivity and upon their
return to civilian life. There is an inherent conflict between their claims to de-
cency, their need to see themselves and be seen as good persons, and the violent
actions they were expected to perform. Combatants tried to solve this conflict
by means of their narratives. They made identity claims that posited them as
essentially good persons under duress, and in comparison to other, unnecessarily
and ‘authentically violent’ comrades. But they also made efforts to neutralise
the reprehensible quality of their actions. They did so in particular by employing
narrative techniques that aimed at ‘undoing’ the one-sidedness of violence against
civilians. By invoking role identities as soldiers and spouses, they were able to
reframe violent and transgressive action as necessary, legitimate, or even heroic.
Combatants found their place in the LRA by negotiating their experiences and
actions through their narratives.
These challenges were shared by all combatants, but experiences, opportu-
nities and restrictions were clearly gendered. Against the popular portrayal of
female combatants as mere auxiliary forces – domestic servants and spoils of war
– the analysis shows that female combatants fulfilled a number of essential roles
on and off the battlefield (Chapter 4.5). In both realms, they made active moves
to navigate their fate, and engaged with often conflicting role expectations. At
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the same time, their presence and the institutionalised roles they played were cru-
cial for the creation of normalcy, in which norms and rules of gender relations in
Acholi society were both confirmed and challenged. Their double role as fighters
and support staff on one side and wives and mothers on the other was addressed
as a challenge. But it also became an opportunity to remove themselves from the
battlefield, both literally and narratively. That is, while women had to deal with
conflicting role expectations, they commanded a number of genuine resources to
exercise agency.
Together, these dynamics created a kind of commitment that compensated
for the missing identification with the organisation’s goals or tasks, and that ulti-
mately freed the LRA from having to win the members’ approval of their means
and ends. In the thesis, I made a strong case for looking at combatants’ practical
immersion in the group and their organisation of everyday life to understand how
they became committed insiders, rather than focusing on ideological aspects of
identification with the group. That does not mean, however, that the LRA and
its members were apolitical, or that they didn’t think they have reasonable cause
to fight. Most combatants had, and continue to have, a conflicted relationship
with the LRA: while they see their abduction as a violation, they attribute some
legitimacy to the armed group’s fight (Chapter 4.6). On a basic level, these le-
gitimacy beliefs were grounded in the realities and everyday life of domination,
or ‘basic legitimacies’ (von Trotha 1994b). But they were just as much based
on perceptions of just cause, and the spiritual authority and charismatic lead-
ership of Joseph Kony in particular to fight past and present violations. These
legitimacy beliefs were not adamant, but were clearly challenged by adverse ac-
tions of the LRA: internal power struggles, lacking goal orientation, and violence
against colleagues, but most importantly, violence against civilians. While these
delegitimising factors were not on par with more practical aspects of combatants’
engagement with the LRA, they clearly impacted how decisions were made about
staying in or leaving the bush.
Decision making processes involved in return were complex, and drew their
momentum from “a mixture of opportunity and willingness” (Annan et al. 2006:
62) on part of the combatants. Opportunities were as much about objective pos-
sibilities to escape the organisation’s close supervision as they were about the
combatants’ subjective perceptions of not just escaping successfully, but return-
ing home safely. Their willingness to attempt escape hinged on their assessment
of the risks involved and possible gains in leaving the bush. Return was not an
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isolated event, but a process that stretched well into people’s lives upon return
(Chapter 4.7). Up to today, former combatants’ narratives are informed by a
number of practical requirements to manage their everyday lives that are both
a legacy and an often painful reminder of their lives in the bush. At the same
time, they are challenged to make sense of themselves and their life stories as
combatants who returned from the bush, and became, or are trying to become,
civilians again. The answers they find influence how they see and approach their
lives today, and what scope of action they see as being available to them.
In sum, forced combatants, though severely restricted in their actions, com-
manded a number of resources – narrative, institutional, organisational – to learn
to live with violence in their everyday lives. In their efforts to make the excep-
tional, extraordinary and atrocious realities of their lives habitable, and to create
spaces of routine, comfort and even enjoyment, combatants showed ‘a talent for
life’ (Des Pres 1976: 192): the capacity, even boldness, to move on in the face
of adverse circumstances. They are able to do the unspeakable, the inhumane,
precisely because they insisted on their humanity and made conscious efforts to
preserve it in an inhumane place. Mentally, some of them survived these experi-
ences just barely, and were unable to start over after they returned from captivity,
becoming “outside prisoners” (Andrew, l. 1242), “suffocating in a bottle” (Jack-
son, l. 1117).
This thesis cautions against seeing the violence of armed groups as some-
thing so extraordinary that it becomes inaccessible, and thereby non-negotiable.
The tendency to interpret armed conflict in Africa as an irrational web of tribal
hostilities, spirit beliefs, violence-induced trauma and brutality impedes under-
standing. It obscures the fact that violence is always something humans do to
each other, and that collective violence typically cannot be understood as the
actions of people ‘out of their right mind’. This is even more true where violence
is not perpetrated by ‘willing executioners’ (Goldhagen 1997), but by (young)
people who have been forcibly recruited into armed conflict. Looking at their use
of violence also means looking at the conditions under which ordinary men and
women come to act violently.
Research perspectives
What do these research findings tell us about armed groups and collective ac-
tion in civil wars more generally? In the introduction, I argued that this case
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study may provide us with some new insights into a theory of commitment to
and agency in collective violence. Here, I will try to give some credence to that
promise, and show where I see perspectives for further research on armed groups
and collective violence in civil war and beyond.
What becomes clear is that the emergence and continuous capacity of the
LRA to act depends on a complex interplay of macro-, meso- and micro-level
dynamics. While dynamics on the macro level – in particular, ethnic politics,
but also the environment in which the LRA operates (Chapter 3) – are indeed
crucial to understanding the armed group’s emergence and resilience, they leave
important questions unanswered. How do young people become committed or at
least compliant fighters even in the absence of prior motivations to fight? How
do they learn to lead their lives as participants in war and violence, and may
even come to chose “the lifestyle of havoc” (Charles, ll. 558)? To find answers to
these questions, I took a closer look the micro- and meso-level dynamics of the
LRA’s insurgency. I argue that this approach yields some new insights into the
processes through which young people become engaged in organised violence and
into the roles they come to play as members of armed groups.
Young people become committed fighters – or better: become committed to
their roles as fighters and combatants more generally – as they come to play a
role in violent organisations or groups. These violent role identities are as much
provided by the violent organisation as they are active accomplishments of the
combatants themselves. They are challenged to find and build an identity that is
both morally decent and compatible with the violent actions they are expected
to perform. In that regard, non-state armed groups are more similar to state
armies than we are led to believe. At the same time, these identities are em-
bedded in their everyday lives, which are, though clearly marked by war, more
about routines than they are about rupture. The simple yet underrated truth is
that humans cannot live, at least not for long, in states of permanent emergency.
Institutions are key to their adaptation to leading violent lives. These institu-
tions both pick up on and challenge ways of living at home. In this sense, they
both try to establish the bush as a ‘home away from home’ while emphasising its
genuine logic. These insights are a call to pay closer attention to the actions and
everyday life of armed groups off the battlefield.
These processes of normalisation are, to a great extent, facilitated by insti-
tutions that provide combatants with orientation and a guide for proper and
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expected action. In this sense, institutions serve the same purposes as elsewhere:
they are practical devices to reduce complexity and facilitate decision-making
processes. In the case of the LRA, they were more than that: they allowed for
the smooth functioning of the organisation’s business of waging war. What seems
to be as important – or even more so – is the way in which institutions made
living with war and violence (and not only the routine perpetration of violence
itself) possible, and even comfortable. That doesn’t mean that combatants were
passive agents of violent action. In fact, they played an important part in cre-
ating these institutions and making them effective. At the same time, some of
these institutions were important resources for the identity claims combatants
made. They provided them with frames that allowed them to understand their
violent actions as routine, necessary, or even heroic. Institutions not only sup-
ported combatants’ socialisation to violence, but made this kind of life habitable,
and allowed combatants to both belong to a social space and be recognised as
persons. Thus, the question of which offers non-state armed groups have to make
on the individual and group level might provide new impulses for understanding
combatants’ motivation to stay and commit even when initial motivations are
non-existent, or become less important or even obsolete.
In sum, the interplay of institutions and identities in armed action provides
powerful incentives for young peoples’ commitment to and agency in armed ac-
tion. Civil war research would profit from paying closer attention to it, not least
because it provides important insights into what it takes to succeed in demobil-
ising and reintegrating former combatants into their home communities, and to
rebuild societies after mass violence.
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Tables and Figures Appendices
Figure 1: Interviewees’ home sub-counties in the Acholi subregion (highlighted)
(Map courtesy of the NUDC, highlights by the author)
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Figure 2: Interviewees’ home sub-counties in the Lango subregion (highlighted)
(Map from UNOCHA, highlights by the author)
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